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The Paradox of Antimilitarism: Civil-Military Relations in Post World War II Japan 
Takako Hikotani 
 
The changing security environment in Asia has led to a renewed interest in the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). However, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed 
either in terms of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but with limited 
understanding of the people within; who they are, what they do, and how they think.  
 This dissertation opens up the black box and brings the SDF officers into the analysis 
of civil-military relations in post-war Japan. I present a theoretical framework inspired by 
principal-agent theory, in which I hypothesize that the type of control (ex-ante or ex-post) and 
preference divergence between the civilians and the military produces four different outcomes 
in civil-military relations: containment, auto pilot, conflictual, and cooperative (possibly 
excessive). I examine how civil-military relations in Japan evolved over time and across three 
realms of defense policy making, budget, personnel, and use of force; utilizing the findings 
from an opinion survey conducted among SDF officers and civilian elite addressing the 
“civil-military gap,” oral history records of former SDF leaders and civilian defense officials, 
and interviews with active duty SDF officers and civilian officials. 
My research shows that civil-military relations in Japan was generally calm, not 
because the ex-ante constraints were strong and suppressed the opposing views of the SDF, but 
because the policy preferences of SDF officers and civilian bureaucracy converged in support 
 
 
of the alliance relationship with the United States. Such preference convergence made it 
possible for the politicians to continue “auto-pilot control” of the SDF, which was convenient 
for politicians who preferred to avoid dealing with military matters in face of the 
anti-militaristic public. However, this led to two paradoxical outcomes: (1) the SDF came to 
enjoy their relative autonomy within the ex-ante constraints, and (2) the ex-ante constraints 
turned out to be self-binding for politicians, possibly hampering their ability to control the SDF 
ex-post.  
Institutional changes through the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s 
along with the perceived changes in the security environment surrounding Japan enhanced both 
the incentive and capacity of politicians to release the ex-ante constraints and to control the 
SDF in their own hands. Re-interpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self defense 
is a step in the same direction. Looking towards the future, the shift from ex-ante to ex-post 
control may result in tension between the civilians and SDF officers, in cases where their 
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The Self Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan is one of the most discussed yet the least 
understood actor in Japanese Politics.  Just over a decade ago, a widely read book on Japanese 
security policy stated that “short of domestic revolution, it is virtually impossible for an 
autonomous military establishment to reemerge. (Katzenstein,1998)” The SDF was described to 
be “fenced in” by constitutional and legal constraints, an intrusive civilian bureaucracy and most 
importantly, by the anti-militaristic public.  Now, the SDF seems to have jumped out of the 
fence and captured people’s attention, with its images shown on many recent books on the “rise” 
of Japan as a “military power.” Still, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed either in terms 
of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but very little discussion over who 
they are, what they do, and how they think.  
 This dissertation aims to rectify such omission by bringing the Self Defense Force 
officers into the analysis of civil-military relations of post war Japan.  I challenge the 
commonly held assumption that the SDF officers are always aggressive yet insignificant actors in 
the defense policy making process, and that the Japanese case is a unique case that requires a 
deep cultural explanation, mostly incomparable to other countries. Instead, I will first present a 
theoretical framework inspired by principal-agent theory that explains why “containing” the SDF 
was a politically cost-effective way for politicians to control the SDF in the short run, but has 
paradoxically led to the creation of a relatively autonomous SDF within its limits, and weakened 




I will then turn to the military (SDF) side of the civil-military relationship. I will 
conduct an opinion survey among the elite SDF officers to examine the extent of civil-military 
convergence or divergence (gap) at three levels: (1) who they are: socio-demographic profile, 
political beliefs, confidence in the military and attitudes towards domestic and foreign policy 
issues, (2) policies they prefer: preference divergence or convergence over national security 
policy, in realms of threat assessment, defense resources, force maintenance and force 
employment, and (3) what they believe the role of the military (SDF) should be in the defense 
policy making process. 
 My aim is to examine whether the apparent calm in civil-military relations in post-war 
Japan was due to successful “containment” of the SDF officers despite their differences in 
preferred policy, or because the preferred policies of the civilian elite and SDF happened to 
converge. Existing literature tends to assume the former, and expect that once the constraints on 
the SDF are lifted, the SDF will seek policies that are more militaristic. Before we come to that 
conclusion, we need to examine whether and how the “containment” system worked, and 
whether the preferences of the civilians and the SDF did in fact converge or diverge. It is also 
important to see what the SDF officers thought about the way they were controlled by the 
civilians. If the system of containment offered them a level of autonomy within certain limits, 
they may prefer that to a system of active political engagement with fewer limits but also less 
autonomy.  
 I also aim to expand the scope of research on civil-military relations and civilian control. 
Existing literature tends to focus on the relative influence of civilians and the military over use of 




military work together in various realms of defense policy making, from threat assessment, 
defense resources (budget), force maintenance (personnel) and force employment. Moreover, 
there may be variation in the level of civilian monitoring in each realm, leading possibly to 
excessive attention to one realm and insufficient oversight over others. In this dissertation, I 
explore the (1) institutions of civilian control, (2) civil-military preference gap or lack thereof, 
and (3) resultant nature of civil-military relations in three realms of defense policy making in 
Japan: budget, personnel, and use of force.   
 
Variables and Logic of Argument 
 The two independent variables I look at are: (1) the way in which politicians control the 
military (SDF): ex-ante or ex post, (2) the extent to which the preferences of the civilians and the 
military (SDF) converge or diverge (gap or no gap).  These two variables interact to produce 
four different patterns of civil-military relations.  
 
Independent Variable 
Institutions of Control: ex-ante or ex-post? 
 Civil-military interactions do not happen in a vacuum. The way in which civilians or 
elected officials on behalf of civilians control the military in democracies takes various forms in 
different countries. The difference may arise from factors including history of each country and 
the security environment, but most importantly, by the type of political institutions. In various 
degrees and methods, all democratic governments at all times monitor the military though means 




 The principal-agent model and literature on political control of the bureaucracy is useful 
in explaining the relationship between civilians and the military in a democracy. In a democracy, 
the civil military relations can be examined as a chain of delegation. Voters delegate power over 
the provision of public goods to civilian leaders, who then delegate power over the provision of 
particular goods, such as national security to military organizations (Avant, 2007). However, 
voters and civilian leaders face problems inherent in the process of delegation, the problem of 
agency slack. The military has much better information about their own capabilities and 
performance than do civilians. Thus, problems of adverse selection occurs when civilians do not 
fully know the competences or preferences of the military (hidden information) and/or problems 
of moral hazard when civilians cannot fully observe the actions of their agents (hidden action.) 
While it is impossible to alleviate all problems of agency, civilians can set up 
monitoring mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty. In the principal agent literature, it is 
suggested that principals can construct (1) ex-ante control mechanisms such as contract design 
and screening and selection mechanisms, and (2) ex-post control mechanisms such as monitoring 
and reporting requirements and institutional checks. Ex-ante mechanisms such as screening tend 
to be effective against problems of adverse selection, whereas ex-post monitoring is effective in 
combating moral hazard. Some control mechanisms can be effective for both ex-ante and ex-post 
oversight (Strom 2006), such as institutional checks. Possible ex-ante and ex-post monitoring 









Table 1-1 Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Civilian Control Mechanisms 
 Principal-Agent 
literature 













 - Offer by civilians to use less 
intrusive monitoring in 
exchange for obedience 
Screening and Selection 
 - Skill requisites 
 - Loyalty Oaths 
 - Other accession institutions 
 - Professionalism 
Setting Up Fire Alarms 
-Limit scope of possible use 
of military (self-binding, 
tripwire) 
- Constitution (article 9) 
-Government 
pronouncements 
- Interpretation of 
Constitution 
- collective self defense 
   - defense oriented 
defense 
   - non nuclear principle 
   - arms export ban 
   - budget: 1% of GNP 
Screening and Selection 
- Exclusion of prewar military 
officers 








- Militia and National Guard 
- Interservice Rivalry 
- Civilian Staff in Congress 
- Atomic Energy Commission 
- Confirmable civilian secretariat 
 
Institutional Checks 
- Interservice Rivalry 
- Discourage jointness? 
- separation of civilian and 
uniformed officers in MOD 
- separation of SDF officers 
from politicians 












- The news media 
- Think tanks 
- Inter-service rivalry 
Police Patrols 
- PPBS 
- Office of the Secretary of 
Defense 
- Restrictive rules of 
enforcement 
- Limits on delegated authority 
- Audits / investigations 
Fire Alarms 
- The news media 
- opposition party 
Police Patrols 
- MOD civilian bureaucrats 
- Cabinet Legislative Bureau 
- Ministry of Finance 
- Opposition party  
- Diet / Party Committees  
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The monitoring mechanisms vary depending on the type of political institutions. The 
principal-agent literature suggests that in a checks-and-balances system like the United States, 
Congress comes up with various ex-post controls over the bureaucracy used to deal with 
problems of moral hazard. The downside of such system in the case of military, as suggested by 
Samuel Huntington (1957), is that the military can take advantage of the division between the 
President and Congress. In parliamentary systems, there is a stronger reliance on ex-ante controls, 
especially screening mechanisms. Ex-post controls tend to be weaker since the parliamentary 
majority has little incentive to scrutinize the executive branch and the actions of individual 
ministries. In the context of civilian control of the military, civilians are less likely to disagree 
over their preferred policies and over ways to monitor the military (Avant, 2007), but may lack in 
both incentives and capacity to do so.  
The parliamentary/presidential distinction is not the only institutions that affect how the 
civilians control the military. Other institutions such as electoral rules and how the central 
bureaucracy is set up influence the incentives and capabilities of politicians to effectively 
monitor and control the military. Japan is an interesting case in this regard. While the basic 
framework of government, a parliamentary system, has not changed, important changes took 
place in its electoral rules and administrative institutions.  
Prior to 1994, the old electoral rules – medium sized, multi-member districts combined 
with a single non-transferable vote (MMD/SNTV) created disincentives for politicians to 
actively engage in defense related matters. Since more than one candidate typically ran from the 
same district, talking about foreign policy and security issues at election times made little sense 




prevented them from emphasizing their differences, or adhere to different foreign security 
policies and risk making the party incoherent. It made a lot more sense for legislators to focus on 
providing “pork-barrel” programs to their local electorate, rather than “indivisible policies” like 
security policy. This tendency was further accelerated due to the perception among conservative 
politicians that the voters were generally anti-militaristic, and that safer to avoid being seen as 
friendly to anything military. 
While electoral rules created disincentives for politicians to actively engage in and 
monitor the SDF, the statutory authority and organizational capacity of the prime minister and 
cabinet members were limited, especially with regards to security policy making. The prime 
minister did not have the statutory authority to initiate policy or to draft laws, rather, the 
individual ministries who drafted the laws preferred to keep matters related to what they see as 
their own “turf” in their own hands. Organizational capacity of the prime minister was also 
limited, with limited staff strength of the Cabinet Secretariat.  
Most relevant to civil-military relations was the limited capacity of the Security Council 
of Japan. Established in 1956 as the Defense Council, the Security Council’s role was “when 
asked by the Prime Minister, to deliberate on important matters related to security of Japan and 
to respond to the Prime Minister, as well as to “voluntarily offer advice to the Prime Minister on 
matters related to national defense.” In 1986, the role of “responding to national emergencies” 
was added, when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone tried to revamp the Defense Council, by 
renaming it the Security Council. However, the Security Council did little of that. Security 
Council meetings were not held at times when important security policy decisions were made, 




the defection of a Soviet fighter pilot to Hokkaido in 1976. Instead, they were held two or three 
times per year, primarily to discuss matters concerning the defense budget. Furthermore, due to 
its institutional legacy of having been established to restrain the power of the Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida and the pre-war military, it was considered not as a means to enhance the power 
of the prime minister or to utilize the SDF but instead to keep a watchful eye over the two. 
The upshot of these institutional characteristics of the Japanese political system was a 
system of civilian control based on “containment,” reliance on ex-ante controls, and dependence 
on the bureaucracy and outside actors for ex-post monitoring. In addition to Article Nine of the 
Constitution, in which “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party introduced a series of preemptive controls, or “trip wires” that set the 
boundaries of defense policy, including the ban on sending SDF unites into combat abroad, 
denial of the right of collective self-defense, political constraints on defense spending, a ban on 
arms exports and the three non-nuclear principles. Once these trip wires were in place, the 
politicians were able to exercise control of the SDF almost cost-free, while the bureaucracy 
conducted ex-post “police patrol” and the opposition party and media provided “fire alarms.”  
Interestingly, however, the institutions of control turned out to be self-binding for the 
politicians themselves. In the short term, they actually increased the political cost of taking 
pro-active stance toward controlling the military. In the long term, the reliance on bureaucrats to 
enforce the restrictions led to a loss of leverage by politicians over bureaucrats and the SDF in 
terms of expertise, and created bureaucratic inertia to maintain the status quo. Moreover, there 




power for a long time. 
The electoral and administrative reforms that took place in the 1990s changed the 
institutional context in which this system of civilian control prevailed. With the replacement of 
the MMD/SNTV system with a combination of a single-member system and proportional 
representation, policy differences between parties, including over defense issues, became more 
important. Thus, there is now an electoral incentive to be conversant on defense matters. 
Furthermore, a series of administrative reforms strengthened both the statutory and 
organizational capacity of the Prime Minister and the cabinet secretariat vis-à-vis other ministries, 
and enhanced the institutional foundations for political leadership. Politicians are now willing 
and capable of changing the status quo. While the direction of political leadership and policy 
direction may vary depending on who is in power, politicians are likely to find the self-imposed 
constraints more costly onto themselves, and may decide to relax them. At the same time, “police 
patrol” by the bureaucracy is likely to become less effective, since politicians have become more 
suspicious of bureaucrats acting on their behalf, and bureaucrats, on the other hand, may be less 
willing to “patrol” the SDF on behalf of politicians.  
In sum, as for the first independent variable, we are witnessing a relaxing of ex-ante 
control, and a simultaneous retreat of ex-post bureaucratic control over time. This shift is 
occurring in all aspects of defense policy, such as budget, personnel, and use of force, with 
important differences in the speed and extent of the transition. Is this a “crisis” in civil-military 
relations? What will the SDF seek as the control mechanisms are to weaken? Looking back, did 
the control mechanisms “contain” the SDF who would have otherwise sought for a different 




variable, preference divergence.    
 
Preference Divergence: Is there a civil-military gap? 
 The second variable I look at is the level of preference divergence between the civilians 
and military. Preference divergence refers to the intensity and scope of disagreement between a 
state’s political leaders and its military leaders
2
. In democratic countries, a certain level of 
divergence in attitudes and opinion between the general public and the military is inevitable, 
since the military requires strict code of conduct and personal sacrifice which may be at odds 
with the values of society. However, deeper cleavages in values and different policy orientations 
can become a problem from the view of democratic control of the military.  
 The preferences of civilians and the military can differ in a variety of topics important to 
the production of national security policy making. The different realms of potential civil-military 
divergence can be summarizes as follows. 
 













Likely areas of 
civil-military 
differences 
Necessary capabilities to 











Force capabilities,  
Unit composition 
Base allocation 
Proposed options for legal 
revision 
 
I used an inductive approach to measure the level of preference divergence. The three 
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sources I used were (1) opinion survey that I conducted in 2004 and 2014 assessing the attitudes 
and opinion of the civilian elite and SDF officers, (2) oral history records of former SDF leaders 
and civilian defense officials, compiled and published by the National Institute for Defense 
Studies, and (3) interviews with active duty SDF officers and civilian officials. Preference 
divergence is a continuous variable: low preference divergence refers to situation where there is 
little evidence of disagreement between the opinion of the civilians and the opinion of the 
military, and high preference divergence refers to cases when the opinions of civilians and 
military is very different. Important point here is that low preference divergence does not 
necessary mean absence of friction, just as high preference divergence does not necessary mean 
visible conflict between civilians and the military.  
Using the above information, whether or not a civil-military preferences converge or 
diverge will be explored in the following three areas: (1) values, norms and mutual image 
between SDF officers and civilian elite, (2) threat perception, US-Japan Alliance, International 
Peacekeeping, and roles and missions of the SDF, (3) role of the SDF in defense policy making 
process. More concretely, the following questions will also be addressed: (1) Changes in 
attitudes/opinions of SDF officers and civilian elite in the past ten years, (2) Difference in 
opinion among different generation of SDF officers, (3) Gap among the civilian elite, general 
public and the SDF.  
The first source, opinion survey was conducted in 2004 and 2014, and was modeled 
after the survey conducted under the “Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian 
Society,” sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) and led by Professors 




sampling methodology were derived from the TISS survey
3
. With the collected responses, first, 
the responses from SDF officers and civilian elites were be compared to examine whether these 
populations differed across a variety of dimensions, such as socio-demographic characteristics, 
political beliefs, knowledge of and confidence in the SDF, and attitudes towards domestic and 
foreign policy issues. A chi-square test will be conducted to determine whether there is a 
significant difference between the civilian and SDF samples across the dimensions. Then I 
explore whether differences in the dimensions identified above have an effect on different 
elements of the defense policy making process, such as threat perception, defense resources, 
force design and maintenance, and force employment.   
The survey sample for the SDF officers was drawn from those who are currently 
assigned to a SDF school, either as students or as teaching staff. There are three types of schools 
in each service (Ground, Maritime, Air,) Officer Candidate School, Command and General Staff 
College, and War College. The Officer Candidates are one year into their career, Staff College 
level officers are the top 20% of officers with about ten years into their career, and the War 
College level officers are about twenty years into their career. This method was adopted to ensure 
variation in ranks among the survey sample, to target the elite segment of the military population 
comparable to the civilian elite sample, and to facilitate the administration of survey by sending 
out questionnaires to schools instead of individual addresses.  
The survey sample for the civilian elite was drawn from the Gakushikai alumni directory, 
with permission from the Gakushikai (attachment). Gakushikai is a joint alumni association of 
seven national universities (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kyushu and Nagoya 
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Universities.) While there are equally respected private universities in Japan, Gakushikai 
members were chosen because of the regional diversity of the population as well as variation in 
occupation and age groups. For the 2004 survey, due to various constraints, I sampled only from 
graduates of University of Tokyo. For the 2014 survey, from among the 22,000 members, 
stratified sampling method was used for sample selection: the population was divided into 
subpopulations by graduating year, and random samples were taken of each stratum. In total, 
3,000 out of 22,000 members who graduated between 1983 and 2010 were chosen.
4
 
 The second source I used to measure preference divergence between civilians and the 
military were the oral history records compiled by the National Institute for Defense Studies 
(NIDS) and National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS.) The oral history collection 
of these two institutes consists of transcripts from interviews with former SDF leaders and 
civilian officials of the Japan Defense Agency. While the collection is limited to those who 
experienced top positions within the SDF and JDA, it encompasses interviews from retired 
members of the SDF, some with pre-war military experiences. The interviews are valuable for 
this dissertation, especially in covering the early post war period, since my survey does not cover 
the earlier generation of officers, and since some interviewees have since passed away. 
 The third source of information I used are my own interviews. I have especially focused 
on the current leadership generation, which falls in between the generation covered in the oral 
history records and those covered by the opinion survey. While my position in the National 
Defense Academy allows me opportunities to talk with officials on an on-going basis, I have 
arranged for separate settings for interviews for my research. In cases I heard something that I 
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would like to quote in a non-interview setting, I made sure to ask for permission before I record 
his/her statement. 
 
Dependent Variable: Four types of civilian control 
In this dissertation, I hypothesize that the two causal variables described above interact, 
and lead to four different types of civil-military relations. 
 
Table 1-3 Preference Divergence and Types of Control 




High Type I: Containment 
 
Type III: Conflictual 
Low Type II: Auto Pilot 
 
Type IV Cooperative/Excessive 
 
Type I: Ex-Ante Control, High Preference Divergence 
 In Type I, politicians install ex-ante control mechanisms such as contract incentives and 
screening and selection, but the military has preferences that are different from the civilians. This 
may be because the screening and selection mechanism did not work, or the military do not agree 
with the ex-ante limitations placed on the military. The military may seem under control, but they 
would be frustrated by the ex-ante limitations placed on them, and is likely to seek ways to avoid 
the limitations. In order to contain the risk, politicians can delegate the task of ex-post monitoring 
to the bureaucracy or outside actors, but there is no guarantee that the bureaucracy will work on 





Type II: Ex-Ante Control, Low Preference Divergence, 
 Type II civil-military relationship may not appear to be different from Type I, but this is 
a case in which the level of preference divergence between the civilians and the military is low. 
This may be either because selection and screening mechanism worked and the military 
preferences were in line with the civilians, or the military has found it beneficial to accept the 
limitations placed on them, possibly in exchange for a level of autonomy within the limits. In 
either case, the military is in an “auto-pilot” mode. While this type may seem ideal from the 
politician’s point of view, there are two long term negative consequences. First, placing 
limitations on the military means that politicians themselves are “tying their own hands” in the 
possible use of the military. Secondly, using the “auto-pilot” mode for a long time will lead to 
politician’s loss of knowledge and expertise necessary to actively either constrain or use the 
military. 
 
Type III: Ex-Post Control, High Preference Divergence 
 Type III civil-military relationship will be the most conflict-prone relationship, with the 
politicians, or bureaucrats on behalf of politicians actively monitoring the military to combat 
moral hazard problems, while the military prefers policies that are different from what the 
politicians pursue. There may be visible clashes, with the military receiving punishment from 
time to time. In cases in which bureaucrats monitor the military on behalf of politicians, the key 
issue for politicians is to make sure that the bureaucrats either share same preferences with the 
politicians, or at least to find it more beneficial to act on behalf of politicians. Ex-post control 




military converge; but it may be difficult for the politicians to detect such convergence occurring. 
 
Type IV: Ex-Post Control, Low Preference Divergence  
 Type IV civil-military relationship can be most cooperative and constructive, with the 
politicians and the military sharing preferences and actively engaging with one another. However, 
it could also be the most frustration-prone from the point of view of the military, if the military 
perceives politicians’ intervention as sign of distrust or skepticism, which they do not deserve. 
The military may prefer to be “left alone,” especially if the politicians had not previously 
intervened.  
 
 In this dissertation, I will examine how the civil-military relationship in Japan evolved 
over time; and across three realms of defense policy making, (1) defense resources (budget), (2) 
force design and maintenance (personnel), and (3) force employment (use of force). I will argue 
that overall, post war civil-military relations is best characterized by type II (auto pilot) 
civil-military relationship, while there are changes over time, and difference between budget, 
personnel, and use of force matters. While there were significant preference gap between the 
civilians and the military in the immediate post war era, the gap narrowed as the pre-war officers 
were replaced by SDF officers, and the US-Japan alliance became a focal point to which civilian 
and military preferences converged. Unlike existing literature that focuses on aggressive 
bureaucratic monitoring and assumes that SDF officers are frustrated by the limits placed on 
them, the chapters on the three realms of defense policy will show how the SDF have gained 




realms of budget, personnel, and use of force. 
 
Table 1-4 Preference Divergence and Types of Control: Japan’s case 




High Type I 
Budget (1950-1976) 
Personnel (1950s) 
Use of Force 
Type III: Conflictual 
(Use of Force 2014?) 
Low Type II: Auto Pilot 
Budget (1976-2000) 
Personnel (1960-2000) 
Type IV Cooperative/Excessive 
Budget (2000-) 
Use of Force (2000-) 
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two: The Institutions of Civilian Control: From ex-ante to ex-post control 
In this chapter, I will discuss how the characteristics of the Japanese political institutions, 
electoral rules and administrative characteristics led to a system of civilian control that is based 
heavily on ex-ante control, and why and how it is now shifting to one of ex-post control.  
 
Chapter Three: Personnel 
 In chapter three, I look at how the composition of the Japan Defense Agency (later 
Ministry of Defense) personnel, both civilian and military, changed in the past sixty years, 
Immediate post-war officers consisted mostly of pre-war officers and were heavily influenced by 
the U.S. involvement in the rearmament process. The civilian officials, on the other hand, 
initially consisted mostly of pre-war Home Ministry (Naimusho) bureaucrats, intent on avoiding 
resurgence of the military. Now, the Ministry of Defense consists of post war, mostly National 




changes in the personnel composition affected the mechanism in which the SDF was controlled, 
as well as the possible convergence of civilian and military preferences over the years. 
 
Chapter Four: Budget 
 The common assumption regarding the defense budget is that SDF officers were heavily 
constrained, both in terms of size and composition, and must have been frustrated with the 
outcome. However, the political preoccupation with the size of the budget and politically 
controversial items (such as the air craft career) may have given the SDF a considerable level of 
freedom within the imposed limits. This chapter examines how this might have been the case by 
looking at the evolution of the composition of the budget as well as changes in budget decision 
making over the years. 
 
Chapter Five: Use of Force and Casualty Aversion 
 The chapter on use of force will first outline how Japanese policy on use of force 
changed since the end of the Cold War. I will look specifically at how re-interpretation of the 
constitution enlarged the scope of possible use of force of the SDF, but that all new operations 
had to be grounded on new legislations or legislative revision, which determined how the 
operation will be monitored. Then, I will explore how the expectation of casualties affected the 
decision of the Japanese government concerning whether, when and how to send SDF to Iraq. I 
will examine SDF officers’ and Japanese civilian elites’ attitudes about casualties, and will argue 






Chapter Six: The SDF: Is there a Civil-Military Gap in Japan? 
In Chapter Six, I present an overview of the opinion survey I conducted, and address 
whether or not a “civil-military gap” exists in Japan, in realms of (1) mutual image and values, 
(2) defense policy issues such as the US-Japan alliance, and (3) the role of the SDF in defense 
policy making process. I will examine whether the results of the survey suggest why the SDF 
seem casualty averse. 
 
Significance of Study 
Contribution to the Literature on Japanese Security Policy 
The uniqueness of this study is that I look at both sides of the civil-military relations, 
especially its focus on the Self Defense Force officers.  As mentioned above, two assumptions 
prevail regarding the SDF, that the officers have more militaristic tendencies, but that they are 
insignificant actors in the defense policymaking process (Berger 1998, Katzenstein 1999
5
).  My 
contribution here is to question both assumptions and to offer a systematic explanation grounded 
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 Katzenstein has argued that civil-military relations in Japan is highly asymetrical, with the civilians in tight 
control of the military.  As for Berger, I share his view that anti-militarism lead to the creation of a 
legalistic system of civilian control.  However, I will show how the “legalization” can be explained as a 
result of rational calculation of individual politicians.  Furthermore, I disagree with him on two other 
points, on the effectiveness of the legalistic system and the consequences of the “containment” of the 
military.  He admits that “loopholes” did exist, but does not consider that to be problematic, because 
“these institutions (of civilian control) originate in the broader, historically grounded Japanese conviction 
that the armed forces are a potential threat to democracy that must be isolated and carefully constrained 
by civilian authorities (pp.204)”  I would argue instead, that such “broader, historically grounded 
conviction” do not exist, and that the current system is a artifact of the political situation immediately 
after World War II.  I also will question his claim that the “containment” lead to an ineffective military, 
restricting contingency planning, and hence increasing its vulnerability in the event of a military 
emergency, and instead, look at what autonomous planning went on in private within the military 




on a rational-choice model, without resorting to an explanation based on cultural uniqueness.  
My survey results show that different services (ground, marine, air) have divergent interests, due 
to historical and operational reasons, as well as between different age groups and experiences, 
and ranks of officers. I argue that it is problematic to assume that the military will have certain 




Contribution to the Culturalist versus Realist Debate on Military Doctrine Development 
One of the most important debates in the field of security policy is the culturalist versus 
realist debate in military doctrine development (Kier 1997, Duffield 1998, Berger, 1998, Johnson, 
1995, Katzenstein 1996, Desch 1998, Duffield, Farrell, Price and Desch 1999.)  What is curious 
about the case of Japan is that both Berger and Katzenstein have barely looked at the “military” 
culture, which is at the focus of the debate, and instead, looked at the anti-military culture in the 
society.  In my analysis, I examine the extent to which the SDF shares the pre-war military 
culture or post-war antimilitarism, which should either fill the missing piece of the puzzle in 
Berger and Katzenstein’s argument, or to provide a case against their claim.  
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 There are two other reasons, other than these two assumptions, that explain the apparent lack (or 
rareness) of research on the SDF.  One reason is practical, one ideological.  The practical reason is that 
it is very difficult to get inside the SDF to conduct meaningful interviews.  For reasons that I will 
investigate later, the SDF had been extremely careful about disclosing any information.  My unique 
position, being a member of the Self Defense Force myself, gives me access to people and material that I 
will not be able to get otherwise, although I will not be able to disclose all that I am able to hear.  The 
other reason for the apparent lack of literature on SDF, is an ideological one, especially in Japan.  Most 
written work on the subject is either extremely sympathetic to the SDF, or overly critical.  The drawback 
for a new scholar to embark on a study of the SDF is that one may be labeled as one or the other.  
Although I must be always careful about the pitfalls of being a part of the organization, that my views 
may be biased or that it would be difficult to take critical positions, or to be seen as such.  However, I 




Contribution to the Rational Choice versus Culturalist Debate in Japanese Politics 
Another contribution of this research is to the rational choice versus culturalist debate in 
Japanese politics.  Most studies in the rational choice camp are in the economic policy, or party 
politics (Kohno, 1997) and security policy seem to be the least likely case for the applicability of 
rational choice theories in looking at domestic politics of Japan. Instead, the most notable work 
taking a culturalist approach is that of Katzenstein and Berger. What is curious is that both 
Berger and Katzenstein have barely looked at the “military” culture, which is at the focus of the 
debate, and instead, looked at the anti-military culture in the society.  In my analysis, I examine 
the extent to which the SDF shares the pre-war military culture or post-war antimilitarism, which 
should either fill the missing piece of the puzzle in Berger and Katzenstein’s argument, or to 
provide a case against their claim. I argue that that most of the behavior of politicians, civilian 
officials, and military officers can be explained by rationalist theories, but the “culture of 
antimilitarism” did play a significant role in the creation of the structure of incentives especially 




Contribution to the Literature on Civil-Military Relations 
 This dissertation follows and contributes to two lines of literature in Civil-Military 
relations, (1) use of surveys to understand military preferences
8
, and (2) institutional approaches 
using principal-agent models
9
. The groundbreaking work using surveys was the Civil-Military 
Gap survey conducted by Feaver and Kohn, and this dissertation is an attempt to apply the same 
                                                   
7
 I therefore will not completely discount Katzenstein’s claim about “regulatory norms”, and “constitutive 
norms”, but I argue that their impact needs to be contested, not assumed.  
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 Examples include Feaver and Kohn (2001), Dempsey (2010), Feaver and Gelpi (2004), Urben (2010). 
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model to other countries
10
. As for the principal-agent approach, earlier works have focused one 
country relative stable institutions (Feaver, 2003) or the difference between parliamentary and 
presidential systems (Avant, 1994.) In this dissertation, I look at the case of Japan, where there 
was significant change in the domestic institutions over time, which affected the way civilians 
controlled the military (SDF).  
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The Institutions of Civilian Control in Japan 
-from ex-ante to ex-post control 
 
In this chapter, I will explain how characteristics of the Japanese political system 
affected the way in which politicians controlled the Self Defense Force in Japan. I will discuss 
the institutional characteristics of the Japanese parliamentary system, and its impact on 
civil-military relations. I will then discuss how the recent institutional changes at electoral and 
administrative levels have affected how the SDF is controlled, from ex-ante to ex-post control. 
 
Institutional foundations of civilian control: parliamentary and presidential systems 
 The process in which democracies control their military differs greatly depending on the 
characteristics of their constitutional arrangement. As Deborah Avant points out, “the rules 
within which political contenders compete for leadership and delegate tasks to military 
organizations affect the strategies that politicians employ to affect military behavior. (Avant, 
2007) The key difference is between parliamentary and presidential systems. 
 
 The relationship between the general public and the military in democratic countries can 
be described as a chain of delegation, in which (1) the general public choose their representatives 
(politicians) through elections process, and delegate their own protection to the politicians; (2) in 
order to protect its people, politicians build up a military force, and delegate the task of 
protection to the military. This relationship is common to all democratic countries, yet the 




between parliamentary and presidential systems. 
 Let me compare the two systems by looking at the case of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. In Presidential systems such as the United States, the executive and legislature 
are elected separately from different electorates, leading to system of mutual restraint to prevent 
arbitrary use of force. Under the constitution, Congress has the power to declare war, raise and 
support the armed forces, control the war funding, while the President is commander-in-chief. 
Whether Congress has in fact been able to exercise restraint in executive war power is widely 
debated, but the important point here is that by design, the Congress and the President is 
expected to restrain one another. The possible downside of such system, as Huntington pointed, 
is that the military can take advantage of the division between the civilian leadership and gain 
leverage. Disagreement over policy between Congress and the President can lead to conflicting 
instructions to the military, who then can play the two against one another in pursuit of policy it 
prefers. 
 In parliamentary systems, in contrast, the legislature (the majority party) and the cabinet 
are integrated, since the party (or parties, in case of coalition governments) which won the 
majority of support forms the cabinet. Thus, the public and the military are connected by a single 
chain of delegation, in which the ruling party, on behalf of the public, controls the military. The 
strength of the parliamentary system is that civilian unity leaves no chance for the military to 
bargain for their preferred policy, making the Prime Minister’s leadership over the military more 
effective. The weakness is that the when leaders make mistakes, there is no one to stop them, and 
the cost can be high. 




civilians are likely to choose. The principal-agent literature suggests that in a 
checks-and-balances system like the United States, Congress comes up with various ex-post 
controls over the bureaucracy used to deal with problems of moral hazard. The downside of such 
system in the case of military is that the military can take advantage of the division between the 
President and Congress. In parliamentary systems, there is a stronger reliance on ex-ante controls, 
especially screening mechanisms. Ex-post controls tend to be weaker since the parliamentary 
majority has little incentive to scrutinize the executive branch and the actions of individual 
ministries. In the context of civilian control of the military, civilians (executive and legislative 
branch) are less likely to disagree over their preferred policies and over ways to monitor the 
military, but may lack in both incentives and capacity to do so. 
 
Institutional characteristics of Japan’s parliamentary system and its impact on 
civil-military relations 
 As explained above, civil-military relations in parliamentary democracies can be 
expressed by a single chain of delegation, and the Prime Minister is expected to effectively 
control the military with the strong backing of the party he represents, while exercising 
leadership through his chosen cabinet ministers. However, in Japan, the Prime Minister’s 
leadership is severely constrained compared with the United Kingdom. This is because of the 
following two reasons: the nature of relationship between the Prime Minister and ruling party, 
and between the cabinet ministers and the bureaucracy.  
 First, the Prime Minister is not necessarily the strongest member of his party, and thus 




through the Diet was not guaranteed. This is mainly due to the electoral system that was in place 




Under the MMD/SNTV system, where the LDP fielded more than one official candidate 
in most districts, the party leader did not control the party nomination. In order to be successfully 
elected, LDP candidates needed more than a party nomination, instead, backing from a habatsu 
leader was sufficient to enter an electoral race against LDP incumbents. Habatsu not only aided 
individual candidates in electoral campaigns, but also helped them in fund-raising and in the 
allocation of positions within the LDP and Cabinet. Habatsu leaders, in their turn, possessed 
strong incentives to expand the membership base of their habatsu in the Diet in an attempt to 
increase their influence within the party. Ultimately, habatsu leaders wanted to become the party 
president (synonymous with the Prime Minister as far as the LDP remained the ruling party), and 
kept the Prime Minister on a short leash, eying to become the next Prime Minister as soon as his 
popularity ratings dipped low
12
.  
While the habatsu was useful for the LDP in electing multiple candidates from each 
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 Earlier versions of this section were included in Hikotani (2004), Estevez-Abe and Hikotani (2008a, 
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 The MMD/SNTV electoral system also created a disincentive for politicians to focus on defense issues, 
hampering their ability to effectively control the military. As Kent Calder observed in his classic book on 
Japanese politics, Crisis and Compensation, that Japan’s old electoral system was not conducive to 
politicians’ involvement in security and foreign policy issues.
 
(Calder, 1989) His chapter on foreign policy, 
appropriately titled “The Residual: Defense,” discusses how it was not in the interest of Japanese 
politicians to invest their time and influence in defense policy matters. More than one candidate typically 
ran from the same district, generating fierce intraparty competition. In such an electoral context, 
individual LDP politicians were pressed to distinguish themselves from their fellow LDP candidates in the 
same district. Talking about foreign policy and security issues at election times made little sense. 
Candidates either had to state a position in accordance with their party’s platform, which prevented them 
from emphasizing their differences, or adhere to different foreign and security policies and risk making 
the party incoherent. For politicians campaigning in a MMD/SNTV system, discussions of foreign affairs 




district under the MMD/SNTV system and ensuring majority in the Diet, it came at a price. They 
weakened the LDP party leadership, and thus, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The absence 
of the party leaders’ control over the party label resulted in his inability to sanction against the 
rank-and-file. Habatsu leaders, not the party leadership, were the ones who directly controlled 
the rank and file. This meant that no decision could be reached without the consent of the 
habatsu leaders. Habatsu leaders, in turn, made sure that their influence was institutionalized in 
three way
13
s: (1) they institutionalized unanimity rules for the most important policy decisions 
within the LDP. (2) They ensure that all post allocations, within the party and the Cabinet, were 
jointly determined. (3) They imposed selection rules for the party president, which magnified the 
influence of habatsu.   
 Secondly, the Prime Minister was constrained in exerting leadership against the 
bureaucracy through his cabinet ministers. As noted above, cabinet ministers did not necessarily 
support the Prime Minister’s leadership, since their selection was determined by habatsu leaders. 
An additional constraint was the so-called “buntan kanri gensoku (the principle of divided 
management: Article 4, Cabinet Law)”, according to which individual ministers who are 
responsible for each ministry’s jurisdictions. With such principle in place, ministers may 
represent the bureaucracy’s preferences even when it diverges with what the prime minister 
wants the ministers to do.  
 Thus, while Japan’s political system is a parliamentary democracy like the United 
Kingdom, the Prime Minister is unable to exert leadership with strong backing of the ruling party, 
nor through effective control over the bureaucracy through the cabinet. Thus, there is no single 
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chain of delegation, instead, the chain is broken in two ways, between the individual members of 
the ruling party and the Prime Minister, and between the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers.  
Non-institutional factors, such as public opinion and external security situation also 
affected the nature of civil-military relations in Japan. Civil-military relations in Japan is 
characterized by the excessive concern among its people about ensuring protection from its own 
military, and inattention to the protection provided by the military. As Matake Kamiya has 
suggested, the Japanese public have been reluctant to acknowledge the possibility that the 
military can play a constructive and positive role in providing peace and security.
14
 As a result, 
no consensus exists among the Japanese about the role the SDF plays in providing security in 
Japan, and its possible role in maintaining international order. 
 Why did such thinking become prevalent? The obvious answer is Japan’s historical 
background. The pre-WWII experience led to a strong sense of regret among politicians and 
government officials about their inability to control the military. This experience led naturally to 
a desire to constrain the role that the military can play, hence to the “restrictive” approach to 
maintaining control over the military. However, history alone does not explain why such 
restrictive thinking continued for so long after the end of the WWII. Two additional factors need 
to be considered. First, Japan’s security was not provided by the SDF alone but was made 
possible by its alliance relationship with and the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. 
Thus, the SDF was not considered to be the independent provider of security and protection for 
the Japanese public. Consequently, even for those who had positive views of the SDF, the SDF 
was neither the essential nor the quintessential provider of their security. Second, the perceived 
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predictability of the Cold War solidified an enduring national consensus: (1) limited military 
power under constitutional restrictions, (2) bilateral alliance with the US (the exchange of 
protection for bases), and (3) prosperity through economic growth.
15
 
In other words, there was no major change in the external environment for the Japanese 
public and politicians to pay attention to whether and how the SDF provides security. Thus the 
paradox: while protection provided by the SDF was barely appreciated, concern over protection 
from the military persisted.  This led to the mistaken notion that the purpose of civilian control 
was to only to restrict the military, not to ensure that civilian preferences prevail in decisions 
over the use of the military. 
 How did such perception by the politicians affect the way in which the SDF was 
controlled? Three characteristics need to be highlighted: (1) the extensive delegation of decision 
making from the politicians to the bureaucracy, (2) the emphasis on ex-ante control mechanisms 
for controlling the military, and (3) dependence on the bureaucracy for ex-post monitoring. Let 
me explain the three characteristics in turn. 
The first characteristic is the extensive delegation of defense policy making to the 
bureaucracy. In a parliamentary democracy, it is not unusual for the ministries to be drafting 
legislations for the ruling party. The longevity of the LDP rule should also explain why 
delegation to the bureaucracy was prevalent across various issue areas. The question I ask here is 
whether and why delegation was more prevalent in defense issues compared to other issue areas. 
 Existing literature on delegation suggest that three factors facilitate the extent of 
delegation from the politicians to the bureaucracy; technical complexity, tangible gains, and 
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. As for technical complexity, while it is difficult to compare the level of expertise 
required across different issue areas, it may be fair to say that defense matters may seem more 
technical and remote compared with issues such as agriculture and public works.  As for 
tangible gains, or, whether involvement in defense policy issues were not likely to translate into 
votes and donations. The single-nontransferable vote (SNTV) system, in which two or more 
people from the same party compete in the same district, encouraged distributive issues while 
minimizing the salience of broadly based issues.
17
 Hence, defense policy became a “residual” 
issue, and dealing with defense issues became relatively costly, in terms of time and effort, from 
the point of view of individual politicians in the legislature
18
. 
 Finally, as for political risk, both external (policy) risk of delegation was considered low, 
while internal (political) risk was considered high. Externally, the SDF was expected to exist 
only for deterrent purposes, and military attack to Japan was considered highly unlikely. In other 
words, the predictability of the Cold War made the political risk involved in delegating to 
bureaucrats relatively low, because during the cold war because actual “use” of SDF was 
considered unlikely.
19
 Furthermore the continuity and stability of a national consensus 
mentioned above: limited military power, bilateral alliance with the US, and prosperity through 
economic growth, made delegating to bureaucrats both rational and sensible. Internally, being 
seen as a defense expert was unwise or almost suicidal as a LDP politician, since the Japanese 
public considered to be generally anti-military. Whether or not expertise in defense matters 
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would have actually cost the politicians votes is unclear. What is clear, however, is that 
politicians did seem to believe so, as seen from the relative unpopularity of membership in 
defense related committees within the party and in the Diet. 
Second characteristic is the emphasis on ex-ante control mechanisms. This tendency 
was further affected by the internal party rules of the LDP, which required all legislation and 
policy initiatives to be approved by the party before being presented to the Diet. Since matters 
concerning the SDF were considered to be potentially politically explosive, the LDP introduced a 
series of ex-ante controls or “tripwires” that set the boundaries of defense policy and 
consequently limited the freedom of action for the SDF.  This includes the senshu-boei 
(exclusively defense-oriented) policy, the ban on sending SDF units for combat abroad, denial of 
the right of collective self-defense, the ban on conscription, the ban on the export of arms, the 
three non-nuclear principles that prohibit Japan from possessing, manufacturing, and introducing 
nuclear weapons into Japan, and the commitment to the peaceful use of space.
20
   
The ex-ante control mechanisms were not limited to limitations on the actual use of 
force and weapons development. As I discuss in detail in Chapter Three there were 
organizational limitations on personnel matters, including what positions SDF uniformed 
personnel can be assigned to, and who and when directly assist the defense minister. For example, 
general staff officers of the JSO and the three service staff offices were for a long time prohibited 
from making direct contacts with the Diet members and officials of other government agencies 
without the presence of a civilian JDA official
21
. Interestingly however, there were relatively 
little attention on recruitment and education of SDF officers, which could have served as a 
                                                   
20
 Katahara, (2001), 69-91. 
21




powerful ex-ante screening mechanism. Budgetary constraints, such as the GNP 1% limit on 
defense spending, is another example of an ex-ante control mechanism. While the 1% limitation 
is no longer in place, the system in which defense budget is decided, as I explain in Chapter Four, 
serves as a procedural constraint on the SDF. 
Third characteristic is that ex-post monitoring was delegated to the bureaucrats. This 
third characteristic, especially bureaucratic control of the SDF within the Japan Defense Agency 
(now Ministry of Defense) has been the center of attention among scholars and is said to be the 
source of frustration among the uniformed officers of the SDF.
22
 The Internal Bureau is said to 
have controlled the military through the system of civilian counselors (sanjikan), who, together 
with the administrative vice minister, assisted the Defense Minister.
23
  
Why did this sort of bureaucratic control emerge? The common explanation of 
“anti-militarism,” is inadequate, since fear of a resurgence of the military could have been 
expressed in other forms of control, such as more direct monitoring by politicians, or by 
“civilianizing” the military, as in Germany. Another common explanation is “misinterpretation” 
by those who were in charge of post-war rearmament, namely that the civilian officials 
misinterpreted what was meant by the GHQ’s Civilian Affairs Section Annex, when GHQ 
demanded that civilian control be guaranteed in the establishment of the Police Reserve Force.  
Officials wrongly thought that the meaning of civilian was limited to “civilian bureaucrats,” and 
created a system based on such misinterpretations.  The misinterpretation explanation, however, 
does not explain why politicians left the bureaucratic control system in place for so long.  
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While the explanations above focus on defense-specific factors, it is important to note 
that “ex-post bureaucratic monitoring of other bureaucracies (on behalf of politicians)” was not 
limited to defense
24
. Personnel screening of bureaucrats was done by the National Personnel 
Authority (Jinji-in), budgetary monitoring was conducted by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and 
legal matters were kept in check by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB). Within each ministry, 
the minister’s secretariat (Daijin-Kanbo) within each ministry kept the ministries in check on 
behalf of the minister. Thus, what was distinctive about the JDA is not so much the fact that the 
bureaucrats monitored other bureaucrats, but that there was a clear distinction between the 
civilian and uniformed personnel within the JDA, with the former assigning themselves the role 
of monitoring the latter. 
The important question here, which I will explore further in subsequent chapters, is 
whether the bureaucrats were simply working on behalf of politicians to monitor the SDF. The 
bureaucracy could have simply been pursuing their own interests, or actually reflecting the views 
of the SDF. The key is to see whose preferences converge or diverge. If the preferences of the 
politicians and bureaucrats converge and the uniformed personnel diverge, the bureaucrats 
should be willing to monitor on behalf of the politicians. If the preferences of the civilian 
bureaucrats and uniformed personnel converge while the preferences of politicians diverge, they 
can collude to pursue their own interest, while the politicians may not be aware of such collusion. 
The third possibility is when the preferences of the politicians and the uniformed personnel 
converge and that of the bureaucracy diverge. In such cases, one can expect that politicians can 
fight for the gains of the uniformed personnel, demanding that the bureaucracy change their 
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course of action.  
To summarize, Japanese system of civilian control characterized by (1) weak political 
leadership, due to the weakness of the Prime Minister and the “broken” chain of delegation, (2) 
dependence on ex-ante control over ex-post control at the political level, and (3) bureaucratic 
ex-post monitoring of the SDF. In the next section, I will examine how the various control 
mechanism worked, at the level of the Diet, cabinet, and the bureaucracy. 
 
Three Levels of Civilian Control: Diet, Cabinet, Bureaucracy  
 Civilian control of the SDF takes place at three levels, the Diet, the Cabinet, and within 
the Japan Defense Agency (Hikotani, 2004). 
The Diet Level 
The Defense White Paper describes the role of the Diet in civilian control as follows:  
The Diet, representing the people, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters 
such as the force structure, organization, and size of the SDF. The constitution and the 
Law on the Establishment of the Defense Agency and the Law on the Self-Defense 
Forces, both enacted in 1954, make functional provisions for the structure, the scope, 
and the location of the authority. In case of external aggression (or when there is a 
danger of such aggression), the prime minister, in issuing orders to mobilize all or part 
of the SDF, must obtain prior (or ex post facto) approval of the Diet (Boei-shutsudo). 
 
 As for the actual working of the control mechanism, we need to look at the (1) acts and 
issues under control: budget, sending troops abroad, personnel appointment; (2) organs involved: 
parliamentary committees; and (3) mechanisms of control: legislations, government 
pronouncements, and statements in the Diet. 




the budget, to advise, to penalize and to approve certain issues or actions
25
. Issues include how to 
recruit, train and promote (personnel), what to buy (budget), and how to use (use of force). The 
following figure shows the frequencies of which each issue was discussed in the Diet
26
. We can 
see an increasing shift in emphasis, from personnel, budget to use of force. This is consistent 
with the findings of my subsequent chapters, in which I find a shift in emphasis on the method of 
control over time. In the immediate post war period, there was extensive scrutiny on whether and 
how to bring back pre-war imperial army officers into the SDF. Since quite a few pre-war 
officers eventually joined the SDF, attention to the personnel make-up of the SDF continued. 
Then, starting at around 1965, budgetary issues started to get attention. Between 1975 and 1990, 
we see a rise in discussion of budgetary matters. Finally, the reference to legal matter became 
consistently high in the 2000s, reflecting the number of legislations during the same period. 
Figure 2-1 Civilian Control: People, money or law? 
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In order for parliamentary control to be effective, most parliaments have created 
standing and special committees to deal with the various parliamentary dimensions involved in 
the oversight of armed forces. Japan is no exception, but it is important to note that no Special 
Committee on Defense existed until 1980. Instead, defense related laws were discussed in the 
Cabinet Committee, This was because Japan Defense Agency was then part of Prime Minister’s 
Office (Sori-fu), and matters pertaining to the Prime Minister’s Office was assigned to the 
Cabinet Committee. One can argue that the lack of a committee specifically assigned to oversee 
the SDF would hamper expertise necessary for the Diet and its members to conduct necessary 
oversight. However, ironically, the opposition parties that were arguably more keen than the 
ruling LDP to keep a watchful eye over the SDF repeatedly blocked LDP’s attempts to create 
such a committee. This is because the opposition feared that they would be coerced to 




While the opposition parties stood by their principle, possibly at the expense of their 
opportunity for oversight, neither was the ruling LDP eager to oversee the SDF. The lack of 
interest to be actively involved in defense matters is evident from the pattern of defense 
committee membership within the LDP. In their study of policy tribes (zoku), Inoguchi and Iwai 
found a peculiar pattern of membership in the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Defense 
Committee (Kokubo IInkai), that it is the reverse of most other zokus
28
. In other policy areas, 
LDP Diet members accumulated policy expertise in the committees within the LDP before 
becoming ministers. But in the case of defense, ministers became committee members only after 
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they complete their term as defense minister
29
.  
 This “reverse pattern” not only indicates the relative lack of popularity of defense 
matters, but had consequences for parliamentary oversight. Most of the LDP members of the 
Parliamentary Cabinet Committee members were LDP Defense Committee members, who 
tended to represent the interest of the Japan Defense Agency. Thus, it made a lot of sense for the 
JDA and SDF to nurture and educate their ministers in hopes that they will become cheerleaders 
for the agency. However, this could have been a detriment for parliamentary oversight. 
Parliamentary oversight was conducted by a committee which consisted of opposition party 
members that were ideologically in denial of the existence of the SDF, and LDP members who 
considered themselves protectors of the SDF. It is easy to imagine that pragmatic discussions 
within the committee would have been difficult, if not impossible. 
Figure 2-2  SDF and Defense in Diet Deliberations 
 
How did the lack of interest and expertise impact legislative activities in the Diet? Using 
the Diet deliberation database, I counted the number of times the SDF and Defense was 
mentioned in Diet deliberations. Figure 2-2 shows a significant drop in reference to the word 
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“defense” in the mid-1970s. Various explanations are possible for this drop: automatic renewal of 
the US-Japan treaty and subsequent waning of the opposition movement, and the formulation of 
the National Defense Program Outline in 1976 may have temporarily ended the debate on 
defense at the Diet level.  
 Can we see a similar pattern in the level of legislative activity within the Diet during the 
same period?  How often were the Law on the Establishment of the Defense Agency and the 
Law on the Self-Defense Forces and other laws that are under the administrative authority of the 
Japan Defense Agency either revised or updated? Since all changes in organizational and 
operational matters required revisions of the law, one can argue that the Japanese Diet has more 
oversight powers compared with other countries, which rely primarily on budget oversight. How 
active then, were deliberations regarding the SDF law within the Diet?  
 From the period between 1956 and 1982, no new laws were legislated until the 
legislation of Anti-Biological Weapons Law in 1982. Only revisions of the Law on the 
Establishment of the Defense Agency and the Law on the Self-Defense Forces (Boei Ni Ho) took 
place, but mostly with regards to organizational matters, not operational matters. Important 
organizational changes in the Ground, Air and Maritime Self Defense Forces such as the 
introduction of the five-regional army system (GSDF) and establishment of the Air Educational 
Squadron (ASDF) in 1959, creation of the 13-division system (GSDF) and Self Defense Force 
Fleet and Education Squadron (MSDF) in 1961 are some of the examples of legislative activities 
involving important organizational changes. Operational revisions were limited to matters to 
improve the SDF’s relationship with the rest of the society, such as bomb disposal (1958), 







 The low level of legislative activity in addition to the lack of a special committee for 
defense until 1980 seems to suggest a complete lack of parliamentary oversight of the SDF 
during the Cold War. However, if we take a different view of the Diet, and evaluate its role not 
just as a legislative body but also as an arena for debate among parties and its members, a 
different picture emerges. A number of important “ex-ante” control mechanisms, limiting the role 
of the SDF and other military related policies in Japan were made in the context of Diet 
deliberations, not through formal legislative activities. Important decisions in the history of 
Japan’s security policy, such as “No SDF dispatch abroad (1954, Upper House resolution)”, 
“arms export ban (1967, Lower House Audit Committee
31
, Prime Minister Sato)”, “Non-nuclear 
Principle (1967, Budget Committee, Prime Minister Sato) are some notable examples
32
. It is 
important to note, moreover, that most of these statements were made by bureaucrats from the 
Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Japan Defense Agency, and other related ministries, speaking on 
behalf of cabinet ministers. 
These government statements, from the point of view of the opposition parties, were 
“positive and concrete realization of the spirit of Article Nine, as a product of Diet 
deliberations
33
.” From the point of view of the ruling party, these statements, made in the context 
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of fending off opposition’s criticism about the precarious standing of the SDF in light of the 
Constitution, were perfectly rational as a short-term solution in defending its position on defense 
policy. These ex-ante “trip wires” also made it easier for the LDP to monitor the SDF in the 
medium term, since any possible breach of these self-imposed limitations will come to the 
attention to the opposition and the media, and the bureaucrats will rush to defend the previously 
stated position on behalf of the LDP politicians. The ritual became so commonplace during the 
Cold War, such that one well-known JDA bureaucrat called the give-and-take with the opposition 
party politicians within the Diet a kabuki performance
34
. The SDF, in other words, were 
controlled in “auto-pilot” mode from the point of view of the ruling party. 
While these ex-ante control mechanisms allowed politicians to exercise control of the 
SDF almost cost free, in the long term, these auto-pilot control mechanisms came at a cost for 
LDP politicians. First, these mechanisms turned out to be self-binding for politicians themselves. 
They increased the political cost of reversing policy to enable active use of the SDF. Second, 
these restrictions led to a loss of leverage by politicians over bureaucrats and the SDF in terms of 
expertise, and created bureaucratic inertia to maintain the status quo. Third, the long-term, 
paradoxical consequence was that the SDF, while frustrated by the constraints, came to enjoy a 
certain level of freedom within those limits. Since the bureaucracy tried to avoid an impasse with 
the opposition in the Diet, they tried at all costs to avoid politicizing any matters related to the 
SDF. The SDF, in other words, were too sensitive to be politicized, the institution became almost 
invisible, especially in urban areas where there are no SDF installations. The SDF was widely 
discussed within the Diet and among academics as an abstract concept, but there was very little 
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active policy discussion over who they are, what they do, and how they think. As a result, the 
SDF became relatively autonomous in areas where military expertise is important, especially 
procurement, personnel, education and training. The resulting paradox, was that containing the 
SDF through ex-ante controls made politicians potentially more vulnerable to the SDF in the 
long term. 
In sum, in terms of legislative activity and committee oversight, civilian control at the 
Diet level was limited during the Cold War. However, if you focus on the Diet as an “arena” for 
debate, a different picture emerges. The Diet provided a stage for numerous “government 
statements” that became the basis for subsequent course of defense policy, especially with 
regards to what the SDF can do. Most of the statements during this period were meant to limit 
rather than enable the SDF. Since most of the legislative changes during this period involved 
organizational, not operational matters, a peculiar situation emerged: the roles and missions of 
the SDF came to be defined by the precarious architecture of government statements over time, 
rather than through legislative action or constitutional change. As a result, the Prime Minister’s 
own leadership and policy options were constrained by the accumulation of the statements made 
by former Prime Ministers, even if they were not written into law. 
 
The Cabinet Level 
The cabinet is responsible for administrative work related to defense issues. The prime 
minister, on behalf of the cabinet, exercises supreme control and supervision of the SDF.  
The prime minister gives orders to the director-general of the Defense Agency (Minister 
of State for Defense, a cabinet level post), who in turn gives the orders to the chiefs of 
staff of the three services. The Security Council of Japan, which is established within the 
cabinet, must be consulted in case of important decision making. The constitution 






 There are two aspects to civilian control at the cabinet level: prime minister’s control of 
the SDF through the Minister of Defense, and through the Security Council. Let me look at these 
two aspects in turn. 
 Between 1954 and 2011, 70 Diet members were appointed Minister of Defense. During 
the Cold War, 43 ministers were appointed within the time span of 37 years, making the average 
length of appointment just a little less than a year. While frequent cabinet reshuffling was the 
norm for all ministers during the LDP administration, the average time span is for defense 
ministers were even shorter, due to the fact that defense ministers frequently resigned, in some 
cases due to scandals in the JDA or for personal problems
35
. During the same period, half of the 
ministers were appointed for the first time, and most were not members of the LDP Defense 
Committee, as I described earlier. With the exception of the hawkish Yasuhiro Nakasone and 
Taku Yamazaki, all the defense ministers were considered to be dovish types, many coming from 
relatively dovish factions (habatsu).  
 The selection of non-defense experts, along with the short span of appointment together 
made it difficult to expect effective control of the SDF though cabinet ministers. While these 
ministers, once they resigned, tended to identify themselves as defense experts, they were more 
likely to become cheerleaders rather than providers of independent oversight. Whether or not 
they end up siding with the civilian bureaucracy or the uniformed officers seem to depend on 
personal histories and issues they face, which I would examine in later chapters. 
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 Did the Security Council then provide a path for the Prime Minister to effectively 
control the SDF at the cabinet level? Established in 1956 as the Defense Council, the Security 
Council’s role, as written, was “when asked by the Prime Minister, to deliberate on important 
matters related to the security of Japan and to respond (present a plan) to the Prime Minister,” as 
well as to “voluntarily offer advice to the Prime Minister on matters related to national defense.” 
In 1986, the role of “responding to national emergencies” was added to its job description, when 
Prime Minister Nakasone tried to revamp the moribund institution, renaming it the Security 
Council. 
The Security Council, however, did little of that. Defense Council (later Security 
Council) meetings were not held at times when important security policy decisions were made, 
such as the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, or in critical emergency situations, such as 
the defection of a Soviet fighter pilot to Hokkaido in 1976. Instead, they were held twice or three 
times per year, primarily to discuss matters concerning the defense budget. Furthermore, due to 
its institutional legacy of having been established to restrain the power of Prime Minister 
Yoshida and the pre-war military, it was not considered a means to enhance the power of the 
prime minister or to utilize the Self Defense Forces but, instead, to keep a watchful eye over the 
two. 
In sum, it was not only in defense policy matters that Prime Minister and cabinet level 
leadership was difficult, due to institutional factors explained in the previous section. Delegation 
to the bureaucracy with little political oversight was prevalent in other policy areas as well, 
during the long LDP administration. What was significant about defense was that delegation was 




who were in charge of controlling the SDF. This misunderstanding was revealed in an exchange 
within the Diet, when a Diet member asked a JDA official whether or not civilian control was in 
fact effective. If the expectation was as such, was civilian control at the bureaucratic level 
effective? Did the bureaucracy monitor the SDF on behalf of the politicians? This question will 
be addressed in the next section. 
 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Level:  
The Defense Minister is assisted in planning, administration and management of the 
JSDF by the State Secretary for Defense (Fukudaijin), and two Parliamentary 
Secretaries for Defense. The Internal Bureau (naikyoku) which consists of civilian 
defense bureaucrats, the Joint Staff Council (JSC), the Ground Staff Office (GSO), the 
Maritime Staff Office (MSO), and the Air Staff Office (ASO) support the Minister of 
States for Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic matters related the work 
of the JSDF.   
 
 The paragraph above explains the expected division of authority within the JDA. While 
its content seems relatively uncontroversial on paper, there was continuous debate over the role 
of the civilian bureaucrats (naikyoku) which stood in between the politicians and the SDF. Two 
issues are at stake here, accountability and effectiveness. First, is it unproblematic, from the point 
of view of democratic accountability, to expect the civilian bureaucracy, who are neither 
democratically elected nor politically appointed, to control the SDF on behalf of politicians? 
Second, does the constant intervention of civilian bureaucracy between politicians and the SDF 
hamper the effective use of the SDF?    
 Provisions in the SDF Law (Jieitai-Ho) and Defense Agency Establishment Act 




between the politicians and the SDF. In Article 9 of the SDF law, the Chief of Staffs of the 
Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces, together with the Joint Chief of Staff, are 
deemed to be the providers of expert military advice. While this provision appears to allow for 
the SDF officers to “directly” advise the defense minister, the Article 16 of the Defense Agency 
Establishment Act stipulates that the civilian bureaucracy may and should stand in between. The 
Directors-General of the Bureaus are expected to “support” the Minister of Defense when the 
Minister gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Ground 
Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff. While the meaning of “support” can be interpreted in many 
ways, the civilian bureaucrat has cited this law as justification for them to intervene or at least be 
present when SDF officers advise the defense minister. 
More concretely, a government ordinance (kunrei) on administrative procedures and the 
“defense councilor system” were the two mechanisms in which the civilian bureaucracy 
intervened. The Japan Safety Agency ordinance number 9 (Hoancho Kunrei #9) prohibited direct 
contact not only between SDF officers and the defense minister, but also bureaucrats of other 
ministries and politicians. This ordinance was abolished in June 1997, but the spirit of the 
ordinance still continues, since the JDA Law remains effective. The second mechanism, the 
defense councilor system, is one in which defense councilors are expected to “support the 
defense minister when basic policies within the jurisdiction of the JDA are decided.” Designed to 
replicate the political appointee system in the United States, the initial expectation was to appoint 
respected officials outside the JDA. However, the position was taken over by the civilian 
bureau-chiefs, effectively adding another basis for “intervention” of the civilian bureaucracy. 




than substantial if the bureaucrats did not try to stop what they wanted to do. In other words, 
while it may be a source of frustration, bureaucratic intervention may not matter so much for the 
SDF if the preferences of the civilian bureaucracy and SDF officers were not so different. Thus, 
the extent of preference divergence between the civilians and SDF officers is important in this 
regard, and I will further explore this point in subsequent chapters. 
How can the above three levels of civilian control mechanisms evaluated from the point 
of view of accountability and effectiveness? First, weak political leadership, due to the weakness 
of the Prime Minister and dependence on ex-ante control over ex-post control at the political 
level led to a disjointed system of accountability. This situation gave the civilian bureaucracy 
justification to consider their roles to “monitor control the SDF on behalf of the Japanese public”, 
rather than on behalf of elected politicians. While the resultant policy may have been the same, it 
became a source of constant frustration on the side of the SDF officers. From the point of view of 
effectiveness, such system was sustainable only because the likelihood of effectively “using” the 
SDF was considered to be low. In other words, the problems inherent in lack of political 
leadership in controlling the SDF were not evident when the emphasis was on “protection from 
the SDF,” rather than “protection by the SDF.” 
 
Changes in Japanese System of Civilian Control: From Ex-Ante to Ex-Post Control 
External events in the 1990s caused the political cost of delegation to rise. First, the 
so-called “traumatic experience of the Gulf War,” that is, Japanese failure to respond quickly to 
an international crisis, and the sense of under-appreciation by the international community 




leadership in order to decide quickly and the importance of including military (SDF) options as a 
form of international contribution. As a result, politicians became aware of the cost of delegation, 
and the price they had paid for their relative inattention to military matters. Second, the LDP’s 
fall from power in 1993 led to a series of institutional reforms that changed the 
executive-legislative relationship, and the political cost of delegating to bureaucrats. Institutional 
reforms took place at three levels, electoral reform, Diet reform, and administrative reform. In 
short, in the past decade politicians have started to “take back” control over policy formulation.  
While these reforms involve all areas of policy (and not just defense policy,) consequences of the 
reform should be most significant in the case of defense, where previously, there was very little 
interest among politicians except for a limited few. 
 
Diet Level: Electoral Reform and Diet Reform 
First of all, electoral reforms eliminated SNTV from the Lower House, giving way 
instead to a mixed system whereby voters are given two votes—one for the single member 
district (SMD) and the other for the proportional representation (PR) district. Of the 500 Lower 
House Diet members, 300 and 200 are elected in the SMD-tier and the PR-tier, respectively. The 
200 PR seats are allocated to 11 regional PR districts (=district magnitude ranging from 6 to 29). 
The Lower House PR system permits voters to cast their vote only for a specific party rather than 
an individual candidate. 
Although the Lower House began implementing a mixed system in the 1996 elections, 
the Upper House had already been using a similar system since 1983. As a result of the changes 




remaining four-fifths elected in MMD using two different methods: two-fifths of the Upper 
House were elected in the old MMD/SNTV districts, whereas the remaining two-fifths were 
elected by proportional representation rule with closed party list. 
The elimination of intraparty competition at the polls—completely from the Lower 
House and three-fifths in the Upper House—significantly affected intraparty dynamics. It 
removed institutional obstacles that had weakened the previous LDP party leadership vis-à-vis 
rank-and-file politicians and, more important, habatsu leaders. After the introduction of the new 
mixed system, the LDP leadership began developing basic rules about candidate nomination. The 
LDP has restricted the candidacy of those who have lost their SMD seats for two consecutive 
elections. Those who lost their SMD seat were not included in the PR list in the following 
electoral cycle. The LDP also introduced strict age restrictions in the PR-tier. Unlike in the 
medium-sized, multi-member districts, where individual LDP politicians “owned” their home 
grounds, the party began to assert its “property right” over SMDs. Whereas habatsu could 
formerly field their own candidates without seeking official party nominations, under the new 
system they were forced to compete for the single official nomination in each district. This is to 
say, the president had the final say when it came to choosing a candidate. Thus, the role of the 
habatsu in candidate nomination drastically declined, diminishing the constraining role of the 
habatsu over the prime minister. 
Furthermore, the demise of the habatsu and new political reforms that strengthened the 
position of politicians vis-à-vis the bureaucracy also increased the political value of gaining 
policy expertise, and raised the cost of habatsu-based system of ministerial selection. Recall that 




previously argued, with the main institutional infrastructure eliminated as a result of the 1994 
reforms, habatsu continued to weaken. This meant that habatsu also began to lose control over 
the allocation of positions within the LDP and the cabinet. Under the habatsu-based allocation of 
positions, one’s policy expertise mattered very little. As the political fortunes of the habatsu 
waned, other important political reforms were implemented that further weakened habatsu-based 
politics. Put simply, these reforms increased possible political return on policy expertise and 
were generally aimed at concentrating power in the hands of prime ministers rather than habatsu 
leaders, and elected officials rather than bureaucrats. 
Second, since this electoral reform, policy expertise became important, as policy 
differences between parties, including defense issues, have become important. Evidence of this 
change in incentives can be been among younger generation politicians, who have become more 
vocal on defense related matters. As described earlier, policy areas, such as defense, security and 
foreign policies used to be very unpopular among LDP Diet members. This was because policies 
that addressed the collective good of the whole nation were “non-divisible” and so gave zero 
electoral returns under the MMD/SNTV mechanism, which required constant oiling of one’s 
personal political machine by distributing “pork.” Under the old electoral rules, any time and 
effort spent cultivating expertise in these areas was seen as time wasted. The 1994 Electoral 
Reform removed the disincentives for efforts to cultivate expertise in non-divisible issue areas. 
After the Lower House elections in 1996, Japanese politicians, as a rule, became freer to pursue 
their interests in the issues of security, foreign policy, and defense. In other words, Japanese 
politicians today face fewer penalties against engaging in policy debates in these areas. The 




place since the institutional reforms also support the view presented here. 
 
Table 2-1  Profiles of Japan Defense Agency Ministers (Estevez-Abe and Hikotani, 2008a) 








1981-1996 6.05 20.0% 0.0% 30.0% 
Post-electoral reform 
1997-1999 




6.38 37.5% 25.0% 75.0% 
 
Two reforms within the Diet are also changing the incentives of politicians in terms of 
how they deal with the bureaucracy, as the cost of delegation to bureaucrats rose while the 
benefit of being informed has changed. The government commissioner (seifu-iin) system, 
whereby bureaucrats were appointed as special commissioners to take part in Diet sessions to 
answer questions in lieu of their ministers, was abolished. As a result, bureaucrats were 
prohibited from answering questions directed to the government at the Diet. Only ministers, state 
secretaries, and parliamentary secretaries are now allowed to take part in debates in the Diet. The 
new emphasis on the importance of policy expertise was highly compatible with the removal of 
disincentives for policy specialization. Furthermore, in the context of a new power struggle 
between habatsu leaders and the party president, the latter, in his capacity as prime minister, 
began to use policy expertise as a requirement for appointing his cabinet ministers and 
advisors—a newly created position in the wake of political reforms in the late 1990s. 
Another reform is to introduce the National Basic Policy Committee. This reform, 
modeled after the U.K., requires the Prime Minister to respond to questions from opposition 




making, and at the same time force them to become knowledgeable about policy issues, not just 
distributive but broader public policy issues such as defense.  Third, the expansion of political 
positions within the cabinet offices means the political leadership will rely less on bureaucrats in 
individual ministries for expert advice in making decisions on security matters. 
 
Cabinet Reform 
Although the Japanese government had undergone continuous small administrative 
reforms since the 1960s to enhance the power of the cabinet and the prime minister, it was 
Ryutaro Hashimoto who, as prime minister, planned a dramatic reform and implemented it in 
1997 as the minister for administrative reform. The purpose of the reform, clearly articulated in 
the final report from the Administrative Reform Conference, was to establish an administrative 
system better able to make comprehensive, strategic and agile decisions, primarily by creating a 
mechanism to enhance the leadership of the prime minister
36
. 
The revisions of the Cabinet Law in 2000 further strengthened the institutional authority 
of the prime minister and the cabinet secretary, giving them the “right to propose (hatsugi ken)” 
important basic policies at cabinet meetings
37
 and to “plan and draft plans (kikaku ritsuan).
38
” 
These changes gave the cabinet secretariat legal authority to initiate policy independently from 
ministries and to preside over the policy-making and coordination process. 
Since then, more than ten pieces of legislation have been initiated and administered by the 
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cabinet secretariat, including the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of 2001.
39
 Before 2000, 
only two laws were administered (shokan) by the cabinet secretariat—the Cabinet Law, and the 
Law on the Security Council of Japan. From the point of view of the individual ministries, giving 
up the authority to “initiate” laws is not a small matter: the “initiation” of laws means that the 
ministry in charge will write the draft of the bill itself, which eventually will define the law’s 
bureaucratic scope. That ministers would generally prefer to keep matters related to what they 
see as their own “turf” in their own hands is understandable. So was their strong resistance to this 
change during the deliberation of Hashimoto’s administrative reform.
40
 
The importance of the change, on the other hand, extended not just to the ministries, but 
to politicians, as well. Giving the cabinet secretariat the authority to administer laws meant that 
old legislative processes could be changed. Traditionally, when the government initiated a bill, 
the relevant ministry would negotiate with the ruling party prior to cabinet approval. This meant 
that different zoku politicians had a chance to influence the content of the bill before it was 
introduced to the Diet.
41
 
In contrast, under the new rules, the prime minister’s leadership in the legislative 
process is enhanced, whereas the old zoku influence is diminished. The cabinet secretariat, with 
its new statutory authority and with the blessing of the prime minister, could (1) gain informal 
cabinet approval before negotiation with the party, (2) deal with multiple zoku at once and 
diminish one zoku’s leverage, and (3) prior to introduction of the bill to the Diet and even prior to 
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negotiation with the LDP, negotiate with coalition partners and opposition parties as a 
representative of the cabinet and the prime minister. Although not all bills would be or should be 
introduced in this fashion, that the prime minister has gained a legislative capacity, to be used at 
his discretion, is of great significance. 
Strengthened statutory authority does not guarantee enhanced cabinet leadership unless 
those who support the cabinet, politicians, and bureaucrats, have the capacity to fulfill their role. 
Initiating and administrating a law is not an easy task, since it requires enough expertise to draft 
a bill and to be able to deal with the Diet deliberations. The increased attention to the positions of 
Chief Cabinet Secretary (kanbo chokan) and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (kanbo fukuchokan, 
seimu) is an admission of the fact. When the cabinet secretariat administers a law, the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary must respond to questions at the Diet. In addition, he must also serve as the 
cabinet spokesperson, giving press conferences twice a day. A reflection of his increased 
importance, the Chief Cabinet Secretary is now officially listed above the five remaining cabinet 
members in order of succession to the prime minister and has, in effect, become the deputy prime 
minister. 
The role of the administrative Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (kanbo fukuchokan, jimu) 
has increased alongside the expanded role of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Administrative Deputy 
Chief Cabinet Secretaries are usually selected from the pre-war Ministry of Home Affairs and 
have a much longer tenure than prime ministers. Therefore, their institutional memory has been 
crucial to prime ministers, especially at the beginning of their administration. 
However, it is obvious that these three people cannot do the job of supporting the prime 




secretariat. The staff members working for the cabinet secretariat, mostly bureaucrats seconded 
from ministries, were generally considered to be fighting on their home ministry’s bureaucratic 
turf in the secretariat, and such organizational arrangements were not conducive to overcoming 
the turf battles to work for the prime minister and his cabinet. A number of measures were taken 
to overcome this problem. 
The first was the establishment of the Cabinet Office to support the cabinet secretariat in 
making plans and arrangements to integrate the policies of each ministry, as well as of new 
councils within the cabinet office, such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. 
Furthermore, a number of new politically appointed positions were introduced. With an 
executive order, the prime minister could now appoint as many personal assistants to the prime 
minister.
42
 In addition, the prime minister could now appoint up to five special advisors instead 
of three. The appointment of Yukio Okamoto, a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, to be 
in charge of Iraq reconstruction during the Koizumi administration is one example. Even more 
significant, perhaps, is that the three new positions of assistant chief cabinet secretaries have 
become politically appointed positions. 
The second measure to assist the prime minister was a drastic organizational reshuffling. 
The three offices of Internal Affairs (headed by a Ministry of Finance official), External Affairs 
(Foreign Affairs), and National Security Affairs (Ministry of Defense) were abolished and 
replaced by three Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (naikaku kanbo fukuchokan ho) positions, 
under whom would work about 100 staffers. Although some division of labor among the three 
still existed, and only former bureaucrats were appointed as the Assistant Chief Cabinet 
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Secretaries, it has been argued that the fact that they can be politically hired and fired heightened 
the sense of loyalty to the prime minister. Furthermore, ad hoc policy groups were established for 
issues involving more than one ministry. These groups are formed and dissolved as necessary, 
and their legal standings vary by laws, government orders, or without any legal basis. For 
example, in the case of Iraq policy, the “Supporting Iraqi Reconstruction” room was established. 
The establishment of the ad hoc group contributed to the increase size of the secretariat, which is 
currently approximately 700. 
Third, the Security Council of Japan, long considered an ineffective, rubber-stamping 
instituion, gained a new life. The 2001 central government reform opened new possibilities for 
the Security Council. The statutory authority and organizational capacity of the cabinet 
secretariat, which had long been in charge of administrating Security Council meetings, was 
enhanced. More important, Prime Minister Koizumi and his staff began to consider the Security 
Council an important mechanism not only for building consensus among its members but to 
create momentum for the government to come up with a concrete plan and announce its 
intensions to the public. 
Furthermore, the Law on the Security Council of Japan was revised alongside the 
passing of the Emergency Law in 2003. It was written into law that the Security Council is in 
charge of identifying an emergency situation and coming up with basic guidelines (taisho kihon 
hoshin) to deal with the situation. To effectively fulfill this role, the Contingency Response 
Committee (jitai taisho senmon iinkai),
43
 a committee consisting of bureau-chief level officials 
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of relevant ministries and the Joint Chief of Staff of the SDF was established. Although 
(fortunately) this committee has not yet convened in an emergency situation, committee 
members met on a regular basis (once a month). Members say that the meetings have been 
successful and, contribute to interagency coordination.
44
 
Finally, in November 2013, the National Security Council of Japan was established 
under the second Abe administration. Three aspects of this new organization are important in 
considering its impact on the Prime Minister and his cabinet’s leadership, and reflect what Prime 
Minister Abe attempted to do in his first administration. First, in addition to the original Security 
Council format consisting of nine ministers (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Minister of Land and 
Transportation, Minister of Defense, and Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission), 
two new formats were introduced to enhance the capacity of the Council: “Four-Minister 
Meeting” format (consisting of Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and Minister of Defense) was established, which is to meet on a regular basis and to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Guard, Ministry of Land and Transportation, Resource and Energy Agency, Ministry of Economics and 
Industry, Ministry of Finance (Director of Customs Bureau and zaimukan) MOFA, Ministry of Justice, 
shobocho, and the Chief of the General Staff Office. There is also a subcommittee (director level), called 
the renraku chosei kaigi. 
44
 The proposal by the Prime Minster Abe’s expert study group (First Abe Administration) to establish a 
“National Security Council” was not so much a radical departure from the past, as was often reported, but 
rather a continuation of the changes discussed above. The main differences are: (1)fewer official members 
of the Security Council (prime minister, cabinet secretary, foreign minister, defense minister, plus more 
ministers as deemed necessary); (2) politicians as National Security Advisors (instead of politically 
appointed Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries with former defense bureaucrats currently playing that 
role); (3) meetings on a regular basis (twice a month); (4) a secretariat of about 10 to 20, including private 




“give fundamental direction of foreign and defense policies concerning national security
45
”  and 
a “Emergency Situations Minister Meeting,” which is to meet in case of emergencies
46
.   
The second important aspect was the establishment of the position of the Special 
Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security, who is “in charge of important policies 
regarding national security
47
.” And finally, the National Security Secretariat was established in 
the Cabinet Secretariat to take charge of the planning, drafting, and coordination of fundamental 
principles and significant matters of foreign and defense policies concerning national security, 
administrative work, and integrating and compiling materials and information provided for the 
NSC. This is in essence a formalization and strengthening of the staff who previously worked as 
staff for the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security Affairs (naikaku kanbo 
fukuchokan ho) which I discussed above. The composition of the National Security Secretariat, 
especially whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defense will be the “dominant” 




In sum, the capacity of the prime minister, the cabinet, and the cabinet secretariat has 
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 For instance, in case of a “foreign invasion in territorial waters” situation, the Minister of Justice, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation, Minister of Defense, and 
the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. 
47
 Yosuke Isozaki, an Upper House member and close confidante of Abe, was appointed as the first 
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security. 
48
 The current staffing is as follows: Shotaro Yachi (Secretary General of National Security Secretariat, 
former MOFA), Nobushige Takamizawa (Deputy Secretary General of National Security Secretariat, 
MOD), Nobumitsu Kanehara (Deputy Security General of National Security Secretariat, MOFA) are the 
leadership. In addition, three councilors (two from MOD, one from MOFA) six team leaders (three from 
MOD, two from MOFA, one from National Police Agency) were appointed. One point of note, which I 
discuss in the conclusion, is that one of the three councilors is a Major General of the Air Self Defense 





been strengthened, both in terms of institutional (statutory) authority and organizational capacity. 
This has made possible major changes in the legislative process. The cabinet secretariat is now in 
charge from the beginning to the end, giving the prime minister more capacity to exercise 
top-down leadership, and to possibly control the SDF ex post. 
 
Bureaucratic Reform 
 The most visible sign of change at the bureaucratic level is the upgrading of the Japan 
Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense. However, the more substantial change came from 
the series of reforms, initiated by Shigeru Ishiba, the twice appointed defense minister in the 
2000s. The series of scandals in 2007, including the arrest of the administrative vice minister, 
intelligence breaches, false reporting in the chain of command during the Indian Ocean refuleling 
operation and an accident between an Aegis-class warship and a fishing boat called into question 
the effectiveness of the SDF and whether it can be held accountable. After a thorough review by 
a government commission consisting of ex-bureaucrats, retired generals and academics, a plan 
for organizational reform of the Ministry of Defense was laid out. Most importantly, it was 
deemed counterproductive to try to contain the SDF as a means of control. Instead, the 
commission proposed engaging the SDF in the policy process
49
.  
The most notable change was abolishing the defense councilor system (sanjikan) and 
instead introducing the position of the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, which I will 
discuss further in Chapter Three. This position has since been filled by four retired SDF officers 
and one retired JDA civilian official. The role of the Defense Council, consisting of both SDF 
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officers and civilian personnel, in assisting the defense minister was also clarified. Another 
notable change was abolishing the Bureau of Operational Policy and instead implementing 
operations under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, on orders of the Minister. Important matters, such 
as operations by units and defense planning are to be submitted for approval of the Minister of 
Defense after deliberation at the Defense Council. 
Does this mean that the civilian bureaucracy no longer “intervenes” between the 
minister of defense and SDF officers? It is important to note that Article 20 of the Defense 
Agency Establishment Act, is still in effect as the Article 12 of the new Ministry of Defense Law. 
Thus, despite all organizational changes, the legal basis for civilian intervention remains 
unchanged. However, it may be more important to focus on the substantial meaning of 
intervention. As I explore further in subsequent chapters, there are signs that the preferences of 
the civilian bureaucracy and SDF officers have converged over time. If this is the case, the 
bureaucracy may no longer be loyal agents of the politicians or self-appointed watchdog over the 
SDF on behalf of the general public.  
 
Conclusion 
Japan’s system of civilian control, characterized by (1) the extensive delegation of 
decision making from the politicians to the bureaucracy, (2) the emphasis on ex-ante control 
mechanisms for controlling the military, and (3) dependence on the bureaucracy for ex-post 
monitoring persisted during the Cold War because the perceived cost of delegation was low. 
However, changes in the international environment and the series of institutional reforms in the 




bureaucrats. Now, the politicians have been attempting to “take back” control of the SDF, as they 
delegate less to the bureaucrats, and at the same time to relax the “ex-ante” control mechanism 
that have been placed in the past. In other words, the politicians have taken back the steering 
wheel, and at the same time have started to turn off the cruise control as well as the various 
“brakes” on the military. 
 How will this change the nature of civil-military relations? Politicians may come to 
realize that life may have been easier with the brakes on because they provided a comfortable 
formula for military policy. If a permanent law to dispatch SDF troops abroad is to be passed, 
when, how, and to what extent the Diet should be involved in such decisions has to be 
determined. It is especially important to be aware that there may not be self-evident reasons of 
national interest to dispatch or not to dispatch troops, so decision making might be difficult. 
 How the relationship between the politicians and the SDF turn out to be, with less 
restrictions on both sides, will depend on the how divergent their preferences are, and will be. If 
the politicians and the SDF officers differ on what they perceive to be the national interest, or 
what the criteria for dispatching troops may be, conflict is inevitable. The preferences of SDF 
officers were previously either assumed to be more militaristic or insignificant because they were 
effectively contained. However, there is also a possibility that civil-military preferences had not 
in fact diverged much in the past, and that ironically it might diverge more in the future under a 
more complex international environment. Therefore, we need to first examine what the ex-ante 
and ex-post control mechanisms were, how they worked, and then open the “black box”, that is, 
to address what the SDF’s policy preferences were, and whether there is a civil-military gap, as I 








 The composition of the Japan Defense Agency (later Ministry of Defense) personnel, 
both civilian and military, changed in the past sixty years, affecting the relationship between the 
two. Immediate post-war officers consisted mostly of pre-war officers, who did not retire as late 
as in the 1980s. The civilian officials, on the other hand, initially consisted mostly of pre-war 
Interior Ministry (Naimusho) bureaucrats, intent on avoiding resurgence of the military. I will 
examine how the changes in the personnel composition affected the mechanism in which the 
SDF was controlled, as well as the possible convergence of civilian and military preferences over 
the years. 
 
Overview: The Civilian Personnel 
 Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was established in 1954, and the first group of civilian 
personnel was hired in 1955. This means that both the leadership of the JDA and its predecessors, 
the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobi Tai) and National Safety Agency 
(Hoancho) ,consisted mostly of civilian personnel that were originally hired in other ministries 
and agencies. In the early years, most of the personnel were former Ministry of Interior 
(Naimusho) personnel, mostly with background in police administration. Even after the JDA 
started hiring its own people, only 42 people were hired between 1955 and 1968, between two to 







Table 3-1: Colonization and Decolonization of Japan Defense Agency / Ministry of Defense Part 1 










 Name Origin Name Origin  Name  Name  Name  
1952 Keiichi Masuhara MOI         
1953 Keiichi Masuhara MOI         
1954 Keiichi Masuhara MOI          
1955 Keiichi Masuhara MOI         
1956 Keiichi Masuhara MOI         
1957 Hisashi Imai MOI       Morio Aoki MOFA 
1958 Hisashi Imai MOI       Morio Aoki MOFA 
1959 HIsashi Imai MOI       HIsaji Hattori MOFA 
1960 Muneo Tokano MOI Yozo Kato MOI     Hisaji Hattori MOFA 
1961 Muneo Tokano MOI Yozo Kato MOI     Jiro Inagawa MOFA 
1962 Muneo Tokano MOI Yozo Kato MOI     Jiro Inagawa MOFA 
1963 Yozo Kato MOI Yoshio Miwa MOI Osamu Kaihara MOI   JIro Inagawa MOFA 
1964 Yoshio Miwa MOI Hisao Obata MOP Osamu Kaihara MOI   Jiro Inagawa MOFA 
1965 Yoshio Miwa MOI Osamu Kaihara MOI Yutaka Shimada MOI   JIro Inagawa MOFA 
1966 Yoshio Miwa MOI Osamu Kaihara MOI Yutaka Shimada MOI   Jiro Inagawa MOFA 
1967 Hisao Obata MOP Yutaka Shimada MOI Motoo Shishido MOI   Motoo Ogiso MOFA 
1968 HIsao Obata MOP Yutaka Shimada MOI Motoo Shishido MOI   Seiki Tani MOFA 
1969 HIsao Obata MOP Yutaka Shimada MOI Motoo Shishido MOI   Seiki Tani MOFA 
1970 Makoto Utsumi MOI Motoo Shishido MOI Takuya Kubo MOI   Seiki Tani MOFA 
1971 Makoto Utsumi MOI Motoo Shishido MOI Takuya Kubo MOI   Kazuo Suzuki MOFA 
1972 Yutaka Shimada MOI Kazumasa Tashiro MOF Takuya Kubo MOI   Keiichi Tachibana MOFA 
1973 Yutaka Shimada MOI Akira Maruyama MOI Akira Maruyama MOI   Keiichi Tachibana MOFA 
1974 Kazumasa Tashiro MOF Ichiro Saito NPA Akira Maruyama MOI   Toru Yamato MOFA 
1975 Takuya Kubo MOI Ichiro Saito NPA Keiichi Ito Pers   Toru Yamato MOFA 




Keiichi Ito Pers   Hiroshi Miyazawa MOFA 
1977 Akira Maruyama MOI Masami Takeoka NPA Toru Hara MOF   HIrohiko Otsuka MOFA 
1978 Akira Tanri MOF Akira Shiota MOH Toru Hara MOF   Hisahiko Okazaki MOFA 
1979 Akira Tanri MOF Akira Shiota MOH Toru Hara MOF   Hisahiko Okazaki MOFA 
1980 Toru Hara MOF Haruo Natsume DPA Akira Shiota MOH   Hisahiko Okazaki MOFA 
1981 Toru Hara MOF Haruo Natsume DPA Akira Shiota MOH   Hirokazu Arai MOFA 
1982 Minoru Yoshino MOF Atsuyuki Sassa NPA Haruo Natsume DPA   Hirokazu Arai MOFA 
1983 Haruo Natume DPA Atsuyuki Sassa NPA Shinji Yazaki MOF   Kiyoshi Furukawa MOFA 
1984 Haruo Natume DPA Seiki Nishihiro  JDA Shinji Yazaki MOF   Kiyoshi Furukawa MOFA 
1985 Shinji Yazaki MOF Muneo SHishikura MOF Seiki Nishihiro JDA   Hiromoto Seki MOFA 
1986 Shinji Yazaki MOF Kazutaka Tomofuji  JDA Seiki Nishihiro JDA   HiromotoSeki MOFA 
1987 Muneo Sisikura MOF Tomoharu Yoda NPA Seiki Nishihiro JDA   Ryuji Onodera MOFA 






1989 Seiki Nishihiro JDA Yoshio Kodama JDA Akira Hiyoshi MOF   Ryuji Onodera MOFA 




  Katsuhisa Uchida MOFA 
1991 Akira Hiyoshi MOF Naoaki Murata JDA Akira Hatakeyama MOF   Katsuhisa Uchida MOFA 
1992 Akira HIyoshi MOF Naoaki Murata JDA Akira Hatakeyama MOF   Yushu Takashima MOFA 
1993 Aikira Hatakeyama MOF Noboru Hoshuyama JDA Naoaki Murata JDA   Yushu Takashima MOFA 
1994 Akira Hatakeyama MOF Yasuaki Mitsui JDA Naoaki Murata JDA   Kanji Koike MOFA 
1995 Naoaki Murata JDA Seiji Ema JDA Masahiro Akiyama MOF   Kanji Koike MOFA 
1996 Naoaki Murata JDA Seiji Ema JDA Masahiro Akiyama MOF   Ryuichiro Yamazaki MOFA 
1997 Masahiro Akiyama MOF Yasuhiro Okoshi JDA Ken Sato MOF Yoji Ota JDA Ryuichiro Yamazaki MOFA 












Ryuichiro Yamazaki MOFA 
1999 Seiji Ema JDA Takemasa Moriya JDA Ken Sato MOF Kyoji Yanagisawa JDA Yoshiki Mine MOFA 
2000 Ken Sato MOF Takemasa Moriya JDA Shigo Shuto JDA Iwao Kitahara JDA Yoshiki Mine MOFA 
2001 Ken Sato MOF Takemasa Moriya JDA Shingo Shuto JDA Iwao Kitahara JDA Sumio Tarui MOFA 
2002 Kosei Ito JDA Kyoji Yanagisawa 
Kyoji Yanagisawa 
JDA Takemasa Moriya JDA Tetsuya Nishikawa NPA Sumio Tarui MOFA 
2003 Takemasa Moriya JDA Iwao Kitahara  JDA Kazuki Iihara MOF Tetsuya Nishikawa NPA Masahiko Horie MOFA 
2004 Takemasa Moriya JDA Iwao Kitahara JDA Kazuki Iihara MOF Kazuo Oofuru JDA Kenjiro Moji MOFA 
2005 Takemasa Moriya JDA Iwao Kitahara JDA Kazuki Iihara MOF Kazuo Oofuru JDA Kenjiro Moji MOFA 
2006 Takemasa Moriya JDA Tetsuya Nishikawa NPA Kazuo Oofuru JDA Shinishiro 
Yamazaki 
MITI Kenjiro Moji MOFA 
2007 Takemasa Moriya JDA Tetsuya Nishikawa NPA Kazuo Oofuru JDA S. Yamazaki MITI Kenjiro Moji MOFA 
2008 Kohei Masuda JDA Kimito Nakae MOF Hironori Kanazawa JDA Nobushige 
Takamizawa 
JDA Masaru Tsuji MOFA 
2009 Kohei Masuda JDA Kimito Nakae MOF N. Takamizawa JDA Hideshi Tokuchi JDA Hiroshi Oe MOFA 
2010 Kimito Nakae MOF H.Kanazawa JDA N. Takamizawa JDA Hideshi Tokuchi JDA --  
2011 Kimito Nakae MOF H. Kanazawa JDA N. Takamizawa JDA Shuichi Sakurai JDA ---  
2012 Hironori Kanazawa JDA Akira Kamata JDA Masanori Nishi JDA Ryutaro 
Matsumoto 
JDA ---  

















Table 3-2: Colonization and Decolonization of Japan Defense Agency / Ministry of Defense Part 2 
 Director of Finance Director of Personnel Director of Education Director of Equipment Director of Medicine 
 Name Orig Name  Name  Name  Name  
1952           
1953           
1954           
1955           
1956           
1957 Taketoshi Yamashita MOF         
1958 Taketoshi Yamashita MOF         
1959 Taketoshi Yamashita MOF   Hisao Obata MOP Toshio Tsukamoto MITI   
1960 Taketoshi Yamashita MOF   HIsao Obata MOP Toshio Tsukamoto MITI Yaoichi Karube MOW 
1961 Taketoshi Yamashita MOF   HIsao Obata MOP Tadao Kubo MITI Yaoichi Karube MOW 
1962 Taketoshi Yamashita MOF   HIsao Obata MOP Tadao Kubo MITI Yaoichi Karube MOW 
1963 Katsuro Ueda MOF Hisao Obata MOP Hisao Obata MOP Saburo Ito MITI Yaoichi Karube MOW 
1964 Katsuro Ueda MOF Hisao Obata MOP Masataka Hotta MOI Makoto Kunii MITI Yaoichi Karube MOW 




Makoto Kunii MITI Masuo Takabe MOW 
1966 Fudeo Oomura MOF Masataka Hotta MOI Ryoichi Nakai MOI Makoto Kunii MITI Masuo Takabe MOW 
1967 Tatsuo Sasaki MOF Shigeru Aso MOI Ryoichi Nakai MOI Mikio Morita 
Tomoyosi Kamatani 
MITI Akira Hamada MOW 
1968 Tatsuo Sasaki MOF Shigeru Aso MOI Tomoyosi Kamatani MITI Akira Hamada MOW 
1969 Kazumasa Tashiro MOF Akira Utsumi MOI Tomoyosi Kamatani MITI Akira Hamada MOW 
1970 Kazumasa Tashiro MOF Atsuo Eto MOI Tomoyosi Kamatani MITI Akira Hamada MOW 
1971 Kazumasa Tashiro MOF Atsuo Eto MOI Tomoyosi Kamatani MITI Kazuo Suzuki MOW 
1972 Kazumasa Tashiro MOF Atsuo Eto MOI Ryuichi Kuribayashi 
Yuzuru Kurobe 
Eiichi Yamaguchi 
MITI Kazuo Suzuki MOW 
1973 Shiro Odamura MOF Tadao Takase NPA Eiichi Yamaguchi MITI Kazuo Suzuki MOW 
1974 Akira Tanri MOF Masataka Imaizumi NPA Eiichi Yamaguchi MITI Takeo Ogishima MOW 
1975 Akira Tanri MOF Masataka Imaizumi NPA Eiichi Yamaguchi MITI Takeo Ogishima MOW 
1976 Toru Hara MOF Masami Takeoka NPA Hiromichi Eguchi MITI Takeo Ogishima MOW 
1977 Toru Hara MOF Isuke Watanabe MOH Naozo Mabuchi MITI Takashi Nozu MOW 
1978 Isuke Watanabe MHA Haruo Natsume DPA Naozo Mabuchi MITI Takashi Nozu MOW 
1979 Isuke Watanabe MHA Haruo Natsume DPA Yukio Kurabe MITI Takashi Nozu MOW 
1980 Minoru Yoshino MOF Atsuyuki Sassa NPA Yutaka Wada MITI Tadashi Honda MOW 
1981 Shinji Yazaki MOF Takashi Ueno JDA Yutaka Wada MITI Tadashi Honda MOW 
1982 Shinji Yazaki MOF Takashi Ueno JDA Hiroo Kinoshita MITI Susumu Shimada MOW 
1983 Muneo Shishikura MOF Takashi Ueno JDA Hiroo Kinoshita MITI (councilor) MOW 
1984 Muneo Shishikura MOF Kazutaka Tomofuji JDA Tokio Ohtaka NPA Katsuhisa Yamada MITI Takeharu Furukawa MOW 






1986 Hisakatsu Ikeda JDA M.  Matsumoto DPA Tomoharu Yoda NPA Yoshiro Kamada MITI Takeharu Furuakwa MOW 
1987 Akira Hiyoshi MOF Yoshio Kodama JDA Hiroshi Hasegawa JDA Masashi Yamamoto MITI Yasushi Fukuwatari MOL 
1988 Kazuo Fujii JDA Yosho Kodama JDA   Masashi Yamamoto MITI Yasushi Fukuwatari MOL 
1989 Kazuo Fujii JDA Akira Hatakeyama MOF   Satoshi Uematsu MITI Takeshi Tamaki MOW 








  Osamu Seki MITI Takeshi Tamaki  
1991 Noboru Hoshuyama JDA Tatsufumi Tsuboi JDA   Osamu Seki MITI Jinsaku Kanamori MOW 
1992 Noboru Hoshuyama JDA Masahiro Akiyama MOF   Tetsuo Nakada MITI Akio Kawaji MOW 
1993 Masahiro Akiyama MOF Yasuari Mitsui JDA   Tetsuo Nakada MITI Akio Kawaji MOW 
1994 Masahiro Akiyama MOF Jiro Hagi JDA   Toshimitu Arai MITI Fujio Kumagai MOW 
1995 Ken Sato MOF Jiro Hagi JDA   Toshimitu Arai MITI Hiroki Sawa MOW 
1996 Ken Sato MOF Yasuhiro Okoshi JDA  MITI Katsuhiko Hatoda  Hiroki Sawai  MOW 
1997 Masayuki Fujishima JDA Kyou Sakano JDA Katsuhiko Hatoda MITI Hiroki Sawai MOW 




Kyou Sakano JDA Kozo Oikawa MITI Itaru Nishimoto MOW 





Kyoji Yanagisawa JDA Kaoru Nakamura MITI Ryoji Takahara MOW 
2001 Takehiko Shimaguchi JDA Kyoji Yanagisawa JDA (Councilor) 
Kaoru Nakamura 
MITI Keiji Tanaka MOW 




Shinnichi Udagawa JDA Atsushi Oi MITI Masanori 
Nishiyama 
MOW 
2003 Kenji Nozawa JDA Tetsuya Nishikawa NPA Atsushi Oi MITI M. Nishiyama MOW 
2004 Kenji Nozawa JDA Tetsuya Nishikawa NPA Atsushi Oi MITI M. Nishiyama MOW 
2005 Kenji Nozawa JDA Testuya Nishikawa NPA Atsushi Oi MITI M. Nishiyama MOW 
2006 Fumihiro Yokoyama JDA Kazuki Iihara MOF Yasutoshi Kojima MITI M. Nishiyama MOW 
2007 Kazuki Iihara MOF Kohei Masuda JDA Hideki Ogawa MITI Kazuhiko Adachi* MOW 
2008 Kenshu Nagaoka JDA Atsushi Watanabe JDA Hideki Ogawa MITI Senya Toyama MOW 
2009 Kenshu Nagaoka JDA Atsushi Watanabe JDA Yoshiyuki Iwai* MITI Senya Toyama MOW 
2010 Masanori Nishi JDA Mamoru Kohtaki JDA Yoshiyuki Iwai MITI Senya Toyama MOW 
2011 Masanori Nishi JDA Hideshi Tokuchi JDA Hideo Suzuki MITI Norihisa Hara MOW 
2012 Hideshi Tokuchi JDA Kazuhiko Masuda JDA Hideo Suzuki MITI Norihisa Hara MOW 
2013 Morio Ito JDA Tohru Mimura MOF Masakazu Yoshida MITI Yasuhiro Suzuki MOW 
 
MOI: Ministry of Interior, MOH: Ministry of Home Affairs, MOF: Ministry of Finance, MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, JDA: Japan Defense 
Agency, NPA: National Police Agency, DPA: Defense Procurement Agency, MOW: Ministry of Welfare, MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOP: Ministry 
of Post and Communications, MOL: Ministry of Labor, Pers: National Personnel Authority 
 
Data on Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 are based on Jieitai Nenkan, 1952-2013. 
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This meant that for quite a long time, the JDA was dependent on other ministries for 
their personnel management. As can be seen in Table 3-1 and 3-2 for the first twenty years since 
its establishment, most important positions in the JDA were occupied by those who were 
originally hired by the Ministry of Interior. In addition, positions which required expertise were 
filled by specific ministries. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) sent officials to become the Director of Equipment, Ministry of Finance to the Director of 
Finance position, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to the International Councilor position, 
and Ministry of Welfare (MOW) to the Director of Medicine. This phenomenon is often called 
the “colonization” of JDA.  
 There were several patterns at which the civilian personnel arrived at the JDA. Some 
came once at a relatively young age (Division Chief-level) and stayed, some came once at a 
young age then again later, and finally, some came at a senior level with a “one way ticket,” that 
is, with no prospect of returning to the home ministry. Altogether, the civilian personnel at the 
JDA, both from other ministries or hired by the JDA, did not have sufficient time to receive 
much training, everything was learned on the job. 
 From Table 3-1 and 3-2, we can observe how former Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials 
are replaced by officials from other ministries in the Director positions from the late 1970s to late 
1980s. While Finance, International Affairs, Equipment and Medicine positions are consistently 
occupied by Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials, the Administrative Vice Minister, Director of 
Cabinet Secretariat, and Director of Defense Policy positions are taken over by other ministry 
officials, most notably Ministry of Finance. 
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 The primary reason for this shift, further “colonization” now by multiple ministries, is 
that while pre-war Ministry of Interior officials reach retirement age, the officials hired by the 
Japan Defense Agency and Defense Procurement Agency were still too young, or not sufficient 
in number to fill all positions. Still, the question remains, why Ministry of Finance officials, and 
not, for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs?   
 The period between 1976 until the end of the Cold War, unlike the period before, was a 
period of relative calm. As I will discuss in the next chapter, after the controversy surrounding 
the drafting of the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in 1976, a stable path was set 
forth for Japan’s defense policy. Defense policy at this time was almost synonymous with 
defense build-up, and the chosen course of policy, “strengthening the US-Japan alliance” was 
equated with increasing Japan’s contribution in a fiscal sense, and not physical. Of course, as I 
explain in the subsequent chapter, the opportunities for U.S.-Japan joint training and exercise 
expanded during the same period, but what mattered most for politicians at that time was that 
defense policy would be managed in a way so that defense build-up proceeded on schedule and 
at the right pace, and with little political turmoil as possible.  
 From this point of view, it was rational, both for politicians to assign financial experts to 
be in charge of defense at that time. It also made sense for MOF to have its own officials 
assigned within the JDA in keeping the defense budget under close watch.  How did those who  
those hired by the JDA feel about this? In some ways, colonization was inevitable because those 
who were hired by the JDA after 1955 simply had not reached the right age according to the 
strict seniority-based promotion system of Japan’s bureaucracy at large. Seiki Nishihiro, who 
was hired in 1956 and was known to have been one of the masterminds of the 1976 NDPG, 
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would eventually become the Administrative Vice Minister in 1988, but until then, there was no 
way he could assume the top position. Then, having an MOF official at the helm was second-best 
solution. There could also have been financial benefits to having an MOF official within the JDA, 
a possibility which I will explore in the next chapter.  
 Finally, the end of the Cold War coincided with the gradual “decolonization,” or 
“indigenization” of the JDA civilian staff. While Equipment, International Affairs and  
Medicine positions remained reserved seats for MITI, MOFA and MOW officials, other positions 
were filled by JDA officials by the mid-1990s. MOF officials still occupied the top position for 
half of the time during this period, but as JDA (now MOD) hiring more officials, and as those 
officials reach right age to become directors and division chiefs, “indigenization” is set to 




Overview: The Uniformed Personnel 
 The composition of the uniformed personnel has gone through even more dramatic 
transformation than the civilian officials of the JDA. In this section, I will first discuss the how 
the GSDF and MSDF were established, each with considerable involvement of the U.S. forces. 
Then I will examine the development in the subsequent years, focusing on the transition from 
pre-war officers to National Defense Academy (NDA) educated officers. The notable 
characteristic of the personnel dimension of civil-military relations in Japan is that both the 
rearmament process and subsequent recruitment took place in a way that was distant from the 
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rest of society, and with little attention to the problems that such isolation may entail
51
.  
The Early Years: Rearmament led by the United States 
The rearmament of Japan was a collaborative work between who fought with one 
another.  It is interesting that the ones who had the most face-to-face confrontation, the U.S. 
Navy and the former Imperial Navy offers formed the closest bond, one that would benefit one 
another. As a result, the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) was able to rebuild its forces 
with little hesitation about carrying on the traditions of the Imperial Navy. Thus, while the MSDF 
closely identified with the US Navy, they were able to maintain their identity as the direct 
offspring of the Imperial Navy.   
The GSDF, on the other hand, had far less direct confrontation during the war, but 
received extensive intervention from the US in the rearmament process. As a result, while the 
intervention by the U.S. was not necessarily positively received, the ties with the Imperial Army 
were also severed. In the following section, I will describe how this process played out from the 
view of the officers, first the National Police Reserve (NPR) later Ground Self Defense Forces 
(GSDF), and then the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF).     
 
Ground Self Defense Forces  
The planning for the rearmament of the ground forces in Japan was accomplished with 
almost full exclusion of the former army officers. This may seem unsurprising, given the 
devastation they allegedly brought to the nation. However, it is not that they did not try, and in 
some instances, they almost succeeded. The close to impossible demand to create a 75,000 
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member force in as little time as possible could have been a golden opportunity to try to “help 
out.” However, (1) their inability to unite themselves, (2) the lack of effective access to the U.S. 
Forces, and (3)Yoshida and the civilian officials’ fervent effort to keep them from coming back to 
power prevented them from exerting influence. 
The Imperial Army was disbanded immediately after the war, and the approximately 
seven million servicemen who were fighting overseas were disarmed. Their return to Japan was 
mostly completed by the end of 1948, with the exception of those who were detained in Siberia 
(Kimura 2004:86). The army leadership was sent to trial, and all officers who graduated from the 
military academies of the Army and the Navy were purged from the public office
52
. There were 
exceptions, though. In the case of the Army, Colonel Takushiro Hattori, who was twice the 
strategic operations chief of the Imperial Army general staff and secretary to Army Minister 
Hideki Tojo, secretly returned from China where he was a regiment commander in May 1946, a 
full year before the rest of the regiment. This was under the direction of the GHQ, whose explicit 
objective was to complete their war history as well as to oversee the demobilization process.   
However, there was also an implicit goal: to involve him in intelligence activities and to make 
him prepare a plan for possible rearmament. Hattori was offered a position as the director of 
research (military history) in the First Demobilization Bureau of the Ministry of Welfare. A 
group of former imperial army officers were also informally organized, and had meetings at the 
Hattori residence, discussing possible rearmament.
53
   
The supporter of this group was Major General Charles A. Willoughby, the head of the 
information department of the G2 section. Willoughby had envisioned that in the event of 
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rearmament, Hattori would be the new chief of staff. He even ordered Hattori to select four 
hundred high-ranking officers from the Imperial Army for the National Police Reserve.   
Hattori’s endeavors came to an abrupt end, however. In August 1950 during when the Japanese 
government, mainly former home ministry officials were scrambling to assemble the Police 
Reserve, Hattori, along with other imperial officers, appeared at the newly appointed Director 
Keikichi Masuhara’s office and declared that they will be working at the National Police 
Reserve.
54
 Masuhara immediately informed Prime Minister Yoshida, who had consistently 
opposed bringing back imperial officers,
55
 and Yoshida in turn immediately called upon General 
MacArthur to stop Hattori and other imperial army officers to enter the National Police Reserve.  
On August 9 1950, the government announced, under the name of Director Masuhara, that 
former officers who were being supported by G2, including Hattori, would not be appointed to 
any positions within the National Police Reserve. It was further announced on August 18
th
 that 
no purged officer would be appointed to the executive staff. 
Thus, the former military was completely excluded from the planning process.  Instead, 
a group of former Interior Ministry bureaucrats
56
 as mentioned in the previous section became 
the Japanese counterparts to the occupation forces to receive directions from the United States. 
Furthermore, a civilian with no military background was chosen to become the first commandant 
of the National Police Reserve.  Keizo Hayashi, who was serving at that time as the Imperial 
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Palace vice chairman (Vice Minister of the Imperial Household Agency) became the first 
commandant.
57
   
Why couldn’t the former Army officers take advantage of the preferential treatment 
offered to Hattori by the United States and exert influence in the rearmament process? Three 
reasons can be identified. First, the former Army officers were divided both in how they thought 
about the post-war situation, and failed to act collectively. Former Colonel Makoto Matsutani 
(who later joined the Ground Self Defense Forces) argues that there were four types of attitudes 
among former officers, in a memorandum he sent to Prime Minister Yoshida on May 15, 1951.  
The four types of attitudes were: (1) pro-rearmament, (2) anti-rearmament, (3) self-restrained, 
and (4) indifferent for the time being. He identified Hattori and his group as type (1), those who 
were central figures in the imperial army and then hired by the U.S.  There were not too many 
that belonged to type (2), and the majority were type (4). Matsutani identified himself as type (3), 
consisting of former pro-British, pro-U.S. types, that were not the mainstream before the war, but 
was now close to Yoshida.
58
 The type (3) group was headed by General Eiichi Tatsumi, who 
was a close and secret confidente of Yoshida.
59
 This group was critical of the Imperial army, and 
did not wish for its return. 
This leads to the second reason for their limited influence. The former Imperial Army 
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officers, especially the group organized by Willoughby, were strongly rejected by Yoshida.  
Thus, they had no chance of influence as long as Yoshida stayed in power, which continued for a 
long time.
60
 General Tatsumi, the Army’s sole access to Yoshida, was deeply skeptical of the 
Hattori group and distanced them from Yoshida even further. 
Finally, the relationship with the U.S. was limited to the G2 and General Willoughby.  
Thus, their fortunes were tied to the internal politics within the GHQ and the relative influence of 
the G2. After the incident in August 1950, which humiliated Hattori and his group, they 
distanced themselves from the U.S. and became very critical of the National Police Reserve, 
arguing that Japan needs a “real force,” not like the NPR that is organized by non-professionals, 
trained by the U.S., and are almost like mercenaries, unable to determine its fate. Thus, the 
former Imperial Army officers drifted further away from the government position, as the 
governments’ position and the fate of the Self Defense Forces became more closely associated 
with the United States. 
Let us now look at how recruitment took place in the early years. The recruitment of the 
NPR personnel had several characteristics. First, that it was done in an extremely short period of 
time, second, while all matters concerning the NPR (organization, equipment, training) were 
under the direction of CASA, the Japanese staff were able to exert some leadership, and finally, 
all recruits were hired as one caliber, against the wish of Director Masuhara who had wished to 
first organize and train officer candidates in one group.   
On August 9
th
 1950, the National Police Reserve Headquarters announced the guidelines 
for application to the National Police Reserve. The conditions laid out to the applicants were 
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quite attractive, given Yoshida’s desire to make sure to attract “good people.” The conditions 
were: (1) age: between 18 and 35, (2) period of service is two years, and 60,000 yen will be paid 
at the end as severance payment,
61
 (3) monthly allowance: 5,000 yen,
62
 (4) all food, clothing, 
and housing are guaranteed, (5) there are opportunities for everyone to be promoted as officers.   




These conditions proved to be quite attractive to the Japanese men at the time. For the 
slot of 75,000, just on the first day of application (August 13), 36,450 men filed their 
applications at the local police stations.  In three days, the number was twice the needed 
applicants, and in the end, 382,003 men applied, 5.1 men to the position of one. Applicants 
included former lawyers, reporters, a village chief, and a Central Bank official. 50.4% had some 
military experience, 79% were single, 35% were farmers, 44.6% were between the ages 20 and 




The examinations took place from the day of application to the beginning of September, 
at 183 locations throughout Japan using public auditoriums, schools, and police stations. The 
exams consisted of physical exam, written exams (Japanese, Math etc), and interviews and 
personal background checks. It was said, however, that the selection process were slightly 
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different by region, and that in some regions the interviews and the background checks seemed 
more important than the written exams.  Among those accepted, 52.6% had some military 
experience, slightly higher than the 50.4% that had applied. 
Those who were accepted entered the NPR in 11 groups, one group every five days 
between August 23 and October 12. They reported to the one of the six major police districts, 
then were sent to camps in Hokkaido (11,850 men), Sendai (19,784 men), three locations in 
Tokyo (3,975 men), six locations in Osaka (17,403 men), and eight locations in Fukuoka (19,891 
men) and 1,167 men in Etajima (Hiroshima.)  
As for promotion, since all recruits were treated as one group, it became a problem early 
on that there was no one in intermediate command positions. Thus, some were hand-picked to 
attend officer candidate schools in Etajima and Ecchujima, and some given temporary 
assignments. In the extreme case of Chikara Sakamoto, after he was selected to attend officer 
candidate school and became Captain, he was appointed temporary Division Commander, a 
position of a Major General. Then, after the official Division commander arrived, he was 
down-graded to regiment chief, and in three months, went back to the original rank of Captain.  
It took another 25 years for him to be promoted Major General. 
The problem of not having commanding officers became obvious, and measures were 
taken early on. In order to rectify this, first, a select group was sent to officer candidate school 
(as in the case of Sakamoto), at the request of CASA. However, this caused the problem of losing 
commanders in the interim, and finally, in September, a decision was made to hire additional 800 
recruits as officer candidates. Former Imperial Army officers were once again not qualified, but 
an exception was made for the non-purged former officers of the Manchukuo Army, as well as a 
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small number of younger officers who were not purged.
65
 There were also those who were on 
special assignments from other governmental agencies.  
However, the problem of lack of leadership still persisted. General Tatsumi, by the 
request of Yoshida, visited several camps and were shocked to see that the civilian-recruit 
temporary commanders had no sense of leadership or familiarity with weapons, and were less 
capable than the average policeman. Deeply concerned, he reported to Yoshida that the NPR is a 
mere “flock of birds,” with no sense of direction, and argued that former Imperial Army officers 
must be recruited. The GS also grudgingly agreed, and former officers were recruited in three 
stages. 
First, in February 1951, 58
th
 class of Army Military Academy and 74
th
 class of the Naval 
Academy (those who were ensigns or second lieutenants at the end of the war) were invited to 
apply, and 245 were recruited. Second, in August 1951, 1700 invitations were sent out to those 
who were Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, (53
rd
 class and younger for Army, 68
th
 class and 
younger for Navy) with the help of veterans.  927 responded, and 405 were recruited by 
October. 
The most controversial was the return of former Colonels.  General Tatsumi, with the 
help of Col. Hattori,
66
 selected ten former Army colonels and one former Navy Captain, and 
they joined the force in July 1952.
67
 The return of sovereignty to Japan and the need to 
strengthen the forces were the reasons offered for this reversal of policy. As a result, by the end 
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of 1952, 44% of officers above the rank of Major were former Army or Navy officers.  This 
trend accelerates, and by 1956, the percentage becomes 70 to 80% (Nakajima 1986: 424.) 
However, this did not indicate the return of Imperial officers to the central planning and decision 
making apparatus. The civilian bureaucrats by that time had devised various institutional 
measures to exclude the influence of uniformed officers, and there were a variety of limits to the 
extent of influence they could exert.
68
     
Training, on the other hand, was led by the United States. How did the recruits feel 
about the training done by the U.S. their recent foes?  Were the imperial officers, who lost the 
battle with the civilian staff, able to exert influence in the “souls” of the force, through the 
training of recruits?  How did the problematic existence of the NPR affect the morale of the 
forces?    
First, all initiatives concerning the training of the forces were issued by CASA. By 
September 1950, basic training guidelines were issued by CASA to the American company 
commanders at each camp, and a 13-week basic training was implemented. However, it is not 
clear how much was accomplished, since they were still busy settling people in (most cases 
taking over the US forces that had left for Korea,) and were lacking in the number of 
commanders and facilities. It did not help that in some camps, the first monthly pay was delayed 
due to the delay in budget negotiations in Tokyo.
69
 After repeated requests by CASA to the 
headquarters, the number of American training staff was increased, from 166 officers, 120 NCOs 
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and 16 civilians in August 1950 to 323 officers, 595 NCOs and 54 civilians by April 1952. 
Secondly, the command of each division was initially under the direct control of CASA.  
All matters regarding (1) personnel, (2) documentations (All rules, regulations and orders were 
issued by CASA in English, and then translated. All initiatives by the NPR headquarters had to 
be approved by CASA), (3) procurement, (4) training, and (5) weapons (all weapon were on loan 
from the United States, and was under the responsibility of US forces.)
70
 The US forces seem to 
have been happy about the management of the NPR. According to the official history of the NPR 
compiled by the US Army 8
th
 division, the CASA support and advice over the NPR was quite 
satisfactory.   
With the return of sovereignty to the Japanese, on April 28, 1952, the CASA transferred 
its roles to SAS-J (Security Advisory Section), and its relationship with the NPR was defined as 
follows: (1) the position of the U.S. advisor rests upon the request of the Japanese government, 
and sent from the USFJ. The advice will be directed to the highest leadership of NPR, (2) US 
advisors do not have the authority to direct the NPR, (3) The word, “advisor” will only be used 
for U.S. officers, and (4) When interpretations differ in terms of rules, regulations and so forth, 
arrangements will be made to rectify the problem in Japanese. This SAS-J since shrunk its 
operation, but still exists today as the MDAO (Mutual Defense Assistance Office), that his 
primarily involved in US-Japan procurement matters. 
How then, did the NPR members feel about the role of the U.S. Forces? Interesting 
results can be seen from the survey conducted by the NPR headquarters. Asagumo Shimbun, a 
military newspaper reports, “The reaction to the extensive involvement of the U.S. can be 
                                                   
70
 They tried to avoid using Imperial Army weapons, for concerns of security. (They were supposed to 
have been demolished)  Some were used to make up for the lack, in some cases. 
 
 79 
categorized into three types, antipathy, opportunism, and indifference. Most respondents fit in the 
“indifference” category. As for opportunists, they are just eager to improve their own situation.  
We should be most concerned about those who are antipathetic. The reasons for antipathy appear 
to be: (1) US involvement is too widespread and detailed, (2) US intervention ignores the actual 
situation of the Japanese, (3) The US seems to underestimate Japanese capabilities, and tend to 
look down on the Japanese. Most of those who feel antipathy are the mid-level commanders, but 
their feelings but have spread to other members.  However, the majority accepts the situation as 
simply inevitable, as a country that lost, but hope for an improvement in the situation after 
sovereignty is recovered. Thus, there must be a visible shrinking of the role of US advisors after 
the peace treaty is signed, otherwise serious problems of command and moral may emerge.” 
Thus, most members seem to have been pragmatic about the US role. More mixed and 
long lasting problem was the issue of promotion, and the invisible distinction between former 
officers and others. As for promotion, since the hiring of officers went through various stages, it 
took time before a set rule was established as general rules of promotion. Complaints were 
rampant about unfair treatment,
71
 and rumors of preferential treatment of Imperial Army officers 
by other Imperial Army Officers continued for some time. 
In sum, in the rearmament process of Japan after World War II, the Imperial Army 
Officers were called upon, to a greater extent than commonly acknowledged. However, their 
influence was excluded from the policy making headquarters, and instead, were gradually 
instilled in the training and leadership on the ground
72
. As a former JGSDF general recalls, they 
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were quite pragmatic about trying to learn from the good aspects of US methods, and to 
incorporate the traditions from the Imperial past.
73
 There was a break from the past before some 
aspects of the past were brought in, which is in stark contrast to the case of the Maritime Self 
Defense Force that I examine next.  
 
The Maritime Self Defense Forces 
The process of rearmament of the naval force was quite different from the experience of 
the ground forces. Tetsuo Maeda calls it the “uninterrupted Navy,” and to this day the Maritime 
Self Defense Force is proud of extending their heritage to the Imperial Navy. The memorial 
museum at the Officer Candidate School in Etajima exhibits many items from the victorious days 
of the Imperial Navy, and its foremost treasure is the piece of hair of Admiral Heihachiro Togo, 
dedicated in a memorial. 
Why was the Maritime Self Defense Force able to inherit so much from the Imperial 
Navy, and why didn’t the United States intervene more? Common explanations point to the fact 
that the Navy tended to be seen as the “victims of the reckless army,” and the better impression 
helped them greatly. However, such generalization makes one overlook the well preparedness 
and the political savvy of the former Imperial Naval officers in the immediate post war period. 
First, let us look at the planning process. Three aspects made the navy well situated in 
the planning process in the immediate post war period, (1) the relative unity of the former 
Imperial Navy Officers, (2) less antipathy from Yoshida, and (3) special relationship with the U.S. 
Navy, which transcended the influence of the GHQ. In addition, the fact that the Imperial Navy 
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virtually continued its operations well after the war, in forms of demobilization and 
minesweeping, and their secret contribution to the Korean War won them support from the U.S. 
Navy. 
Let me elaborate on this in order. First, in contrast to the Imperial Army officers that 
were divided after the war, the Imperial Navy Officers were quick to come together as one 
immediately after the war.  They organized themselves around two prominent men, former 
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor, and 
Admiral Zenshiro Hoshina. Hoshina had personally received the message from Admiral Yonai, at 
the end of the war, to rebuild the Navy, to utilize naval technology for the building of a new 
Japan, and the inheritance of the virtues of the Imperial Navy to its descendants.
74
 The Navy had 
similar access points to the GHQ as Hattori’s group had on the Army side, as part of the 2
nd
 
Demobilization Bureau within the Ministry of Welfare. With obvious leaders, the Navy officers 
were able to avoid the problem of “too many captains on one boat” that the Army suffered from, 
and benefit from their position at the Welfare Ministry. They took advantage of their position to 
start planning for the rebuilding of the Navy from immediately after the war, and were prepared 
to present a plan when the time comes for them to get involved. 
Secondly, Yoshida did not seem to have the personal antipathy towards Navy officers as 
he did with the Army officers. The efforts of the Hoshina group to influence Yoshida via the U.S. 
Navy (which I elaborate below) did not amount to much result until 1950, since the Maritime 
Safety Board was doing its job, and a necessity of rebuilding Navy was not a widely shared 
notion. But in 1951, General Tatsumi invited Admiral Yamamoto to accompany him to advice 
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Yoshida. Through this introduction, Yamamoto was able to present the plan the 2
nd
 
Demobilization Bureau had prepared, in the case of Yoshida’s negotiation with the U.S. 
government in 1951. Thus, they were able to preempt the needs of Yoshida.  However, the 
massive rebuilding plan did not materialize, and instead, the alternative plan that Yamamoto and 
his group advised, to create an organization within the Maritime Safety Board in preparation for 
receiving old frigate vessels from the United States was adopted. This alternative plan became 
the seed for later evolution into the Maritime Security Force and later Maritime Self Defense 
Force, as a separate organization from the Maritime Safety Board, which remains today to be the 
equivalent of a coast guard in Japan. 
Finally and most importantly, Admiral Nomura’s personal relationship with admirals in 
the U.S. Navy gave the former Imperial Navy officers leverage over the Japanese government, 
and the GHQ. Admiral Nomura had known Admiral Turner Joy, then Commander of the Far East, 
and though him, Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was stationed in Japan in 1950. At that time, the 
Imperial Navy officers were worried about the contents of the MacArthur letter, which requested 
increasing the Maritime Safety Board personnel by 8,000. They were worried about the lack of 
interest in the rebuilding of a naval force. Hoshina recalls that he worried that the US may be 
planning to take charge of naval and air defense, and expect only ground forces from Japan. 
(Agawa 2001:135)    
Hoshina visited Nomura, who then visited Far East Commander Admiral Joy and 
presented his plan for rebuilding a new navy, which the 2
nd
 Demobilization group had drafted.  
Joy was stunned by the ambitiousness of the plan, but introduced Burke to Nomura. Burke 
helped Nomura redraft the plan. Nomura tried to present it to John Foster Dullus on his visit to 
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Japan in January 1951. He fails to do so directly, but asks his personal secretary to deliver the 
plan. The same plan is presented to Yoshida on February 9. In the end, the less ambitious version 
of the plan, to receive the used frigate ships from the U.S. was adopted. However, more 
importantly, former Navy officers succeeded in achieving U.S. Navy’s support for the creation of 
the seed of a post war Navy, as a separate entity from the Maritime Safety Board.   
What does this episode show? The former Navy officers, unlike the Army officers, had 
close ties with the U.S. that they utilized well as an asset. They were not affected much by the 
inner-fighting of the GHQ, since their contacts in the U.S. Navy was above them in terms of rank. 
In dealing with the Japanese government, it is symbolic that Nomura presented his plan to Dullus 
before he presented it to Yoshida.   
Why then, was the U.S. Navy so supportive? What is beyond the typical “navy to navy 
special friendship” explanation? One answer is the fact that the Japanese Imperial Navy was 
continuously engaged in minesweeping efforts after the war, and the U.S. Navy benefited from 
that. The more important answer may be in their efforts during the Korean War. In 1950 at the 
outset of the Korean War, the U.S. Navy requested sending Japanese minesweepers to Korea.  
Since this could have been a politically explosive event, the request made by Burke to Yoshida 
and the discussions that took place was kept confidential, as well as the operation itself until 
Takeo Okubo, then head of the Maritime Safety Board wrote about the operation in his memoir.
75
  
Between October 8 and December 12 1950, total of 46 minesweepers were sent, and 1200 former 
Imperial Navy personnel served on this mission. There was even a casualty: 25 year old Hantaro 
Nakatani. His family was compensated by the U.S. Navy but he exact cause of his death was 
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kept confidential for the years to come. It is difficult to show the direct link between the Navy’s 
efforts in Korea with the U.S. support. However, it is hard to argue that it had no effect, and 
Burke and others’ recollections seem to confirm the extent of the influence. 
Another difference between the case of the National Police Reserve and the Maritime 
Safety Board (later Maritime Security Force) was the way in which recruitment took place, that 
is: (1) the extremely high proportion of former Imperial Navy personnel, (2) virtually no 
intervention from the U.S., or rather support offered by them to the former Navy officers, and (3) 
hiring and training of officers separate from the enlisted. 
First, the high proportion of Imperial Navy personnel is clear from the data. The early 
Maritime Safety Board officers, who were engaged in the minesweeping, were exempt early on 
from the purge for their expertise. Thus, a group of 10,000, later augmented to 8,000 sailors and 
officers were inherited from the pre-war Navy. Then, the next opportunity, the beginning of the 
Maritime Security Force took place on April 26, 1952. Since purge on all officers were lifted two 
days later on April 28, they did not have to worry about former Navy officers’ applications. In 
fact, among the 3,392 men that was eventually recruited (out of 21,531 applicants), more than 
99% were former Navy personnel (Asagumo, 01/02/90.) 
  Secondly, the United States did intervene in the personnel selection, as they did with the 
NPR, but in this case in support of the Imperial Navy officers. In selecting people for filling the 
important positions in the new Maritime Security Force, the initial plan was to promote three 
from the Maritime Safety Board who were not former Navy, and one officer from the Imperial 
Navy. The U.S. Navy intervened by sending a memorandum from the Far East Command that 
everyone except for the one officer from the Imperial Navy is unsuited for the job. (In the end, 
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the U.S. Navy’s intervention was rejected, and the original plan was followed.)   
Finally, officers were hired in a separate category from the enlisted, in a way the NPR 
wished to hire but could not. In addition, they were able to start the training of selected officers 
preemptively, in preparation of receiving the frigate vessels, before the additional hiring began.  
Therefore, they did not have the “flocking birds” problem that the NPR had, and was well 
organized and prepared for their new job. 
In sum, the rebuilding of the naval forces in Japan took a very different path from that of 
the ground forces, resulting in differences in how they relate to the United States and the 
Imperial Army and Navy. Makoto Sakuma, who was the first graduate from the National Defense 
Academy to become chief of staff recalls
76
,  
“According to my predecessors who joined the JMSDF during its nascent stages, the 
United States did not intervene much in the establishment of the MSDF, arguing that 
Japan’s Imperial Navy was a great navy.  I think there was considerable awe and 
respect to the Imperial Navy, about the fact that they fought to the very end.
77
”   
 
The MSDF was quick to acknowledge that their future depended on their relationship 
with the US Navy, and took a pragmatic approach to align their interest with the U.S, which in 
turn enabled them to maintain their identification with the Imperial Navy. 
“I really did not have a sense that the United States was a former enemy.  It was simply 
that we lost the war.  We had American advisors at the Defense Academy, and we used 
a borrowed ship from the U.S. in our training cruises at both the Academy and at the 
Officer Candidate School.  So it was only obvious to us that (the SDF) was created by 
the support of the United States.  Therefore, the United States, at least for me, was a 
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In contrast, the initial impact of the U.S. on the Ground Self Defense Forces was far 
more extensive and intrusive. The organization and equipment resembled that of the US Army 
and translations of US Army Doctrines were used in the education and training administered by 
the US military advisors stationed in Japan. Still, as Sakuma pointed out,  
“I think the GSDF has an instinctive sense of distance from the United States, which I 
think is inevitable….I think the GSDF was always skeptical whether or not the United 




Subsequent Development: From Pre-War Officers to NDA-educated Officers 
How did the composition of SDF personnel, especially officers, change in the 
subsequent years? As seen in Table 3-3, the proportion of former Imperial Navy and Army 
officers among the newly formed Ground and Maritime Self Defense Forces were very high. 
This is especially true in the case of the MSDF, where the percentage exceeded 50% among all 
ranks, and over 90% at captain level. And as Table 3-4 shows, pre-war military officers go on to 
occupy key leadership positions within the SDF well into the 1970s. Officers in leadership 
positions in the Joint, Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices in Tokyo. In 2001, 83% of officers 
in leadership positions were NDA graduates, and in 2009, the percentage rose to 89%. NDA 
dominance is most pronounced in the GSDF, with the percentage in 2001 and 2009 being 97% 
and 94%, and least pronounced in the MSDF, with 60% in 2001 and 83% in 2009.  
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Table 3-3: Percentage of Former Imperial Army / Navy Officers, by rank (1954) 
 
 GSDF MSDF 
Lt General/ Admiral 11.5 50.0 
Major General / Rear Admiral 57.1 63.6 
Colonel/Captain 65.9 91.6 
Lt Colonel / Commander 52.9 82.3 
Major / Lt Commander 52.9 92.1 
Captain / Lieutenant  32.7 89.8 
First Lieutenant / Lt Junior Grade 15.6 81.8 
Second Lieutenant / Ensign 35.0 51.3 




Table 3-4: Educational Background of SDF Officers in Leadership Positions 
 
 Pre-War Military Schools Civilian Universities National Defense Academy 
JSO GSDF MSDF ASDF JSO GSDF MSDF ASDF JSO GSDF MSDF ASDF 
1974 6 27 23 24 1 5 8 4 0 0 0 0 
1978 6 26 23 19 1 7 7 9 0 0 0 0 
1984 2 4 4 3 5 10 17 9 0 20 11 17 
1988 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 3 5 29 25 27 
2001 0 0 0 0 1 1 13 4 15 34 20 26 
2009 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 4 19 31 26 28 
Source: Hirose, Katsuya (1989). Kanryo to Gunjin, Appendix 6, and Jieitai Nenkan, 2009 and 2011 
 
Leadership Position: Division Chief Level and above 
Data from 2009 includes Defense Medical College graduates as National Defense Academy graduates. 
 
JSO: Joint Staff Office 
GSDF: Ground Self Defense Force Staff Office 
MSDF: Maritime Self Defense Force Office 











Table 3-5: The Educational Background of SDF Leadership  
 Chief of Staff,  
Joint Chief of Staff 
Chief of Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF President, National 
Defense Academy 
 Name Origin Name Origin Name Origin Name Origin Name  
1950   Keizo Hayashi Tokyo 
(MOI) 
      
1951           
1952     Kogoro Yamazaki Tokyo 
(MOP) 
  Tomoo Maki A 
1953           
1954 Keizo Hayashi Tokyo 
(MOI) 
Takeo Tsutsui Tokyo 
(MOI) 
Hiroshi Nagasawa ImpN Kenjiro Uemura Tokyo 
(MOI) 
  
1955           
1956       Tsuyoshi Sanagi ImpN   
1957   Shigeru Sugiyama ImpA       
1958           
1959       Minoru Genda ImpN   
1960   Ichiji Sugita ImpA 
(MOI) 
      
1961     Sadayoshi Nakayama ImpN     
1962   Hiroshi Omori Tokyo   Takeshi Matsuda ImpA   
1963     Kazumi Sugie ImpN     
1964 Kazumi Sugie ImpN   Tomoharu Nishimura ImpN Shigeru Ura ImpA   
1965   Yoshihide Amano ImpA     Hiroshi Omori B 
1966 Yoshihide Amano ImpA Seiichi Yoshie ImpA Ryuichi Itaya ImpN Hirokuni Muta ImpA   
1967 Hirokuni Muta ImpA     Takesi Omuro ImpA   
1968   Masao Yamada Tokyo       
1969 Ryuichi Itaya ImpN   Kazuomi Uchida ImpN     
1970   Hayao Kinugasa ImpA     Masamichi Inoki A 
1971 Hayao Kinugasa ImpA Ryuhei Nakamura ImpA   Yasuhiro Ueda 
Kanshi Ishikawa 
ImpA   
1972     Suteo Ishida ImpN     
1973 Ryuhei Nakamura ImpN Toshiro Magari ImpA Hirokazu Samejima ImpN Motoharu Shirakawa ImpA   
1974 Motoharu Shirakawa ImpA Hideo Miyoshi ImpA   Yoshitaka 
Tsunoda 
ImpN   
1975           
1976 HIrokazu Samejima ImpN Hiroomi Kurisu Tokyo Teiji Nakamura ImpN Akira Hirano ImpN   
1977 Hiroomi Kurisu Tokyo Takehiko 
Takashina 
ImpA Ryohei Ohga ImpN     
1978 Takehiko Takshina ImpA Shigeto Nagano ImpA   Goro Takeda ImpA Kuniyasu 
Tsuchida 
B 
1979 Goro Takeda ImpA     Ryoichi Yamada ImpN   








1981 Tsugio Yada ImpN Sumio Murai ImpA Masaru Maeda ImpN Osamu 
Namatame 
ImpA   
1982           
1983 Sumio Murai ImpA Keitaro Watanabe ImpA Manabu Yoshida ImpN Shigehiro Mori ImpA   
1984 Keitaro Watanabe ImpA Morio Nakamura ImpA       
1985     Hiroshi Osada ImpN     
1986 Shigehiro Mori ImpA Masao Ishii Rikkyo   Taira Omura Tokyo 
Tech 
  






Haruo Natsume B 
1988           
1989     Hajime Sakuma NDA1     
1990 Taizo Terashima Tohoku Atsushi Shima NDA1   Akio Suzuki NDA1   
1991 Hajime Sakuma NDA1   Fumio Okabe NDA2     
1992   Tetsuya Nishimoto NDA3   Isao Ishizuka NDA3   
1993 Tetsuya Nishimoto NDA3 Hikaru Tomisawa  NDA4 Chiaki Hayashizaki NDA4   Saburo Matsumoto A 
1994     Tateo Fukuchi NDA5 Shigeru Sugiyama NDA4   
1995   Nobutoshi Watanabe NDA6       
1996 Shigeru Sugiyama NDA4   Kazuya Natsukawa NDA6 Koji Muraki NDA6   
1997 Kazuya Natsukawa NDA6 Yuya Fujinawa NDA8 Yasumasa Yamamoto NDA7 Yuji Hiraoka NDA8   
1998           
1999 Yuya Fujinawa NDA8 Tsuneo Isojima NDA9 Kosei Fujita NDA9 Teiji Takegochi NDA9   
2000         Masashi Nishihara A 
2001 Teiji Takegochi NDA9 Masahiro Nakatani NDA10 Toru Ishikawa NDA11 Ikuo Totake NDA11   
2002   Hajime Massaki NDA12       
2003 Toru Ishikawa NDA11   Koichi Furusho NDA13 YoshimitsuTsumagar
i 
NDA13   
2004 Hajime Massaki NDA12 Tsutomu Mori NDA14       
2005     Takashi Saito NDA14 Tadashi Yoshida NDA14   
2006 Takashi Saito NDA14   Eiji Yoshikawa NDA15   Makoto Iokibe A 
2007   Ryoichi Oriki NDA16   Toshio Tamogami NDA15   
2008     Keiji Akahoshi NDA17 Kennichiro 
Hokazono 
NDA18   
2009 Ryoichi Oriki NDA16 Yoshibumi Hibako NDA18       
2010     Masahiko Sugimoto NDA18 Shigeru Iwasaki NDA19   
2011   Eiji Kimizuka NDA20       
2012 Shigeru Iwasaki NDA19   Masatoshi Kawano NDA21 Haruhiko Kataoka NDA20 Ryosei Kokubun A 
2013   Takafumi Iwata NDA23   Harukazu Saito NDA22   





What is the source of the high proportion of NDA graduates among the officer corps? 
What is the consequence of this? Is there any problem with recruitment? In Cultural Norms and 
National Security, Peter Katzenstein suggests that NDA is having problems both recruiting and 
retaining students. If this is the case, the NDA dominance among the officer could be a major 
problem, considering the quality of the officer corps
80
. To address this concern I will consider the 
recruitment and promotion processes to address why, and what effect this has on the nature of 
civil-military relations, especially the possible preference gap between the civilians and SDF 
officers/ 
The largest contributing factor to the dominance of NDA graduates is that the path of 
entry to become an officer is not as diversified as in other countries. In the case of the United 
States in 2005, 18% of those who were commissioned as officers were graduates of service 
academies (U.S. Military Academy, US Air Force Academy, US Naval Academy) while 39% 
were recruited from Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), intended to reflect the wider 
society
81
. At the same time, furthermore, recommendations from local congressmen and military 
officers are expected, along with interviews and physical examinations, which indicate that 
getting accepted to a military academy requires different qualifications from civilian universities.  
In the case of Japan, the two sources of recruitment are the National Defense Academy 
and other civilian universities who together attend the Ground, Maritime or Air Officer 
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does not mean that the number of applicants were 438, since the number of applicants for 1989 was around 
10,000. Every year, NDA calculates the number of acceptance letters using an estimate of retention rate, but 
sometimes they miscalculate and end up with less students. For the year 2014, they underestimated the 
retention rate and the incoming class was larger than 600.) Katzenstein,(1989) pp.109. 
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. In 2007, 27% of those who were commissioned to become officers were 
graduates of NDA, while 20% were from civilian universities. The remaining 40% are 
commissioned internally from non-officers, and are on a slower career trajectory, so only the 
NDA and civilian university graduates are expected remain in the competition to take on 
leadership roles.  
There is no equivalent of a ROTC program, and there are no regional considerations or 
special requirements to apply to NDA. As is the case with other universities in Japan, majority of 
students are selected based on written examinations, not high school records
83
. Once accepted, 
cadets receive a monthly stipend of about $900, and receive military training alongside a 
academic program leading to a bachelor’s degree upon graduation. There is no legal obligation to 
serve, cadets do not need to return the stipend even if they leave during the course of four years, 
or upon graduation. Female cadets were admitted for the first time in 1990, but their percentage 
is fixed at around 7 to 10 %. 
Has the recruitment efforts been successful? Since the current reality is that most SDF 
officers in leadership position are graduates of NDA, this should be a major concern. Let me 
access this from different angles. First if number of applicants is one indicator, the recruitment 
efforts should be considered relatively successful. Figure 3-1 shows the number of applicants to 
NDA and Officer Candidate School (OCS) between 1986 and 2006. Since NDA accepts only 
around 500 and OCS around 400 each year, it seems safe to say that there are enough applicants. 
For example, in 2006, 14,258 applicants applied, and 426 were accepted, so only one in 28 male 
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 The GSDF Officer Candidate School is located in Kurume, Fukuoka Prefecture, the ASDF school in Nara, 
and MSDF school in Etajima, Hiroshima 
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 A small proportion is accepted through the Suisen (recommendation) system, reflecting a trend to do so 




applicants and one in 92 female applicants were accepted.  
 
Figure 3-1 Number of Applicants to NDA and Officer Candidate Schools 
 
The lighter shade shows the number of applicants to NDA, the darker shade the number for Officer 
Candidate School. The number accepted for each is around 500 and 400 each year. (Source: NDA White 
Paper, 1986-2005, Source: Junko Furuta (2008), “Comparative Analysis of Military Recruitment,” MA Thesis, 
National Defense Academy. pp.30.) 
 
Since competition alone does not guarantee quality, let us look at a different indicator, 
the college competitiveness score compiled by a college preparatory school (Fig. 3-2.) In Japan, 
applicants apply to specific departments of university, and in NDA’s case, either Science and 
Engineering or Humanities and Social Science. We can see that the applicants for Humanities 
and Social Science majors are consistently above the score of 62, and the Science and 




















Figure 3-2 The Competitiveness of NDA according to College Preparatory School 
 
The bottom line denotes the deviation scores for Science and Engineering major, the upper line for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences major. Score of 50 is average score for all universities. The two majors are 
selected using different examinations. The proportion of Science and Engineering and Humanities and 
Social Sciences are 80%-20%. (Source: Junko Furuta (2008), “Comparative Analysis of Military 
Recruitment,” MA Thesis, National Defense Academy. pp.53.  Records from a college preparatory school, 
Yoyogi Seminar were used.) 
 
So far, recruitment success was measured according to indicators used for civilian 
universities. But there are other points of interest for evaluating cadet recruitment: (1) regional 
distribution, (2) prevalence of legacy (cadets with family members who are former or current 
members of SDF), and (3) attitudes of incoming cadets (their motivation to apply.)  
As for regional distribution, we can observe that almost all prefectures have at least one 
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incoming cadet each year. Recruitment is conducted through the Ministry of Defense’s Provincial 
Cooperation Office, which is located in every prefecture, but it is not that there are some 
automatic quota for each prefecture, so it is a result of merit-only based competition. Notable fact 
is that there is a slight western bias, with a large population coming from the island of Kyushu. 
Although there are some fluctuations by year, about a quarter of students come from Kyushu 
each year. There are several possible reasons for this: historically, prefectures of Kagoshima and 
Kumamoto have a strong martial tradition, many large-scale SDF bases are located in Kyushu, in 
central (and visible) locations, and there are some schools that have historically required that all 
students take the NDA entrance exam as a practice test for subsequent exams
85
. Still, overall, it is 
hard to point out a serious bias that requires rectification. 
On the question of legacy students, there are no special advantages given to applicants 
with family ties to the SDF (although rumors exist that there is.) One potential advantage might 
be that the applicant will be well prepared for the interview, which takes place with both civilian 
and SDF interviewers. It is likely that a typical applicant would have never met a SDF officer in 
uniform in person, so it may make a difference if you have a family member. My data shows, 
however, that the “legacy rate” is relatively high if you count non-officers and civilian employees 
of the JDA/MOD, but not as many if you count only NDA alumni. Approximately 10-15% of 
incoming cadets have family members working for the JDA/MOD, but less than 5% are sons and 
daughters of NDA alumni. There is an increasing trend, for both all members and only NDA 
alumni, and we expect the numbers to rise. This is a welcoming trend if you take believe that 
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having a certain percentage of legacy students is a good thing, but not if you value diversity and 
social representativeness. 
Finally, the attitudes of SDF incoming cadets can be observed though a survey 
conducted by the NDA Examination office. The data are not new, and are from the incoming 
class of 2002, but the most recent version available. According to the survey, 65.7% of the cadets 
responded that NDA was not the only school they applied to, and only 55.9% were determined 
that they will become SDF officers. As for the reason why they decided to attend NDA, 32.0% 
responded “to train myself,” 18.7% “SDF officer is a stable job,” 15.0% “to study,” and 13.3% 
“protecting your country is an important job.” Financial reasons came next at 6.4%.
86
 
In sum, Katzenstein is wrong to argue that NDA is having problems recruiting cadets, 
both in terms of quality and quantity. However, his other claim, “SDF exists in relative isolation 
from public
87
” requires further examination. The dominance of NDA graduates among the officer 
corps can be a problem in this regard, especially if the dominance is due to emotional, not 
rational reasons.  
Let me now turn to the promotion system of SDF officers. If the predominance of NDA 
alumni in SDF leadership positions is not explained by recruitment alone, does the promotion 
system work in NDA graduates’ favor, and if so, isn’t there a chance this would lead to the 
relative isolation of the officer corps from the society? What is the role of the civilian 
bureaucracy, if any, in SDF personnel management? I will address these questions by focusing 
on the promotion system of the GSDF. 
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are more inclined to respond as they believe is “appropriate.” 
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First, examination and Professional Military Education (PME) schools play a major role 
in the promotion of officers. During the course of his/her career, an officer who reaches the rank 
of General would have spent a total of approximately nine years in PME schools
88
 out of a 
career of 38 years
89
. If, as Huntington prescribed, extensive military education was key to 
military professionalism, the SDF has surely followed his prescription. Most important is the 
Command and General Staff College (CGS), which you are expected to apply for, about ten 
years after graduating from the Officer Candidate School. An officer is given four chances (four 
years) to apply, and whether or not you get accepted to the CGS, the timing, and your grades in 
the program significantly affects your promotion possibilities. Approximately 30% of each 
graduating class of OCS is accepted to the CGS course, and only this “elite” group remains in the 
race to become General in this class. 
Then, do schools and exams explain the key to explaining NDA dominance in SDF 
leadership positions? In order to address this, I selected two graduating classes, one graduating in 
1970 and another in 1980, and followed the career paths of the entire class to see the changes in 
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 Nine years is based on the following calculation: Officer Candidate School (34 weeks), Education for 
Lower and Middle Ranking Officers (Branch Service Schools: 33-77 weeks, depending on branch),Education 
for Senior Officers (Command and General Staff College: 2 years, Advanced Command and General Staff 
Course: 25 weeks, Joint Staff College: 5 months)  
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 Mandatory retirement age for those who reach the rank of General is 60, Colonel is 56, Lieutenant 
Colonel/Major is 55. All NDA graduates at least reach the rank of Major.  
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CGS admittance Captain to Major ,Major to 
Lt Colonel 
















21% 89% 11% 86% 14% 85% 15% 87% 13% 
 
As you can see from the data, the proportion NDA graduates among elite (fast track 
promoted) officers increase as they progress into their careers. I conducted interviews several 
members of the GSDF in charge of personnel in 2003 and 2013 if this is a conscious, planned 
outcome or if there could be a systematic explanation for this. One reason offered was that for a 
long time, the quality of applicants to the Officer Candidate School, judged by the universities 
they graduated from, was not very high. That is, although there are some exceptions, such as 
University of Tokyo graduates, most applicants were from second and third-tier universities, less 
competitive than NDA
91
.  Another possibility is that the within the GSDF, those who specialize 
in combat arms (infantry, tank, and field artillery) have a better chance of being promoted, and 




With the recent rise of interest in the Self Defense Forces, the quality of applicants to 
the Officer Candidate Schools has been rising. However, since it takes time before they assume 
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 Furuta (2008) looked at the data of OCS non-NDA enrollment between 1995-1006 and found that while 
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leadership positions, the SDF leadership will consist almost entirely of graduates of NDA for 
some time. While quality and diversity of NDA graduates seem relatively unproblematic at this 
point, two characteristics of the SDF personnel system should be pointed out: the (almost) single 
source of commission and exam-based promotion. I will examine what impact this has on the 
relationship between civilian bureaucrats and their control of the SDF in the next section.   
 
The Civilian Bureaucrats and SDF Officers: Three different relationships 
As I discussed above, the composition of both the civilian bureaucracy and SDF officers 
have changed dramatically in the past sixty years. In the following section, I will break the sixty 
years into three periods, and examine what the characteristics of each period were, what control 
mechanisms the civilian bureaucracy used to keep the SDF in check, and whether the preferences 
of the civilian and the SDF converged or diverged over time. I will focus on how the bureaucracy 
attempted to control the SDF officers by (1) getting in between the SDF and politicians, 
(containment) and (2) keeping the three services divided (divide and rule).  
 
1952-1977: Pre-War Bureaucracy vs Pre-War Military 
As explained above, the pre-war members of the Imperial Navy and Army were 
gradually brought back to rearm Japan. It is not hard to imagine that the civilian bureaucracy was 
skeptical about these pre-war officers, some of them having played important roles in the war. 
While some former Ministry of Interior bureaucrats were purged, most were de-purged by 1952, 
and a number of them were assigned to create the National Safety Agency to oversee both the 




The fact that the bureaucrats, not politicians became the main architects of the new 
Japan Defense Agency, led to two mechanisms for controlling the SDF; (1) containment: making 
sure that the bureaucrats stands in between the SDF and politicians, and (2) divide and conquer: 
making sure that the Ground and Maritime forces do not collude. In other words, this period is 
marked by the installment of “civilian control through institutional design.” 
The primary control mechanism for “containment” was the legal provisions regarding 
the roles of the civilian bureaucracy and SDF officers. The Japan Safety Agency ordinance 
number 9 (Hoancho Kunrei #9) prohibited direct contact not only between SDF officers and the 
Defense Minister, but also bureaucrats of other ministries and politicians (Table 5-8). What this 
provision shows is the degree of skepticism the civilian bureaucracy had not only about SDF 
officers but also about elected politicians. Faced with a need to rearm at a time when democracy 
was still fragile (in their view), the civilian bureaucracy considered themselves to be working on 
behalf of the general public to achieve “protection from the military.” One of the drafters of this 
ordinance recalled in a panel discussion in a symposium, “I thought this (ordinance number 9) 
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Table 3-7 National Safety Agency Ordinance #9 (Provisions regarding Administrative 
Procedures between Internal Bureau and Staff Offices) 
 
Type of  Administrative matter Internal Bureau 
(civilian) 
Staff Office (SDF) 
Basic Policies regarding National Safety Agency Plan  
Operating Principles 
Basic plan of action 
Draft Minister’s Orders 
Prepare Draft  
Assess Staff Office Draft 
Prepare Draft 
Order operating principles 
Detailed execution plan 
 Chief of Staff order 
Legislation, ordinance, government order Initiate 
Assess Staff Office Draft 
Initiate 
Lower-order ordinances by the Staff Office Assess Staff Office Draft Initiate 
Daily action reporting Must review  Draft 
Reporting to the Defense 
Minister 
Important matters Must review  
Non-essential 
matters 
 Chief of Staff order 
Consultation with the Diet and other Ministries Main role Supplemental role 
Defense Minister’s oversight  Assist Defense Minister, Internal Bureau may 
demand mandatory 
reporting 
Source: Prepared by author based on Hirose (1989) pp.67 
 
The establishment of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1954 created another 
opportunity for the civilian bureaucracy to use legislation to “lock in” their involvement in all 
matters related to the SDF. The SDF Law (Jieitai-Ho) and Defense Agency Establishment Act 
(Bouei-cho Secchi Ho) are the two laws that were the basis for establishment JDA. Article 9 of 
the SDF law assigns the Chief of Staffs of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces, 
and the Joint Chief of Staff to be the providers of expert military advice to the Defense Minister. 
While this provision appears to allow for the SDF officers to “directly” advise the defense 
minister, the Article 16 of the Defense Agency Establishment Act stipulates that the civilian 
bureaucracy may and should stand in between. The Directors-General of the Bureaus are 




authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air 
Staff.  
The role of the Directors-General as “supporters” of the Minister is further endorsed in 
Article 9 and 11 of the Defense Agency Establishment Act. Article 9 defines the role of Defense 
Councilors as primary advisors to the Minister. The Defense Councilor system was initially 
meant to be modeled after the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, with possibility of political 
appointment. However, Article 11 designated the Director-Generals to be simultaneously 
assigned as Defense Councilors, thereby giving authority to the Director-Generals to not just 
“support,” but also to be the primary advisors to the Minister. This provision is said to have 
“locked in” the civilian bureaucracy between the SDF officers and the minister. 
 As for the “divide and conquer,” the Defense Agency Establishment Act of 1954 
authorized the establishment of Joint Staff Council. While there were some concerns among the 
civilian bureaucracy about the SDF gaining leverage, the concern was unnecessary. Joint Council 
had difficulty playing even a mediating role between the services
94
. Therefore at this point, the 
civilians did not need to try to “divide,” since the three services were not inclined to seek 
jointness. 
How did the SDF officers, then including many former Imperial Army and Navy 
officers, feel about the civilian official’s maneuvers to contain and to divide them? One can 
imagine that they would be frustrated by the civilian bureaucrats setting up barriers between 
them and the Minister, and giving orders on military matters. In fact, the Chief of Staff of the 
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 One notable example of this is the case of the Nike Surface-to-Air Missile. The GSDF and ASDF fought 
over who would be in charge of the Nike Missile. The Joint Staff Council could not resolve the conflict and the 




GSDF position, for seven years, was occupied by a civilian former Ministry of Interior 
bureaucrat with no military experience, wearing a uniform for the first time. And much has been 
written about the arrogant attitudes of some civilian bureaucrats that would yell and give orders 
to uniformed officers. 
However, surprisingly, oral records of officers at this time generally show a pragmatic 
attitude towards these arrangements, so long as they are focused on defense build up. Teiji 
Nakamura, former chief of MSDF Staff Office writes:  
“Generally speaking, it is hard to conceive of a situation in which military demands do 
not reach the Minister of Defense. Of course, the minister may not be interested enough 
to listen, but in no time have I experience not being able to communicate because of the 
internal bureau standing in between. If anybody says that, I think that is just an excuse, 




 Nakamura, however, highlights potential problems with this arrangement, in the case of 
emergency.  First, since civilian bureaucracy is acts on behalf of the Defense Minister 
(politician), and there is a tendency not to involve the minister and seek political guidance. 
Second, it is unclear whether they can expect the civilians to sufficiently advise the Defense 
Minister. Nakamura writes that both are not such a concern during peacetime, but if the 
international situation changes dramatically, this could be a problem, leading to a suboptimal 
outcome. 
 
1977-1988 The Storm before the Calm? 
 1977 to 1988 is a brief period of transition for both civilian and for the uniformed 
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personnel. On the SDF, those who had substantial experience in leadership positions in the 
pre-war military had retired, and for several years the leadership consisted of those who had 
neither military education nor experience. The civilian bureaucracy at this time also ran out of 
pre-war bureaucrats and was most intensely “colonized” at the time, mostly under the leadership 
of the finance ministry. This was also a time in which there were gaps in threat perception at the 
time, and the civilians and the SDF had very different understanding of how close they were to 
yuji, or emergency situation.  
In 1965, the existence of the so-called Mitsuya Kenkyu, or the joint study group to 
consider Korean Penninsula contingencies was revealed by an opposition party member in the 
Diet. Although civilian staff had also participated in the study group, it was portrayed as a sign of 
possible secret military collaboration, leading to a coup. After Mitsuya incident, all planning 
matters for emergency situations became a taboo and were kept confidential, even if there were 
any planning. It was against this backdrop that there were two incidents of “the revolt of the 
generals,” in which the two former Joint Chief Council Chairs, Hiromitsu Kurisu and Goro 
Takeda, publically criticized the lack of emergency preparedness in Japan
96
.  
 The friction between the civilian and SDF leaders at this time can be understood as sign 
of frustration of the SDF and the sign of their determination to “step in” and alert the public and 
politicians about the lack of both interest and expertise among both civilian bureaucrats and 
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 In an interview with Shukan Posuto (Weekly Post, July 28 and August 4, 1978, Kurisu criticized the 
lack of emergency awareness has left Japan seriously deprived of necessary legislations to deal with 
emergency situation. In such case, he argued, that the SDF will be forced to take “extra-legal measures” to 
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A similar case is with General Goro Takeda, who argued in the Monthly Hoseki that “exclusively defense 
oriented defense” was nonsense and that keeping the defense budget under 1% of GNP was endangering 




politicians. While the elected politicians were focused on economic matters at that time, the 
civilian bureaucracy also consisted of those from different ministries and only expecting to be at 
the ministry for a limited period of time. The former-interior ministry bureaucrats of the early 
period might have been bossy and might have had different policy preferences, still they were 
interested. On the side of the SDF officers, there was no discipline that held the organization 
together from common pre-war experiences, and the post-war NDA-trained officers had not quite 
reached the leadership position. 
 One development that occurred around this time but was largely unnoticed then was the 
increased interaction between the SDF and the US at the service level. Drafting of the Defense 
Guidelines turn out to be a trigger that once again expanded not only the MSDF interaction with 
the U.S. Navy, but also the GSDF’s exposure to the US Army. As Makoto Sakuma former Chief 
of Joint Staff Office recalls.  
“The way in which we built our forces was rather unbalanced, with exclusive focus on 
anti-submarine and naval mine warfare, because the alliance relationship with the 




Therefore, their national military identity was inseparable from that of the US Navy.  We can 
also observe that the MSDF was a few steps ahead of the government in aligning their strategy 
with the U.S. Navy. 
“During the Navy to Navy talks (of 1979,) we communicated to the US that the JMSDF 
is willing to defend to around 15
th
 Parallel North, and the US side seemed very pleased 
to hear that, and immediately reported to the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations.)  This 
was of course, was (about two years) prior to the “1000 mile Sea Lane (SLOC)” by 
Prime Minister Suzuki; so we would have been in serious trouble if such conversation 
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 While the close ties between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy is a relatively known fact, 
what is significant is that the development of personal ties with the U.S. military at this time was 
happening also within the GSDF.  
“The Defense Guidelines were significant in that we could not conduct joint exercise 
with the United States openly and officially.  Without the guidelines, it would have been 




 In 1981, the GSDF started their U.S.-Japan Bilateral Exercises.  The purpose of the 
bilateral exercise is to enhance tactical capability, interoperability, mutual understanding and 
communication in order to enhance the credibility and deterrent effects of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty. Another important development around this time is that the GSDF began to send 
its personnel, especially those expected to become leaders in the GSDF to US military education 
institutions, such as the Army War College (AWC), Marine Corps Command and General Staff 
College (MCGSC), US Army Command and General Staff College (USAC&GSC) at Fort 
Leavenworth, and more recently, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), US 
Combined Arms Center (CAC), and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). 
Sending future generals to these US Army institutions was different in nature from 
sending soldiers on the ground to train in bilateral exercises. As Carol Atkinson points out, 
military education exchange programs were designed to “socialize others to your own norms, 
ideas, and procedures, and in the process build (US) soft power.
100
” From the point of view of 
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Japan, these programs created an opportunity for GSDF officers to reflect upon its own military 
identity in comparison to the US military identity to which there are exposed to. It also offered 
an opportunity for the officers to reconsider their views about the role of military, threat 
perception, and the US-Japan alliance relationship itself.   
The period between 1977 and 1988, therefore, was a period of tension between the 
civilian bureaucracy and the SDF officers. However, it is worth noting that one of the 
developments concerning personnel in this period was once again the development of personal 
ties with the United States, leading to shared determination that the US-Japan Alliance was most 
important for the SDF, in preparing for contingencies and for defense planning, which I will 
examine in the next chapter. 
 
1988- JDA/MOD career bureaucrats and NDA Graduates: happy coexistence?  
 The appointment of the first NDA graduate- Chief of Staff, and the appointment of the 
first indigenous JDA administrative vice minister occurred around the same time, coinciding with 
the end of the Cold War. The roles and missions of the SDF expanded during that time, and the 
demand for SDF officers’ rose. For the first time in history, retired SDF officers were invited to 
the government commission reviewing the NDPG, and active duty SDF officers were promoted 
to be the central planners in the drafting of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines. 
 How did the changes in external environment affect the relationship between the 
bureaucrats and the SDF officers within the JDA? First, as I mentioned earlier, the civilians’ and 
officers’ policy preferences, especially concerning the US-Japan alliance had converged by that 




play in the decision making process, in terms of the policy outcome. Secondly, as I argued in 
Chapter 2, politicians began to consider it costly to be excessively dependent on the bureaucracy, 
especially on security matters which now seemed more fluid and unpredictable than during the 
Cold War. Therefore, politicians started to seek the expertise of the SDF officers, both for the 
information the SDF officers can bring and for the competitive edge they may be able to gain 
vis-à-vis other politicians by getting access to exclusive knowledge. In other words, SDF officers 
as well as their expertise all of a sudden became more valuable than before.  
 Given such change, it became extremely difficult for the bureaucracy to try to 
“intervene” in all matters, and the National Security Ordinance number 9 became difficult to 
maintain. Finally, on June 30, 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto ordered the JDA to abolish 
Ordinance number 9, and officially, the basis in which the bureaucrats “intervened” disappeared. 
The other legal basis for “locking in” bureaucratic involvement, the Defense Councilor system 
lasted somewhat longer, but was abolished in 2009. By that time, however, it was already 
customary for the Chiefs of Staff to participate in the Defense Councilor meeting and their voices 
were already heard. Therefore, together both the Ordinance Number 9 and the Defense Councilor 
system can be viewed as simply catching up to reality, rather than drastic change in and of itself. 
 What may prove to be more significant changes are (1) progress in the Joint Operation 
System since 2006 and (2) establishment of the National Security Council and National Security 
Secretariat in 2013. In 2006, the SDF shifted to a joint operations structure. Along with such 
change, it was determined that (1) The Chief of Joint Staff solely assists the Minister of Defense 
on SDF operations from a military expert’s viewpoint, (2) the Minister of Defense commands 




are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff.  In other words, the civilian bureaucracy is nowhere in 
sight. Furthermore, the Bureau of Operational Policy within the Internal Bureau will be abolished 
this year to eliminate the overlap in roles. While there will be more civilians working in formerly 
uniform-only positions, still the trend is towards greater role for the Joint Staff.  
 It is important to note that the civilian bureaucracy did not strongly oppose the 2006 
reform. In fact, the three services may have opposed the move towards jointness. There are two 
reasons why the civilians may have decided not to oppose. First, the proponents of reform, led by 
General Takegouchi, then, chairman of the Joint Staff Council, did not demand abolishing Article 
12 of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (Now Defense Ministry Establishment Law) 
which granted legal basis for the administrative vice minister and bureau chiefs. General 
Takegouchi understood that it was not worth the fight to try to abolish the legal basis, since he 
figured such provision will not hinder their exercise of joint operations. Second, the the Joint 
Staff Council had been the counterpart to the U.S. Forces in Japan, coordinating matters related 
to defense guidelines and various exercises by that time. Therefore, the civilian bureaucrats 
understood that as the U.S. Forces become more “joint”, it is inevitable that Japan would become 
more “joint.”  
 As for the National Security Council and Secretariat, it is somewhat too early to tell. 
However, there are already signs that the NSC will become the center of security policy making, 
replacing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.  With the Prime Minister 
more willing and capable of exerting leadership on defense matters, those who are closer to him 
are certain to be more influential. Therefore, exactly how the civilians and officers will work side 






 In this chapter, I have examined how the composition of both the civilian bureaucracy 
and the SDF officers has changed in the last sixty years, and how the change has affected the 
relationship between them.  I also looked at the way in which the United States has always 
been an important actor in personnel development, both at the rearmament phase and later 
through educational programs. While the system of containment, or ex-ante arrangements to 
ensure civilian bureaucracy can “intervene” have gradually dissolved, direct contact between 
SDF officers and politicians and/or members of other ministries have not caused any problems 
for the civilian bureaucracy, since the SDF officer’s preferences are generally in line with that 









 The common assumption regarding the defense budget is that SDF officers must be 
frustrated with the budget, both in terms of its size and its content. The results from the 2004 
Civil-Military Gap survey seems to confirm this, that 69.2% of SDF officers argued that the 
defense budget should increase, while the 36.9% of civilian elite shared that view. At the same 
time, however, only 55.9% of the officers argued for “enhancing” the force capability of the SDF, 
while 38.3% responded that the same level of capability should be remained. 
Does this contrasting result suggest that while the SDF officers may hope for “more” 
money (quantity), but may be quite content with the force structure in terms of its “quality”? 
Does this mean that they “got what they wanted” within the quantitative constraints? If so, was 
this due to insufficient monitoring? Or, is it simply because the civilians agreed with the SDF in 
terms of “how” the budget should be spent within its limits? 
In assessing this, I will describe the three-tiered system of civilian monitoring of the 
defense budget, the respective roles of the actors in the process (politicians, the bureaucrats 
(Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defense) and how the process has evolved over the years. I 
will describe how the ex-ante control mechanism, “GNP 1% limit” on defense spending had a 
paradoxical effect of dampening interest in how the money was spent. I will also show how the 
multi-layered ex-post monitoring system led to bureaucratic inertia, and how the SDF officers 





The Three-Tiered System of Defense Budget Process: NDPO, MTDP, and Annual Budget 
 The Japanese system of defense budget process is characterized by the three 
simultaneous planning processes with different time spans. The premise of this three-tiered 
system was the Basic Policy for National Defense, which was approved by the Cabinet on May 
20, 1957 and was in place until December 17, 2014
101
. The Basic Policy which was outlined to 
serve as the baseline for defense build-up was very concise: 
The aim of national Defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any 
such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are 
founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows: 
(1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve 
world peace. 
(2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the 
foundations required for national security. 
(3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient 
defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation. 
(4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security 
arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively 




 While the high expectations on the United Nations (item 1) may seem excessively 
optimistic in hindsight, the fourth item has the most important implication for the defense budget, 
is that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements is considered a “given” in dealing with external 
aggression. It is worth noting that there were no politicians ever challenged this basic policy and 
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that it was almost forgotten, while it was continuously referred to as the one and only “political” 
directive for defense budget making at the bureaucratic level. 
 
Tier One: The National Defense Program Guideline (1976, 1995, 2004, 2010, and 2013) 
Between 1958 and 1976, the Japanese defense budget increased rapidly under for four 
consecutive five-year defense plans (the First Defense Plan was for three years.) Then, in 1976, 
the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) was announced, under the awareness that (1) 
in general, a full-scale military clash between the East and West would be unlikely to occur, and 
(2) in the vicinity of Japan, the balanced relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet 
Union, and the existence of the Japan-U.S. security alliance would continue to play a substantial 
role in preventing a serious invasion of Japan
103
.  
The NDPG was a brainchild of a civilian Japan Defense Agency (JDA) official Takuya 
Kubo, then Director of Defense Bureau. The idea behind the NDPG and its central tenet, “Base 
Force Concept” was two-fold, (1) to present the guideline as a “upper limit (ceiling)” of Japan’s 
defense build-up, to counter critiques from the opposition who fear limitless build-up, and (2) to 
present the case for the “lower limit (minimum level)” of defense, to make sure that the defense 
budget would not be cut even if détente was to continue internationally. There was also a 
domestic politics concern at that time, that JDA was worried about the eventual decline of the 
LDP, and the chance that a different party or coalition in power would not support the defense 
budget the way the LDP had continued to do in the four consecutive defense plans
104
.  
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From 1974, Kubo circulated his idea within the JDA, and his idea was taken up by 
Michita Sakata, on his arrival to the JDA as Defense Minister. Sakata organized his own study 
group consisting of external experts, “Boei wo Kangaeru kai”, who came up with a similar 
proposal to Kubo’s “Base Force Concept.” With this conclusion, on October 29, 1976, Defense 
Minister Sakata issued a ministerial order to authorize the “Base Force Concept,” and on the 
same day, Prime Minister Takeo Miki approved the 1976 National Defense Program Guideline 
(NDPG). The NDPG consists of an articulation of the “most appropriate defense posture for 
Japan,” and a supplemental list (beppyo) of presented as a goal to be fulfilled to realize the 
defense posture. The articulation is as follows: 
Equipped with various functions that are necessary from defense, well-balanced in its 
organization and deployment including its logistical support system, and is capable of 
providing sufficient defense during peacetime, responding effectively to limited and 
small-scale invasion, and being deployable for disaster relief and other missions that 




In addition, the Miki cabinet announced the so-called “GNP 1% limit,” or that “total 
defense spending each year should not exceed the equivalent of approximately 1/100 of the 
Gross National Product of the given year. The “GNP 1% limit” was put in place in response to 
concern from the opposition party and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) that the NDPG lacks a 
“hadome (check)” on spending. While Defense Minister Sakata’s preferred expression was 
“spending to be around 1%”, not “not to exceed,” the MOF and JDA reached a compromise, that 
the wording will follow what the MOF pushed for (“not exceed”), but that the 1% limit would 
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not be linked to the NDPG, leaving room for the limit to be abolished if it is necessary to do so in 
order to meet the goals of the NDPG
106
. 
The 1976 NDPG was extremely unpopular among the SDF officers, and the JDA 
officials at the time did not expect the NDPG, Base Force Concept or the 1% limit to remain in 
effect as long as it did
107
. Contrary to expectations, however, all three decisions made in 1976 
remained as “ex-ante” limitations on the defense budget for a very long time. While the GNP 1% 
limit was breached and the “hadome” was abolished in 1987, the annual defense budget 
remained below 1% of GNP for all years except for the years 1987-1989. A new NDPG was not 
drafted until 1995, and the Base Force Concept was not abolished until 2010.  
The longevity of these budgetary restraints seems to suggest the effectiveness of ex-ante 
control mechanisms, to contain the SDF officers’ desires to purchase more equipment and build a 
larger force. However, a closer examination of the SDF officer’s changing attitudes towards the 
Base Force Concept and the 1976 NDPO reveals how unexpectedly these ex-ante limits allowed 
for a level of autonomy for the SDF officers to continue building a force that in the way they 
wanted. 
The critiques of the SDF officers regarding the Base Force Concept and the 1976 NDPO 
can be summarized into three major points, (1) the “non-threat based” assessment, (2) the 
dependence on the United States and lack of political risk taking, and (3) the quantitative 
limitations (GNP 1% limit). Let me discuss these points in order. 
First, the strongest criticism against the Base Force Concept was that it was “post- threat 
based (Datsu-Kyoiron),” that it was based on an overly optimistic view of the security 
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environment. There was two aspects of this criticism, one, that that the threat assessment itself 
was inaccurate, and two, that it was impossible to come up with an “ideal defense posture” 
without taking into account the threat environment surrounding Japan.  
The first concern proved to be correct, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979. Calls to abolish the Base Force Concept and to return to the “threat-based” 
assessment came not only from the SDF officers but also from civilian officials within the JDA, 
such as Hisahiko Okazaki, a MOFA official working at JDA at that time. However, the criticism 
from SDF officers subsided once it became clear that the JASDF will be able to purchase one 
hundred F-16s in ten years and that the JMSDF can purchase forty-five P3C surveillance 
aircrafts in eleven years. In other words, the Base Force Concept provided prior justification for 
their purchases, and did not prevent them from purchasing what they considered necessary. 
Hence, the interest of the SDF officers shifted from criticizing the concept, to making sure that 
they can purchase what they asked for
108
. 
 In addition, “non-threat based” logic turned out to be a convenient logic for the SDF 
once the Cold War actually ended. As Figure 5-2 indicates, one striking feature of Japan’s 
defense build-up is how little it was affected by the end of the Cold War. For example, almost no 
bases were closed in Hokkaido even after it became clear that the Russians are not going to 
invade Hokkaido. The Base Force concept was abstract and ambiguous enough to provide 
justification for continuation of a defense posture that no longer made sense.  
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 The second critique of the Basic Force Concept and the NDPO had to do with the 
“expansion” provision” and the over- reliance on the United States. While the NDPO aimed to 
“respond effectively to limited and small-scale invasion,” that in turn suggested that Japan will 
not continuously prepare for large-scale invasion. Instead, the NDPO stipulated that political 
decision to “expand” fore should be made in case of major crisis. The SDF officers criticized this 
“expansion” provision to be “utterly irresponsible and unrealistic,” since there were no political 
action taken to prepare for any possibility for “expansion,” either in terms of the budget or legal 
measures. They argued that since no political action would be taken, the realistic response should 
be to make sure that the U.S. forces would arrive in an emergency situation. As one retired 
general pointed out, “The real message of the NDPO is that we have no choice but to strengthen 
the US-Japan alliance, to make it operational as much as possible.
109
”  
 As I have shown in the previous chapter, the SDF officers were surprisingly and 
pragmatically pro-U.S. at this point, considering that most officers at this time were former 
Imperial Army and Navy officers. They were extremely pragmatic in considering the US-Japan 
alliance as the only viable option to keep Japan safe. However, there was some remaining 
sentiment to pursuing a more independent military posture. Noboru Hoshuyama, one of the 
civilian JDA officials who drafted of the NDPO, recall that the wording of “respond effectively 
to limited and small-scale invasion” was included to reflect that sentiment, to make sure that 
Japan would not become entirely dependent on the U.S.
110
 Still, the pragmatic response of the 
SDF officers was to shift their attention and to make sure that U.S.-Japan alliance becomes truly 
operational and be given political justification. Thus, the unexpected consequence of the NDPO 
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was to solidify and to provide justification for the SDF to seek stronger ties with the United 




 Finally, the third critique to the Base Force Concept and NDPO was how it was linked, 
although not officially, to the GNP 1% limit. There were concerns among the retired SDF 
officers that “the Japanese public would come to equate the “Base Force” in the “Base Force 
Concept” as “what you can buy with 1% of GNP,” and consider it as sufficient force, regardless 
of what the “1% of GNP” might amount to in the future
112
. While the NDPO called for 
“enhancing quality, not quantity,” they argued that placing quantitative limits, especially when 
rapid GNP growth was not expected, was dangerous, and that the symbolism of the “GNP 1%” 
may constrain Japan’s defense posture in the years to come. 
 Their concerns proved to be correct, that “GNP1%” did become a symbolic figure in the 
political debate over whether or not there was too much or too little spending on defense. This 
may not have been a fortunate outcome for the Japanese public at large, since there is no logical 
basis for the “GNP 1%” to be any indicator for appropriate level of defense. However, ironically, 
the symbolism may have worked in the SDF’s favor, that the preoccupation with the “GNP 1%” 
may have dampened efforts to scrutinize what the “1%” consisted of.  
As I showed earlier, political discussions within the Diet on civilian control did focus on 
budgetary matters, but the focus tended to be on symbolic matters, either the “GNP 1%” limit, or 
purchases of notable new equipment that seem “offensive” or in contradiction to the spirit of the 
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constitution (the case of the helicopter carrier, as I refer to later, is one example). Even after the 
1% limit was abolished in 1987, the symbolism continued, that as long as the defense budget 
remained under 1%, there was little attention to what the defense budget consisted of. 
This brings us to the next question: within the limits of the NDPO “supplementary list 
(beppyo)” and the symbolic GDP 1% limit, to what extent does the SDF have discretion over the 
defense budget? How, and to what extent do politicians and bureaucrats conduct ex-post 
monitoring?  In order to assess this, we need to look at the second and third tiers of defense 







Table 4-1 The National Defense Program Guideline: The Conceptual Basis 






Disaster relief, etc. 
 
Preventing and dealing 




Contributing to building a 
more stable security 
environment 
- PKO & International disaster relief 
activities 
- security dialogue and defense 
exchange 
 
Dealing with various 
contingencies, major 
disasters 
- Large scale natural disasters & 
terrorism 
- Contingencies in the vicinity of Japan 
 
Defense of Japan 
- Prevention of invasion 
- Dealing with invasion 
Independent, proactive 
initiatives to improve the 
international security 
environment 
-Making international peace 
cooperation activities a primary mission 
-security dialogue & defense exchange 
 
Effective responses to new 
threats & diverse 
contingencies 
- ballistic missiles 
- Guerrillas & special operation forces,  
- Invasion of islands 
- ISR, territorial invasion, armed spy 
ships etc. 
-Large scale, special disasters 
 
Preparation against a 
full-scale invasion (securing 
the most basic elements) 
Improving the global 
security environment 
-initiatives focused on international 
peace cooperation activities 
- Arms control & disarmament,& 
support for capacity building 
-Anti-Terrorism measures & security 
of maritime traffic 
Further stabilizing the 
security environment in 
the Asia-Pacific region 
- defense exchange & intra-regional 
cooperation 
-Support for capacity building 
Effective deterrence & 
responses 
- Surrounding waters & airspace 
-Attacks on islands 
- Cyber attacks 
- Guerrillas & Special Ops 
- Ballistic missiles 
- Complex contingencies 
- Large scale, special disasters 
- Preparations against a full-scale 
invasion 
(maintaining minimum necessary 
level of preparations against 







Concept of Basic 
Defense Capability 
- Maintaining a balanced posture 
in terms of organization and 
deployment, including logistical 
support systems, equipped with 
the various functions required for 
defense 
-Effectively dealing with 
contingencies up to and 
including limited, small-scale 
invasions 
- Contributing to civil stability for 
the populace, disaster relief 
 (adherence to same 
fundamental policy) 
 
- Does not adhere to the realization of 
measures to deal with a limited, 
small-scale invasion singlehandedly 
- “dealing with various contingencies 
such as major disasters” and 
“contributing to building a more stable 
security environment” added to the 
roles of defense capability, joining the 
existing role of “defense of the nation” 
Multifunctional, flexible, 
effective defense capability 
(Maintenance of the effective 
aspects of the concept of the basic 
defense capability) 
 
- Being able to work independently 
and proactively on improving the 
international security environment, 
as well as dealing effectively with 
new threats and diverse 
contingencies 
Dynamic defense force 
(Not bound by the concept of 
basic defense capability) 
-Facilitating effective deterrence of 
and responses to various 
contingencies, and making it 
possible to proactively conduct 
activities to further stabilize the 
security environment in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and improve the 
global security environment in a 
dynamic manner. 
-Developing multifunctional, flexible, 







Table 4-2 The Supplemental List to National Defense Program Guidelines, 1976, 1995, 2004, 2010 
Category 1976 NDPG 1995 NDPG 2004 NDPG 2010 NDPG 
GSDF Authorized personnel 
Regular 










Major Units Regionally deployed units in 
peacetime 
12 divisions 







Mobile operation units 1 armored division 
1 artillery brigade 
1 airborne brigade 
1 combined training 
brigade 
1 helicopter brigade 
1 armored division 
1 airborne brigade 
1 helicopter brigade 





1 armored division 
Ground to air guided missile 
units 
8 anti-air artillery 
groups 
8 anti-air artillery 
groups 
8 anti-air artillery 
groups 














MSDF Major Units Destroyer units for mobile 
operations  
Regional district units 
Submarine units 
Minesweeping units 
Patrol aircraft units 
4 escort flotillas 





(land based) 16 
squadrons 




1 minesweeper flotilla 
(Land-based) 
13 squadrons 




1 minesweeper flotilla 
9 squadrons 
4 escort flotilla 
(8 divisions) 
4 destroyer units 
6 submarine units 
1 minesweeper flotilla 
9 flight squadrons 
Main Equipment Destroyers 
Submarines 
Combat aircraft 
About 60 ships 
16 ships 
About 220 aircraft 
About 50 ships 
16 ships 
About 170 aircraft 
47 ships 
16 ships 
About 150 aircraft 
48 ships 
22 ships 
About 150 aircraft 
ASDF Major Units Air control & warning units 28 warning groups 
1 squadron 




8 warning groups 
20 warning 
squadrons 
1 airborne warning 
squadron 
(2 squadrons) 
4 warning groups 
24 warning 
squadrons 










12 squadrons 12 squadrons 
Air Reconnaissance Units 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron 
Air Transport Units 
Air refueling/transport units 




Surface-to-air Guided Missile 
Units 
6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 
Main Equipment Combat Aircraft About 430 aircraft 
(about 360 aircraft) 
About 400 aircraft 
About 300 aircraft 
About 350 aircraft 
About 260 aircraft 
About 340 aircraft 






Aegis-equipped destroyers    4 ships 4 ships 




   7 groups 
4 squadrons 
3 groups 
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NDPG 
GNP 1% Limit “Total Review” 
 1986 
MTDP 




































DP= Defense Plan 
First Tier: National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) 
Second Tier: Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) 


















Figure 4-1  Annual Defense Budget Making Process 
 
January: Requests / Plan proposals are presented to the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Staff Offices from regional outlets 
 
February: Annual Situation Estimate  Formulation of Basic Plan  Overall plan decided 
 
March: Consolidation of regional requests and staff-office initiated plans 
 
April-May: Budget proposal review at the Staff Office 
 
End of May: Presentation of the Staff Office Draft to the Internal Bureau (Civilian JDA/MOD) 
 
June-July: Budget Proposal review at the Internal Bureau 
 
July: Explanation of the Draft plan to the LDP (ruling party) Defense committee 
 
August: JDA (MOD) annual budget proposal (gaisan yokyu) completed  presented to the Ministry of Finance  
 
 
September to December: Ministry of Finance Budget Bureau reviews  
    (MOD civilian and uniform personnel explains justification for the proposal) 
 
December: Consultation with LDP Defense Committee (informal)  Presentation of the MOF proposal 
 
-- LDP Defense committee members and MOF Budget Bureau chief discuss possible “rejuvenation” of deleted 
items from the JDA/MOD proposal (fukkatsu sessho) 
 
- Approval of the LDP Defense Committee 
 




Tier Two: The Mid-Term Defense Plans 
 The second tier of the defense budget making process is the drafting of the Mid-Term 
Defense Plan.  As mentioned earlier, the Five-year Defense Plan system that existed between 
1958 and 1976 was abolished and replaced by the 1976 NDPG, and the defense budget was 
decided on a one-year (annual) basis in the following years. However, since most items on the 
defense budget required sufficient lead time for development and since defense contracts tended 
to extend for multiple years, it soon became evident that a longer-term planning process was 
necessary. Thus, the five-year planning process was reintroduced in 1980 as a process strictly 
within the JDA. Following this development, in 1986, the five-year plan was once again 
upgraded to a government level planning process, requiring approval by the Security Council of 
Japan.  This meant that purchasing major defense equipment (such as aircrafts and ships) 
involved approval by the Security Council twice, first when the MTDP is approved, and second 
when the annual budget is approved. 
The way in which the Mid-Term Defense Plan is drafted within the JDA (MOD) is not 
open to the public, and the JDA denies the existence of an official draft. Furthermore, the 
defense planning documents of the three services are confidential. Therefore, it is impossible to 
examine the content of the plans: what the three services included in the respective plans, and to 
what extent they were able to realize their plans. What I was able to find out through interviews 




The GSDF, MSDF, ASDF simultaneously and continuously drafts three types of 
defense estimates, long-term (10-15 years), mid-term (5 years), and short term (1 year,) 
corresponding to the three-tiered defense planning process. The mid-term estimate provides the 
basis in which each service prepares their Mid-Term Proposals to be presented to the Internal 
Bureau of the JDA/MOD. The Internal Bureau (civilian bureaucracy) then assesses the three 
service proposals, and trims it down so that the three proposals combined will be within the 
limits presented by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and comes up with the JDA(MOD) 
Mid-Term Proposal. The JDA(MOD) Mid-Term Proposal is then presented to the Budget 
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, who then assesses the proposal in terms of (1) total size of 
budget, (2) proportion of types of expenses (material and non-material), and the (3) 
project-based rationale. After informal consultation with the LDP defense committee, the MOF 
proposal is presented to the Security Council, and then the Cabinet meeting for approval. 
It is worth noting that there was a change in the budget process within the JDA in 1991. 
Instead of merely being on the receiving end of proposals, the Internal Bureau presents multiple 
scenarios (with different spending limits) for each service to consider, and the Staff Offices of 
each service comes up with multiple plans (called “case studies”.) This way, the Internal Bureau 
will be able to discern the priorities attached to each item in the budget and to assess 
accordingly, rather than trimming down the proposals in a proportional manner. 
Overall, how can we evaluate the Mid-term defense planning process from the point of 
view of civilian control? First, evaluating the elected politician’s role in defense planning, the 





have a chance to examine the proposals. While the opposition party can pose questions about 
several items in the Mid-Term Plan, it is difficult for them to reverse any substantial matters
113
. 
If the Security Council and cabinet meetings were more for “rubber-stamping” than for 
substantial discussion, politician’s oversight of the defense budget should be considered 
extremely limited.  
This point is worth emphasizing for two reasons. One, as I referred earlier, Security 
Council (then Defense Council) has the potential to play an important role in the purchasing of 
major equipment (ships and aircrafts) by being involved twice, in the planning stage (MTDP), 
and in the purchasing stage (Annual Budget). This was a measure introduced in 1972 to 
“strengthen civilian control.” Being involve twice instead of once may seem more “stronger” 
control, but not if their approval in the planning stage leads to less scrutiny in the purchasing 
stage.  
Take, for instance, the case of the MSDF’s helicopter carrier, DDH Hyuga. For the 
MSDF, purchasing a “large ship with a flat deck”, or in plain language, a carrier, was a 
long-held wish that had been halted twice by the civilian bureaucracy (within JDA and MOF) 
for financial reasons (size of ship) as well as symbolic reasons (shape of ship: carrier as an 
offensive equipment). In the 2001 MTDP, the MSDF succeeded in gaining approval of the 
Security Council for the purchase of a ship large enough to be a carrier, while keeping the 
design of the ship tentatively not looking like a carrier. Then, at the purchasing stage, the MSDF 
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changed the design of the ship to one with a flat deck. The prior approval by the Security 
Council at the planning stage made it possible for the MSDF to purchase a ship that was “large 
enough,” and only having to reveal the design of the ship gradually at the purchasing stage, 
making it difficult for potential opposition to find a timing to block the purchase of the ship.  
Two, as I discussed earlier, the Security Council was upgraded to National Security 
Council in November 2013, and is expected to play a greater role in defense planning, 
especially with the drafting of the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS has replaced the 
long-lived Basic Policy for National Defense as the guiding principle of defense planning. 
Although the relationship between the NSS and NDPG is yet to be determined, the Security 
Council consisting of cabinet members and its politically appointed staff can enhance the 
politician’s influence in defense planning, if they try to do so. 
Second, the Ministry of Finance has long considered their role in the defense budget 
process as a “linchpin” of civilian control in Japan
114
. Katayama (2005) even refers to the 
lessons of the pre-war period, during which the MOF was unable to stop the Imperial military’s 
endless expansion. Still, the role of the MOF is limited to keeping the fiscal situation in order, 
and making sure that the tax payer’s money is not wasted. They may question the value of a 
certain equipment, but in most cases do not go far as to pick and choose. Instead, they question 
the MOD, both civilian and SDF, about how they would justify their case vis-a-vis the tax 
payers.  
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Finally, within the JDA/MOD, the Internal Bureau plays a role as the primary actor to 
assess each service’s proposals. The procedural change introduced in 1991 is an attempt to play 
a proactive role in the budget, rather than to merely “shrink” and “staple together” the three 
services’ proposals. However, since the NDPG predetermines the direction and composition of 
the budget in the longer term, the role of the civilian officials in JDA/MOD in the MTDP stage 
might be limited to making sure that the budget will be used to meet the goals of the NDPG in 
an orderly manner.  Furthermore, as is the case of MOF budget bureau, in most cases their 
mentality is not to work on behalf of politicians, but on behalf of tax payers to make sure their 
money is well spent.  
 
Tier Three: The Annual Budget Process 
 The annual budget process follows a similar schedule as in the MTDP. As described in 
Figure 4-1, the annual budget request for operational expenses are turned in from regional 
outlets in January, and a consolidated budget is compiled by each service by the end of May. In 
the summer months of June and July, negotiations take place between the Staff Offices and the 
Internal Bureau to determine what item should be on the respective years’ budget.  
The Internal Bureau uses three “filters” in their assessment, according to Yasuo Ebara, 
civilian bureaucrat in the MOD
115
. The three filters are: (1) constitutional/legal filter: whether 
the purchase of certain equipment is legally sound, (2) social filter: whether the purchase is 
socially acceptable, and does not contradict past statements in the Diet; (3) budgetary filter: 
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whether the cost associated can fit within the annual budget. The second filter is the most 




After the MOF announces the Budget Request Guidelines (gaisan yokyu kijun) in late 
July/early August, the Internal Bureau compiles the Official Budget Request, which is approved 
at a ministerial meeting, including the three appointed political ministers, administrative vice 
minister, civilian bureau chiefs, Chief of Staff of three services, and the Chief of Staff, Joint 
Staff. The Official Budget Request is then presented to the MOF, and the process that follows is 
the same as the MTDP process. 
The annual budget process tends to be technical in nature, even more so than the 
MTDP, since it is a process to allocate one-fifth of the planned expenditures under the five-year 
MTDP. Thus, the ex-post monitoring role of the Internal Bureau and the MOF is limited to 
keeping the procurement process on schedule. Although politicians do intervene at the final 
stage of budget making (fukkatsu sessho), what is to be “revived” through political intervention 
in most cases is already scripted, and more likely a show for the politicians to appeal to their 
supporters. Thus, the key to civilian control on budget matters rests upon the way in which 
political leaders are involved in the long-term planning, such as the NDPG which determines 
ex-ante the rationale for defense procurement, as well as more attention ex-post on how the 
budget is used annually. The latter is difficult to change, given the limited involvement of the 
Diet in budget matters, which is the case in other policy areas as well.  
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In this chapter, I have shown that the intense attention to the “GNP 1% limit” together 
with the vagueness of the wording of the 1976 NDPG led to a situation in which the SDF can 
build up their forces with little intervention from politicians. While the bureaucrats enforced 
ex-post monitoring, it was effective in keeping quantitative control over the budget, but was 
limited in its capacity to address the qualitative aspects of the budget. Recently, the NDPG has 
been reviewed in a shorter time span. While it is undeniable that it is at least partly due to the 
changing security environment after the Cold War, it is also important to note the institutional 
changes that I described in Chapter Two that may have motivated politicians to engage in 
defense matters more proactively than in the past. 
One continuing theme from the previous chapter is the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance: 
how was a prerequisite to the discussions that took place over the budget, and how it allowed 
for the politicians’ relative lack of interest in defense matters. Allowing the Base Force 
Capability concept live for as long as it did, and keeping the budget at below or around 1% of 
GNP would not have been possible without U.S. military commitment in the region. This in 
turn means that if there are significant changes in how the defense budget is determined in 
Japan, and the role politicians play in the process.  
Finally, another continuing theme from the previous chapter is whether the 
establishment of the National Security Council will affect the budget process. Since the 
Koizumi administration in 2001, the Cabinet Secretariat has been trying to take the lead in the 





Management and Reform (Honebuto no Hoshin) “, but the defense budget had been largely 
unaffected by this initiative
117
. What may bring greater change, however, is that the National 
Security Council released the National Security Strategy, the 2013 NDPG, and the 2013 MTDP 
all on the same day, on December 17, 2013. Since this was less than a month after the NSC and 
the National Security Secretariat was officially established, it is hard imagine that these three 
documents were actually prepared by the NSC. However, if the NSC and the National Security 
Secretariat continues to take the lead in the drafting process, and if the civilian bureaucracy and 
the SDF officers staffed at the NSC works strictly on behalf of the administration in power and 
not from the respective services and ministries they are forwarded from, the dynamics of the 
defense budget process may change dramatically. 
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Use of Force 
 
 On July 1, 2014, the Abe administration announced that Japan will re-interpret the 
constitution to lift the self-imposed ban on the exercise of collective self-defense (CSD). In the 
statement, “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure 
Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” the Abe administration declares that: 
 
To this day, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is 
permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs….. as a result of careful 
examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached 
a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occur but also when 
an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan 
occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to 
fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and 
when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure 
Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary 
should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for 
self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. 
 
 While there is no question about the significance of this policy change, it is worth 
noting that constitutional re-interpretation is nothing new, but rather, follows a consistent 
pattern of how the provisions regarding use of force have changed in the post war history of 
Japan: re-interpretation of Article 9, followed by legislation or revision of laws authorizing 





Secondly, there continues to be a misunderstanding that the constitutional “brakes 
(hadome)” were brakes on SDF members’ action, although they are actually brakes on the how 
politicians, especially the Prime Minister, can use the SDF. Relaxing the restrictions deriving 
from Article 9 does not mean delegating more authority to the SDF, so those who argue that the 
SDF will “run amok” once the brakes are released understand it backwards. It is the politicians 
that are releasing the ties that bind them, and what specific action the SDF will be able to take 
will depend on the subsequent legislations that authorize their actions.  
Finally, another consistent pattern is the way in which “risk to people’s lives” is 
brought up as reason for opposition to expanding the scope of “use of force.” In the recent 
debate regarding collective self-defense, serious discussion took place over whether allowing 
for collective self-defense may lead to conscription of young men in the future. The “slippery 
slope to massive casualties” is a rhetoric continuously invoked by those who oppose expanding 
the scope of “use of force”, and since that is the case, constitutionality of a mission tended to be 
measured by the potential risk to cause people’s lives. 
In this chapter, I will first review how the control mechanisms for use of force have 
evolved, starting from an interpretation of Article Nine that forbid existence of any war 
potential whatsoever, to an interpretation that allows for the “exercise of collective self-defense.” 
I argue that relaxation of the interpretation of the Article 9 of the constitution changed the scope 
of what the SDF can do ex ante, and that the subsequent legislations that gave legal grounding 
for each operation determined how the operation should be monitored ex post.  





had a different meaning in Japan compared to other countries. I will then examine how the 
expectation of casualties affected the decision of the Japanese government concerning whether, 
when and how to send SDF to Iraq. I will argue that the Iraq operation was a turning point for 
both the Japanese government and the SDF.  Finally, I will look at the results concerning 
casualties in my 2004 Civil-Military Survey, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter Six. 
 
Use of Force policy since the end of the Cold War: from ex-ante to ex post control? 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the 
aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized” (Article Nine, Constitution of Japan) 
 
 The Self Defense Forces would not have existed without the reinterpretation of Article 
Nine. The definition of the term “war potential” was reinterpreted to allow for “that which does 
not exist the minimum necessary level for self-defense.” Subsequent announcements of 
re-interpretation and clarification defined the scope of SDF’s action (Three conditions for the 
exercise of self-defense, no overseas deployment). In other words, the reinterpretation of the 
constitution defined “ex-ante” the way in which the elected leaders would be allowed to use the 
SDF. The reinterpretation most commonly took the form of a Minister or a civilian bureaucrat, 
most likely from the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Japan Defense 





made, it constrains subsequent policy discussion. Therefore, the point of view of the 
bureaucrats, the seemingly arcane, “theological arguments (shingaku ronso)” in the Diet was 




 Re-interpretation alone did not enable pave the way for using the SDF in new 
situations. Another unique feature of the constitutional and legal aspects of Japan’s defense 
policy is that various activities and duties of the SDF must be all specifically grounded in laws 
such as the Self-Defense Forces Law. Unlike in other countries where defense law takes the 
form of a negative list, which means that anything may be recognized at the discretion of the 
government provided that it is not prohibited by international law or the constitution of the 
country, Japan’s defense related laws take the form of a positive list, meaning that there must be 
legal grounding for any action taken by the SDF. Therefore, “every time a situation arises that 
was not envisaged under existing law, new legislation has to be put in place to enable the SDF 
to take the necessary action to deal with the situation
119
.” 
 Table 5-1 shows how re-interpretation and legislation defined and expanded the scope
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Table 5-1  Constitutional Interpretation / Enabling Legislation on the Use of Force   
 EX ANTE 









Three Conditions for exercise of self defense  
(1) when facing an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression 
(2) when there is no other means of countering the act 
(3) when the use of force in self-defense is limited to the minimum necessary level  




No Overseas Deployment “In the wake of the establishment of the SDF, we hereby 
recognize that in light of the spirit of the constitution and the peace loving spirit of our 
people, we will not deploy the SDF overseas.”  
   
1954.6.9 
SDF Law 





consent required in 
principle 







Disaster Relief Dispatch 
(Saigai Haken) 
Minister of 














Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy (senshu boei): official definition (1981) 
“Japan will not employ defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted 
on Japan by another country, and even in such a case only the minimum force 
necessary to defend itself may be used. Only the minimum defense forces necessary 
for self-defense should be retained and used.” 




“Ittaika” (Integration of of the use of force between the SDF and other countries’ 
militaries) “SDF logistical support of US forces deployed for peace and security of the 
Far East should be considered as “ittaita”, and outside what is permissible under the 
constitution. 
   
1972.10.14 
Government 
On the Right of Collective Self Defense (official position:1981.5.29 in response to 



















-International Law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is 
the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the 
state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since 
Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under 
international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise 
of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum necessary level of self- 
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 SDF Law (84-4) 
Law Concerning Measures 
to Ensure the Peace and 
Security of Japan in 
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 Anti-Terrorism Special 
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 Emergency Situations 
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 Required, Prior 
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 SDF Law (82-3) 
Destruction measures 
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Right of Collective Self Defense 
The Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack 
against japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is 
in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival 
and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and 
pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to 
repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to 
the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the 
Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the 
Government’s view to date. 
TO BE REVIEWED 
-SDF Law 
-Rear Area Situations Law 




Article Nine: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 






of SDF action in the post war period. From this table, we can see how “relaxing the brakes 
(ex-ante control)” and “imposing new rules (ex-post monitoring)” occurred consecutively. 
 Several points about Table 5-1 are worth highlighting. First, constitutional 
re-interpretation did not always expand the scope of use of force, but in some cases constrained 
it in ways that were not envisioned when the statements were made. For instance, the concept of 
“ittaika,” or integration with other countries being equal to the use of force, was introduced in a 
statement by the head of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau in 1959. The concept went on to have a 
life of its own, having an symbolic and constraining effect on what Japan can do in its alliance 
relationship with the United States. Another example is the current focus of discussion, the 
concept of collective self-defense. Citing Kazuya Sakamoto, Michito Tsuruoka of the National 
Institute for Defense Studies argues that “the separation between individual and collective self 
Defense rights emerged in the mid-1950s as a convenient way for the government to secure the 
interpretation that the Constitution allows the exercise of individual self-defense.” The 
government needed to narrow the scope of what would be possible under self-defense to 
address domestic opposition, and separating the individual and collective was seen to be a good 
practical way
120
. But as the concept was formalized in 1972 and 1981, the hurdle for the rights 
of collective self-defense became high, possibly as an unintended consequence. 
 Second, Table 5-1 highlights how much legislation took place from 1990 to 2010 
without formally announcing the re-interpretation of the constitution. It is hard to avoid the 
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impression that de-facto exercise of collective self-defense took place during this period
121
. This, 
in turn, makes one wonder if the recent re-interpretation to allow for collective self-defense is 
necessary in order to accommodate for what Prime Minister Abe has listed as examples of 
exercise of collective self-defense. 
 Third, re-interpretation alone does not change policy, but must be followed up by new 
legislation or revision of existing law, since all new activities or expanded “use of force” 
possibilities must be grounded in law. Currently, more than ten separate legislations are under 
consideration for revision, since Prime Minister Abe chose to revise existing legislations instead 
of enacting a comprehensive new legislation
122
. What remains to be seen, and what is crucial 
for civilian control is whether there will be changes in “who authorizes the operation” and “how 
the Diet is involved.” These provisions will determine what ex-post monitoring will take place. 
 Finally, the Abe administration denied the possibility that enlarging the scope of SDF 
operations by allowing from collective self-defense will lead to increased risk for the SDF. In 
the Diet session following the July 1 announcement as well as in the Q&A session, the 
administration has repeatedly stressed that there will be no change, and that “members of the 
SDF have always taken risk for the country, and the new missions arising through legislative 
change will be just as risky,” and that “risk may possibly decline since the credibility of the 
US-Japan alliance will rise and that Japan may be less likely to come under attack.” The 
administration also adds that “in case of logistics support of other countries, we will make sure 
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that the safety of SDF members will be secured.”  
 The issue of casualties, therefore, is likely to affect the future discussion concerning 
enlarging the scope of the SDF’s use of force. The question that comes up next are: how do the 
public think about the risk of casualties, and, do the SDF officers think differently? How has the 
issues of casualties affected the policy debate over the use of force, and how is it expected to 
continue in the future? In the next section, I will look back at the case of Iraq reconstruction, 
and then pick up some questions from the Civil-Military Gap survey, which I introduce in the 
next chapter, to address what the SDF officers think about the risk of casualties, and whether 
their attitudes differ from that of the civilian elite. 
 
Use of Force and Casualty Aversion 
The Japanese Self Defense Forces have not suffered any casualties among its members 
since the end of World War II, except in training related accidents and illnesses.  This may not 
be surprising; given the constitutional restrictions that limit the role they can play abroad.  
However, since the end of the Cold War, the SDF has been deployed overseas, through its 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and 
multilateral operations in the Indian Ocean.  The 2004 Iraq operation was the largest 
operation: in the case of the Ground Self Defense Force, more than 2000 members were sent to 
Iraq in the first year, exceeding the number of SDF personnel sent overseas from GSDF in the 
previous 12 years.   







collective self-defense, and the forthcoming legislations that are likely to expand the range 
operations that the SDF can engage in, is certain that the risk of casualties in increase in the 
future.  In fact, although the Japanese government had so far chosen to send the SDF only in 
areas where they can protect themselves without “using force (and thereby not violating the 
constitution)”, it has been widely considered among those who participated that it was rather 
miraculous that there were zero casualties to this date.  This (fortunate) lack of casualties in 
many ways raised the psychological bar for the first casualty within the SDF, as well as the 
political bar for politicians. 
 The Iraq operation in 2004 was a turning point in regards to the issue of casualties.  
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi acknowledged for the first time in his speech to the public 
that he is well aware that “the situation in Iraq is severe, and it is not necessarily safe
123
.”  
Concerns about possible casualties and the possible impact on electoral results reportedly 
affected the government’s decision over the timing of the deployment. The issue of casualties 
was also prevalent among the public debate and in the media. Commentators from both the 
right and left asked whether it was worth risking SDF members’ lives to “help the U.S. war in 
Iraq.” Yellow handkerchiefs were hung all around the city of Asahikawa, where the first 500 
members were sent, wishing their safe return. 
Casualties or casualty aversion had a different connotation in Japan compared to most 
countries.  There were three aspects to this “unique” nature; (1) casualties as a sign of 
constitutional violation, (2) casualties generally meaning civilian casualties, (3) concern over 
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causing casualties, than suffering casualties. 
 
Casualties as a sign of constitutional violation 
The issue of casualties took on a unique meaning in Japan because the SDF members 
were not supposed to be under risk except for “exclusively defense-oriented defense” reasons.   
The constitution of Japan prohibited use of force abroad, and this has limited Japan’s 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities in several ways.   
First, there is a strict criterion for participation.  The Five Principles to participate are: 
(1) the parties to the conflict must have already agreed on a cease-fire, (2) the parties to the 
conflict and the territorial states must give their consent to the deployment of peacekeeping 
forces including the Japanese force, (3) the peacekeeping forces should maintain strict 
impartiality, (4) should any of the above requirements cease to be met, Japan retains the right to 
withdraw its contingent, and 5) the use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessity 
and strictly in self-defense
124
.  
Second, there were limitations on what the SDF can do. Until December 2001, 
operations such as supervising cease-fires, monitoring the implementation of relocation, 
withdrawal or demobilization of armed forces, patrolling the buffer zone, inspection of carrying 
in or out of weapons, collection and storage of abandoned weapons, assisting the designation of 
cease-fire lines ore the exchange of POWs were prohibited. 
Thirdly, there are strict limitations on the use of weapons.  The Japanese Constitution 
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was interpreted to impose considerably stricter limitation on Japan’s peacekeeping activities 
than the U.N. policies in terms of the “use of weapons”
125
 The PKO law that was enacted in 
1992 restricted the decision to use a weapon for self-protection to the individual soldier facing a 
danger, rather than a commanding officer of the unit.  The 1998 amendment changed the 
principle so that “the use of weapons, in principle, shall be conducted under the orders of a 
senior officer present at the scene.” 1999 Non-Combatant Evacuation Law allowed using 
weapons to protect those that are under the mission’s protection, and the 2001 Anti-Terrorism 
Law and the revised PKO law allowed for protecting those under command. However, these 
changes merely expanded the definition of the rights of individual self-defense, and there has 
not been a substantial change to allow for use of weapons for mission accomplishment. 
These restrictions were attempts to find a legal and political compromise in order to 
make possible SDF’s overseas activities without changing the constitution. While these 
compromises made sense domestically, it did not make much sense internationally: the SDF can 
only operate in places and situations that are relatively safe (and thus only need small arms for 
self-defense). This also led to the unique symbolism attached to the issue of casualties in Japan:  
the likelihood of casualties became the litmus test for the constitutionality of sending troops 
abroad.  This is because the likelihood of casualties was equated with the likelihood of use of 
force abroad, which was prohibited under the constitution. Therefore, the Japanese government 
tried to deny the possibility of casualties, in order to justify their decision.   
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Casualties meaning “civilian” casualties 
Japanese translation of the word “casualties” tends only to be attributed to civilian 
casualties, and not troops.  “Giseisha,” which is closest in meaning to the word casualties, tend 
to be used for civilian casualties, while “senshisha” (those who died in combat) is used for 
military casualties.  This is partly because the word “gisei” in “giseisha” literally mean 
sacrifice, and sacrifice is not a word commonly used for those who (supposedly) willingly went 
to combat.  There is also a historical reason for this: the pre-war Japanese military, especially 
the Army was considered an aggressor from the public’s point of view, while the Japanese 
public at large was the “casualties” in the war.   
 
Concern over causing casualties, rather than suffering casualties 
 Related to the above point is that during the early debates concerning PKO and sending 
the SDF troops abroad, there was more concern over causing casualties than suffering casualties.  
This was due to the skepticism expressed by the opposition party and certain newspapers that 
by “sending armed SDF troops abroad,” Japan is returning to its imperial past.  
Whether there was a widespread mistrust towards individual SDF members is 
uncertain.  However, it is true that the possibility of shooting a local civilian and thereby 
“ruining Japan’s reputation as a peaceful nation,” was a serious concern.  In the end, the SDF 
personnel sent to Cambodia were allowed to carry firearms, but since that time, every time the 







criticized as a detriment to the safety of the troops
126
 by retired SDF officers.  They argue that 
politicians are putting the SDF at risk by denying the necessary equipment, while being 
dishonest to the public about the risks involved.   
However, it is also true that such symbolism attached to casualties has made the 
Japanese government extremely careful about sending troops, and thus has kept the SDF out of 
harms’ way. Whether or not the SDF would be happy to put them in risk once the constitutional 
limits are lifted, limits on weaponry are limited, and the public becomes more trustful of the 
SDF is a different issue. Ironically, public misunderstanding, mistrust and political 
indecisiveness had kept the SDF in a safe place, which they may or may not have come to 
enjoy.  
 
The Debate over Iraq: Normalization of the “casualty” issue?  
In 2003, the Japanese government, for the first time after the end of WWII, made a 
conscious decision to send troops abroad, while being explicitly aware of the risk of casualties.  
Public opinion and their concern over casualties entered the minds of politicians, leading not to 
denial of the possibility of casualties but towards electoral calculations and political 
maneuvering.  There were, however, still “old” issues left behind that reappeared after the 
decision was made, namely, the constitutional issue over the ban of collective self-defense, the 
symbolic aspect of the casualties issue. 
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What was new: the importance of public concern for SDF casualties 
Prime Minister Koizumi publicly acknowledged that there casualties are possible in 
Iraq.  Consequently, the political debates shifted from likelihood of casualties (and the doubts 
of constitutional violation) to issues such as ways to minimize the risk of casualties, as well as 
how to arm the SDF to keep them safe.  Therefore, although the provision on use of weapons 
(to beyond self-defense) was not substantially relaxed, there was not much criticism from the 
opposition party or the press about the type of weapons the JGSDF carry, or the equipment to 
bring. Even the Social Democratic Party, that had never been sympathetic to the SDF, accused 
the government of  “not caring enough about the welfare of the troops,” an argument that the 
government could turn around and use to allow for more equipment.  
 What was also new was the Koizumi administration attention to public opinion, 
especially on the possible shifts in opinion if there was to be a casualty. To the surprise of many 
overseas observers, the majority of the supposedly casualty averse, pacifist Japanese people 
supported government decision to send troops to Iraq.   
Public support for sending SDF troops abroad for non-combat missions had been 
steadily increasing at that point. Percentage of support for UN peacekeeping activities was 
45.5% in 1990, but increased to 70.2% in 2003
127
. Another important data during the same 
period concerns whether the public believed there was any danger for Japan to be involved in 
war.  In 1990, 31.3% said war is unlikely while 22.3% said that it is. This trend reversed in 
2003, with 11.1% saying “unlikely” while 43.2% believes war is a possibility.   
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 The decision to send SDF troops to Iraq was made in the context of such public 
opinion. Opinion polls taken by various newspapers and TV stations during the discussion 
leading up to the current SDF operations in Iraq offer an important insight in understanding 
public opinion on the issue of casualties
128
. While public support started at about 50/50 in June 
2003 and dipped to 22.6% in November, it recovered to 50.3% in January. Two factors are 
worth noting here: first, very few respondents approved or disapproved the mission altogether, 
and most viewed support as conditional. This suggests that there were much less “solid doves” 
or “solid hawks” on the issue of sending SDF troops than in the past. In terms of casualties, this 
result suggested that the public’s attitude towards casualties had also become more conditional 
(whether the mission is worth the sacrifice), rather than ideological (whether or not the mission 
is constitutional.)   
Second, it is important to look at why support for the mission increased. The 
government, in garnering public support for the Iraq mission emphasized the importance of the 
alliance relationship with the U.S. in light of the missile threat from North Korea. This seemed 
to be an appropriate strategy for the government, in light of the public opinion poll result that 
shows increased concern among the public over the security of Japan. However, when we look 
at the polls which directly asked the supporters of the mission for the reason for their support, a 
much higher percentage consistently raised “international contribution” or “help rebuild Iraq” 
as the primary reasons for support, at a much higher percentage than “for the sake of the 
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US-Japan alliance.”      
What does this apparent gap suggest? On the one hand, it may suggest why public 
support did not wane despite the increased doubts over the legitimacy of the war. If the SDF 
activities had not been seen to be for the Iraqi people and not primarily linked with U.S. policy, 
ups and downs in public support may have had little to do with the relative success / failure of 
US policy in Iraq, as long as the SDF is safe and the Iraqis are happy one way or another. The 
Japanese government, attentive to public opinion, noticed this, and started to de-emphasize the 
alliance aspect and instead emphasized how happy the Iraqis were with the SDF activities in the 
city of Samawah. However, whether the public’s tolerance of casualties is stronger for an 
altruistic motivation (doing good for other countries) or for security (for the safe of security of 
Japan) remains uncertain.  
 
What was not new: the continuing symbolic nature of casualties 
Prime Minister Koizumi, while acknowledging the possibility of casualties, evaded the 
issue of “risk of casualties = use of force = constitutional violation” debate by arguing that the 
SDF will only be sent to “areas not in combat
129
”. He defined the “areas not in combat” not by 
relative safety (whether or not there are terrorist attacks and other violent activities) but by 
whether or not these attacks are conducted by either a nation state or an equivalent 
organization
130
. The latter definition (who is behind the attacks) was to be determined 
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 This definition was also used in the earlier legislation to send JMSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to 








individually by the extent of planning, level of organization, continuity, and other aspects.  
This definition was obviously subject to manipulation, and the Defense Minister was criticized 
for being tautological, by saying “The SDF will only go to areas where there is no combat, so 
wherever they go is ‘an area not in combat.’” Thus, such “acrobatic” interpretation of the 
constitution was once again used, leaving the possibility that casualties will once again become 
a symbolic issue. 
Secondly, although the tragic deaths of the two diplomats working for the CPA in Iraq 
ironically served as a “wake-up call” for the Japanese public to realize that Iraq is not a safe 
place, several attempts were made by the government to show to the public that Iraq was not so 
“dangerous.” First, during the Diet deliberation in September before the General Election, an 
investigative team consisting of government officials was sent to Iraq. Their primary goal was 
to find out how Japan can contribute to Iraqi reconstruction, but the other (hidden) mission was 
to remain in Iraq so as to provide an alibi that Iraq is not too dangerous, at least during the Diet 
session
131
. Secondly, in December, the head of the LDP’s coalition partner, Komeito, which was 
the important swing vote in the debate, went to Samawah, the planned location of the SDF 
operation, to show that it was safe enough for him to visit. 
 Finally, the constitutionality issue came back to haunt Prime Minister Koizumi after 
the sovereignty handover to the Iraqis. Since the Japanese public had perceived that the SDF 
was working on its own for the welfare of the Iraqis, they revolted against the automatic 
transition to becoming part of the Multilateral Forces, which Koizumi believed would be 
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politically feasible, after the end of June. The constitutional issue of the ban on use of force 
abroad and on joining collective defense operations came back. What made matters worse is 
that Koizumi mentioned his intention to continue to President Bush before he officially 
announced it to the public. In the end, another acrobatic gesture was made, promising to “be 
part of a multinational effort, but to be retain independent command,” but this issue is certain to 
have cost Koizumi substantial votes in the upper election.  
Thus, the decision to send troops to Iraq suggested that the issue of casualties became 
less of a symbolic issue (as a sign of the constitutionality of the mission) and more of a political 
issue (whether the mission is worth the risk), more like in other countries. What it has also 
shown is that the Japanese public may not have been absolutely casualty averse, but rather 
conditional in their judgment. There were also signs that the political debate may become more 
realistic about the conditions on use of weapons and become less preoccupied with trying to 
ensure the “safety” of the troops with minimum weaponry.   
 Was this good news for the SDF? There were some reports that certain politicians were 
unhappy about the perceived “reluctance” on the side of the GSDF leadership to send their men 
in harms’ way. In response, the GSDF members have often argued that it is not that they do not 
want to go (or that they are wimps) per se, but rather that they do not wish to be sent abroad 
with insufficient means to protect themselves, with no public support, with no political will, 
with no constitutional legitimacy, and with no honor to the mission. Although the latter three 
will be infinitely hard to measure, the former two conditions seem to be improving, leaving 







addressed by increasing the condolences payment to the families left behind (from 60,000,000 
yen to 90,000,000 yen.) 
 So then, are SDF officers casualty averse?  How do they feel about the risk of 
casualties in specific missions?  How do they compare with the civilian elite and our alliance 
partner, the United States?  The following section tries to address these questions. 
  
Are SDF officers “casualty averse”?   
In my 2004 Civil-Military Gap survey, the specific question asking about casualties 
was as follows:  
Q 38   When the SDF is sent overseas, there may be casualties.  Imagine that a Prime 
Minister decided to send SDF troops on one of the following missions.  In your opinion, 
what would be the highest number of casualties that would be acceptable to achieve this? 
(A: To defend Japan against external aggression, B: In situations in areas surrounding 
Japan
132
, C: UN Peacekeeping Operations, D: Supporting multinational operations in 
fighting terrorism, E: Helping reconstruction efforts in Iraq) 
(Response options: 1-- zero, 2 --1-5, 3 -- 6-10, 4 -- 11-30, 5 --31-50, 6 -- 51-100, 7 --more than 100) 
 
 The options A to E correspond to the specific laws that allow for different activities of 
the SDF.  The specific scenarios that the respondents will have in mind when they respond are 
as follows: A: some form of combat on domestic soil, B: contingency in Korea or Taiwan straits, 
C: peacekeeping operations in Golan Heights and East Timor (recent cases), D: supplying fuel 
to allies in the Indian Ocean, E: mainly JGSDF reconstruction/humanitarian assistance in Iraq. 
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Casualty aversion: civil-military gap?  
First, what is most interesting here is that only 81% of the SDF officers believed that 
more than 100 casualties are inevitable, even for defending the Japanese homeland. In fact, 
4.7% percent chose the options for “less than 10.” The same was the case for “situations in 
areas surrounding Japan.” Only 49% of SDF officers said that they can tolerate more than 50 
casualties. It is not clear whether this answer was because they believe that either situation are 
highly unlikely, or that they were confident that the SDF is well trained and equipped to deal 
with both in a casualty-free manner. Also, if we had asked to write down actual numbers (as in 
the TISS survey), the average number may have been higher. 
Secondly, there was a significant difference between the different types of mission.  
We can see here that in the cases of PKO, Terrorism and Iraq, contrary to the press reports that 
the SDF was only willing to accept zero casualties, only about 20% chose “zero.” Still, we can 
see that only a low number is tolerated: percentage of those who can only tolerate less than 10 
casualties are 63.6% (PKO), 58.2% (Terrorism), 60.5% (Iraq).   
Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Japanese public is highly casualty 
sensitive, the results here showed that civilians show a higher casualty tolerance almost across 
all situations. The exception is in the cases of PKO, Terrorism and Iraq where fewer civilians 
tolerated more than 100 casualties. The caveat here is that the civilian sample is taken from a 
specific elite sample, and the general public’s tolerance may be much lower. Still, it is 









Table 5- 2  Casualty Aversion: Civil-Military Gap? 
A. Defense of Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 51-100 100+ 
Civilian(n=100) 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.0% 2.0% 97.0% 
Military (n=893) 5.5% 2.6% 2.1% 1.7% 2.0% 2.1% 84.0% 
B: Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
Civilian(n=99) 7.1% 8.1% 8.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 43.4% 
military(n=884) 10.4% 7.7% 10.3% 9.7% 10.7% 12.1% 39.0% 
C: UN PKO 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
Civilian (n=99) 19.2% 22.2% 25.3% 16.2% 7.1% 3.0% 7.1% 
military(n=882) 23.2 24.6% 15.8% 11.5% 6.5% 3.3% 10.2% 
 
D: Fighting Terrorism 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
Civilian (n=101) 19.2% 20.2% 20.2% 21.2% 7.1% 3.0% 9.1% 
military(n=882) 18.3% 19.3% 59.9% 13.8% 7.9% 4.9% 12.3% 
E: Iraq 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
Civilian (n=99) 18.2% 27.3% 24.2% 16.2% 4.0% 4.0% 6.1% 










Officers’ perception of civilian casualty tolerance  
Next, I looked at the SDF officers’ expectations about the general public’s casualty 
tolerance. First, it is striking that many officers believed that the public would not tolerate any 
casualties across all cases. (Defense of Japan: 13.2%, Surrounding areas: 25.6%, PKO: 45.8%, 
Terrorism 42.9%, Iraq 43.1%)  Therefore, we can observe that officers share the common 
belief that the Japanese general public is highly casualty sensitive. 
Secondly, very few officers chose a higher number for “perceived public” than for their 
own casualty sensitivity. In other words, those who chose a higher number tended to be 
relatively less casualty sensitive than the rest.   
Finally, the gap between the perceived preference and actual preference was greater for 
“defense of Japan” and “situations in areas surrounding Japan” rather than for PKO, terrorism, 
and Iraq. This confirmed the popular notion among officers that the Japanese public was 
unrealistic about their own security, that they believed that security is provided cost free.   
 
TABLE 5-3  Casualty Aversion: Perceptions of Civilian Preference 
A. Defense of Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
Civilian (n=103) 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.0% 2.9% 93.2% 2.9% 
Military (n=912) 0.5% 2.2% 2.0% 1.6% 2.0% 2.0% 81.0% 3.9% 
Perceived civ pref 13.2% 5.7% 3.7% 5.3% 2.3% 2.5% 61.1% 6.1% 
 
B: Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 







Civilian (n=103) 6.8% 8.7% 7.8% 10.7% 10.7% 9.7% 41.7% 3.9% 
military(n=912) 9.9% 7.5% 10.0% 9.3% 9.8% 11.7% 37.3% 4.9% 
Perceived civ pref 25.6% 16.2% 11.2% 8.9% 7.1% 4.9% 19.2% 6.9% 
 
C: UN PKO 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
Civilian (n=103) 18.4% 20.4% 24.3% 15.5% 7.8% 2.9% 6.8% 3.9% 
military(n=912) 23.2% 24.6% 15.8% 11.5% 6.5% 3.3% 10.2% 5.0% 
Perceived civ pref 45.8% 25.5% 10.8% 5.4% 1.7% 1.2% 2.6% 6.9% 
 
D: Fighting Terrorism 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
Civilian (n=103) 18.4% 20.4% 19.4% 20.4% 5.8% 2.9% 8.7% 3.9% 
military(n=912) 18.3% 19.3% 59.9% 13.8% 7.9% 4.9% 12.3% 5.2% 
Perceived civ pref 42.9% 25.1% 12.0% 6.6% 2.7% 1.1% 2.8% 6.8% 
 
E: Iraq 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
Civilian (n=103) 17.5% 25.2% 23.3% 15.5% 4.9% 3.9% 5.8% 3.9% 
military(n=912) 20.9% 22.6% 17.0% 13.7% 6.3% 3.7% 10.7% 4.9% 
Perceived civ pref 43.1% 26.5% 12.0% 5.9% 1.9% 1.0% 2.8% 6.8% 
 
Is there a difference across services?  
Although the difference is not very wide, the GSDF showed a lower level of casualty 
tolerance than the other two services. This can be interpreted in several different ways, and 
require further analysis. First, the MSDF and ASDF had a strong sense that they were “on duty” 
consistently throughout the Cold War. They were always under some risk in doing what they do 







GSDF were training for potential ground invasion, and were ‘last resort’ in case of emergency, 
but it calls into question the extent to which any of them thought that such invasion was 
actually likely. 
Another explanation is that the GSDF is more likely now to be dispatched abroad, and 
that the likelihood of actually being deployed makes them weary of casualties. I will test this 
notion in the sections below. 
Finally, it is interesting that the ASDF officers chose lower numbers for PKO, 
terrorism and Iraq. The ASDF has been actively engaged in airlift in PKO and international 
disaster relief missions, although it has not been widely publicized. There seems also to be a 
tendency among politicians to treat airlifts as relatively safe, which has been a source of 
frustration for ASDF officers. Therefore, the low numbers chosen by ASDF officers may reflect 
their dissatisfaction that they are under-appreciated. 
 
TABLE 5- 4 Casualty Aversion: Cross-Service Difference 
A: Defense of Japan  
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
GSDF(n=399) 4.5% 3.3% 3.3% 2.8% 3% 3.5% 76.7% 3.3% 
MSDF(n=236) 5.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0% 1.2% 0% 86.4% 4.7% 
ASDF(n=277) 5.8% 1.8% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.4% 82.7% 4.7% 
Total military 0.5% 2.2% 2.0% 1.6% 2.0% 2.0% 81% 3.9% 
 
B: In situations in areas surrounding Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 







GSDF(n=399) 8.6% 9.5% 13.2% 9% 11.2% 10.7% 33.8% 3.3% 
MSDF(n=236) 9.7% 5.5% 5.9% 7.2% 7.2% 11% 47.5% 5% 
ASDF(n=277) 11.9% 6.1% 7.6% 11.6% 9.7% 13.3% 32.9% 5.4% 
Total military 9.9% 7.5% 10.0% 9.3% 9.8% 11.7% 37.3% 4.9% 
 
C: UN Peacekeeping Operations 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
GSDF(n=399) 20.8% 25.8% 14.5% 13.8% 7.0% 4.5% 9.5% 3.8% 
MSDF(n=236) 22.0% 22.0% 14.0% 2.9% 7.2% 3.8% 14.4% 5.5% 
ASDF(n=277) 27.8% 23.8% 19.1% 8.7% 5.1% 1.1% 6.5% 6.5% 
Total military 23.2% 24.6% 15.8% 11.5% 6.5% 3.3% 10.2% 5.0% 
 
D: Fighting terrorism 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
GSDF(n=399) 15.3% 19.8% 19.0% 14.0% 9.3% 5.3% 13.3% 4.0% 
MSDF(n=236) 20.8% 16.9% 16.5% 11.9% 7.6% 5.1% 15.7% 5.5% 
ASDF(n=277) 20.6% 20.6% 18.4% 15.2% 6.1% 4.3% 7.9% 6.5% 
Total military 18.3% 19.3% 59.9% 13.8% 7.9% 4.9% 12.3% 5.2% 
 
E: Iraq 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
GSDF(n=399) 18.5% 25.1% 17.5% 13.3% 7.3% 3.8% 11.0% 3.5% 
MSDF(n=236) 22.9% 16.9% 16.1% 11.4% 5.9% 5.5% 15.7% 5.5% 
ASDF(n=277) 22.7% 23.8% 17.0% 16.2% 5.1% 2.1% 6.1% 6.5% 
Total military 20.9% 22.6% 17.0% 13.7% 6.3% 3.7% 10.7% 4.9% 
 
 
Is there a difference by rank? 







School would show a higher casualty tolerance. My belief was based on two observations, that 
the recent cadets at the National Defense Academy seemed to be more realistic about what they 
are getting themselves into (compared to past cadets), and that they also seemed willing to risk 
their lives for such missions. 
The results showed almost the opposite. Officer candidates consistently showed a 
higher score for “zero” and lower score for “100+”, showing their reluctance for casualties. In 
contrast, majors to colonels chose higher numbers across all cases. This leads to the next 
question, whether this was because the younger officers are more likely to be sent overseas in 
the future, than the older ones. Do officers who believe that they are likely to be sent abroad 
show less tolerance for casualties, than those who do not expect to be sent? 
 
TABLE 5-5  Casualty Aversion: Difference by Rank 
A Defense of Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
OCS(n=430) 6.5% 4.0% 3.3% 3.3% 2.8% 4.2% 74.2% 
2
nd
 Lt to Capt.(n=161) 6.2% 0.6% 0% 0% 6.2% 6.2% 88.2% 
MAJ to COL(n=309) 2.9% 0% 1.0% 0% 1.0% 0% 87.4% 
B: Situations surrounding Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
OCS(n=430) 10.0% 10.5% 14.4% 10.9% 11.6% 12.8% 27.7% 
2
nd
 Lt to Capt.(n=161) 12.4% 6.2% 5.0% 6.2% 8.7% 11.2% 45.3% 
MAJ to COL(n=309) 8.8% 2.9% 5.2% 8.7% 8.1% 10.0% 46.6% 
C: UNPKO 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 







OCS(n=430) 20.9% 27.2% 18.4% 13.4% 7.0% 3.5% 7.0% 
2
nd
 Lt to Capt.(n=161) 31.1% 23.6% 9.3% 9.9% 5.6% 3.8% 11.8% 
MAJ to COL(n=309) 23.3% 22.3% 14.6% 8.1% 6.5% 2.9% 12.6% 
E: Iraq 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
OCS(n=430) 20.9% 24.4% 21.2% 13.3% 7.2% 3.3% 79% 
2
nd
 Lt to Capt.(n=161) 27.3% 15.5% 15.5% 13.0% 5.0% 4.3% 13.1% 
MAJ to COL(n=309) 19.0% 23.3% 12.3% 13.9% 4.9% 4.5% 10.0% 
 
Likelihood of going overseas 
TABLE 5-6  Casualty Aversion: Likelihood of Overseas Deployment 
C: UNPKO 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
Very likely/likely (n=671) 20.0% 21.3% 12.7% 10.7% 5.7% 3.9% 8.0% 
Hard to say (n=211) 23.7% 23.2% 19.4% 6.6% 5.7% 2.3% 11.8% 
Not likely/unlikely(n=132) 27.3% 25.8% 12.9% 13.6% 6.8% 0.1% 8.3% 
E: Iraq 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ 
Very likely/likely (n=671) 16.8% 19.0% 14.0% 12.5% 5.8% 3.4% 9.8% 
Hard to say (n=211) 22.3% 24.2% 17.5% 10.9% 4.3% 3.3% 10.0% 
Not likely/unlikely(n=132) 25% 22.0% 18.2% 12.1% 6.8% 3.0% 8.3% 
 
I picked up these two cases for this question, since these were the most likely venues 
that officers will be sent overseas at the time of the survey. Looking at the results, we could 
observe that those who believed that they are likely to be sent abroad were more casualty 







among who believed that they are “very likely or likely to be sent abroad”, 54% chose “less 
than 10”.  65.6% of those who said “hard to say” and 66% of those who said “unlikely or 
highly unlikely” also chose “less than 10.” The numbers for Iraq were more or less the same, 
49.8%, 64%, and 65.2%, respectively. 
Therefore, we can tentatively conclude that the reason why younger officers showed 
higher casualty sensitivity was not because they believe that they are likely to be sent. We must 
look more closely at factors such as experience, political beliefs, trust/distrust of politicians, and 
their views on appropriate missions for the SDF.   
 
Comparing US and Japanese Officers  
Finally, I contrasted the results of the TISS survey of US officers with our survey on 
questions about possible contingencies in Asia, and for PKO. First, for Asian contingencies, I 
contrasted the Japanese results for “situations in areas surrounding Japan” with the US results 
about Korea and Taiwan
133
. For PKO, I contrasted the Japanese results with the US results on 
questions about “preventing ethnic cleansing in Kosovo” and “stabilizing democratic 
government in Congo.”     
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 The actual wording in the TISS survey for this question was: “When American troops were sent 
overseas, there are almost always casualties.  For instance, 43 Americans were killed in Somalia, 383 in 
the Gulf War, roughly 54,000 in Korea, roughly 58,000 in Vietnam, and roughly 400,000 in World War 
II.  Imagine for a moment that a President decided to send military troops on one of the following 
missions.  In your opinion, what would be the highest number of American military deaths that would 
be acceptable to achieve this.”  The options highlighted for this case are: A. To stabilize a democratic 
government in Congo, B. To prevent widespread ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, E. To defend South Korea 
against an invasion by North Korea, F. To defend Taiwan against invasion by China. (Feaver and Kohn, 
2001. p.485) The respondents are asked to give actual numbers, not to choose options as in our survey.  







First, on the questions of Korea and Taiwan, both the SDF officers and Japanese 
civilians showed much lower tolerance for casualties than the U.S. For Korea, 9.9% of SDF, 
6.8% of Japanese civilian elite, and 4.6% (Korea) and 25.8% (Taiwan) of US officers responded 
“zero”.  The contrast was stronger when I aggregate the numbers between 1 and 50.  46.5% 
of SDF, 44.7% of Japanese civilian elite chose between 1 to 50, while the figure was 7.9% for 
Korea and 35.1% for Taiwan in the U.S. survey.   
Of course, the SDF and U.S. roles in regional contingencies are different. According to 
the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, the SDF is expected to engage only in support missions, not 
to fight in the front lines. However, considering the geographic proximity of Korea and Taiwan 
to Japan, and increasing demands to “equalize” the alliance relationship, such differences in 
casualty sensitivity may become problematic. 
The U.S. - Japan difference is not as stark on the questions of PKO.  The percentage 
of those who responded “zero” were 23.2% (SDF), 18.4% (Japanese Civilian), 46.9% 
(US-Congo), and 22.8% (US-Kosovo) respectively. The numbers for the SDF and Japanese 
civilian may be higher if “Congo” and “Kosovo” were mentioned in the questions. On the other 
hand, the percentage of those who responded “1-50” was 58.4% (SDF), 68.0% (Japanese 
civilian), 36.6% (U.S. Congo), and 32.0% (U.S. Kosovo). We can see here the higher desire 










TABLE 5- 7 Casualty Aversion: US-Japan Comparisons 
 
B: In situations in areas surrounding Japan 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
GSDF(n=399) 8.6% 9.5% 13.2% 9% 11.2% 10.7% 33.8% 3.3% 
MSDF(n=236) 9.7% 5.5% 5.9% 7.2% 7.2% 11% 47.5% 5% 
ASDF(n=277) 11.9% 6.1% 7.6% 11.6% 9.7% 13.3% 32.9% 5.4% 
Total SDF 9.9% 7.5% 10.0% 9.3% 9.8% 11.7% 37.3% 4.9% 
Japan: Civilian 6.8%% 8.7% 7.8% 10.7% 10.7% 9.7% 41.7% 3.9% 
U.S. Korea 4.6% 3.3%      92.1%  
U.S.: Taiwan 25.8% 9.3%      64.8%  
C: UN Peacekeeping Operations 
 Number of Casualties tolerated (% of respondents) 
zero 1-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 51-100 100+ other 
GSDF(n=399) 20.8% 25.8% 14.5% 13.8% 7.0% 4.5% 9.5% 3.8% 
MSDF(n=236) 22.0% 22.0% 14.0% 2.9% 7.2% 3.8% 14.4% 5.5% 
ASDF(n=277) 27.8% 23.8% 19.1% 8.7% 5.1% 1.1% 6.5% 6.5% 
Total SDF 23.2% 24.6% 15.8% 11.5% 6.5% 3.3% 10.2% 5.0% 
Japan: Civilian 18.4% 20.4% 24.3% 15.5% 7.8% 2.9% 6.8% 3.9% 
U.S. Congo 46.9% 36.6% 16.6%  









Conclusion: Expanding missions, but casualty averse officers? 
This chapter has shown that the recent reinterpretation of the constitution may expand 
the scope of use of force of the SDF, leading possibly to increased risk of casualties. I argued 
that re-interpretation of the constitution has continuously defined the scope of possible use of 
force of the SDF for the past sixty years, and that either new legislation or legislative revision 
must take place before the SDF engages in any new operation. 
The debate over constitutional re-interpretation also revived the issue of risk of 
casualties. While the case of Iraq operations in 2004 suggests that the risk of casualties have 
become a more political than symbolic issue, recent debate in some ways brought back the 
symbolic discussion. While the Abe administration denies this, the re-interpretation and 
subsequent legislations enlarge the scope of SDF operations; it is only natural to expect that 
there may be increased risk for the SDF. However, my survey showed that the SDF officers are 
quite casualty averse.  
How is civil-military relations likely to evolve when the missions of the SDF is likely 
to expand while the SDF officers remains casualty averse? Are we likely to witness a situation 
where the “reluctant officers are out of control
134
”?  A preliminary assessment of the opinion 
survey suggested that SDF officers were more casualty averse than the civilian elite, and that 
there is a great gap between Japan and the United States in the level of casualty tolerance. 
 In the next chapter, I will analyze the opinion survey I conducted in 2004, to address 
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whether or not there is a serious civil-military gap in Japan. I will examine if there are signs of 
preference divergence between the SDF officers and civilian elite, and what that means for the 







Is there a Civil-Military Gap in Japan? 
 
Introduction 
 Civil-military gap refers to the difference in opinion and attitudes among civilians and 
the military over values, norms, and security policy. The concept of “civil-military gap” 
received considerable public attention in the United States during the Clinton administration, 
when there were visible friction between the civilian and military leaders, and when the 
conservative leaning of the military was highlighted as a concern during a democratic 
administration. However, the possible difference in values between the military and rest of the 
society is an issue for concern in any country. This is especially true in democratic countries, 
where certain important values for a democratic country, such as individual rights and freedom 
of speech, seems to run counter to important values for the military, such as individual sacrifice 
and professional restraint.  
 Most importantly, civil-military gap is a concern for democratic control of the military. 
As I have argued in the earlier chapters, whether or not the control mechanisms civilians choose 
to place may or may not be effective, depending on how different civilian and military 
preferences may be.  
In this chapter, I will first introduce the debate over civil-military gap in the United 
States, and show how debate is not just applicable, but actually relevant and important when we 







will turn to the case of Japan, and introduce the idea behind the survey project I undertook in 
2004. Then, based on the survey result, I will address whether or not a “civil-military gap” 
exists in Japan, in realms of (1) mutual image and values, (2) defense policy issues such as the 




Civil-Military Gap Debate in the United States 
 Since the days of the Founding Fathers, the possible gap in values between the 
professional military and civil society was an issue of concern for the civilian leaders. In the 
field of civil-military relations research, which became popular after World War II, there were 
three periods in which the “gap” issue attracted attention. The first period is immediately after 
World War II to the beginning of the Cold War. After World War II, the United States, for the 
first time in its history, had to maintain a large standing force. Making sure that the large 
standing military will become a threat to democracy, while keeping the military strong enough 
to counter and contain Soviet threat was considered a difficult task. It was Samuel Huntington, 
who took up this difficult task and provided an answer, which became the frame of reference 
and inspiration for civil-military research within the United States and abroad for years to come 
(Huntington 1957). 
 Huntington argued that the solution to the dilemma, of “keeping the military strong 
enough to fend off enemies but not to make it a threat domestically” was to control the military 
through “objective control,” and at the same time to encourage military professionalism. 
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Huntington believed that certain level of ideological gap between the conservative officer corps 
and the liberal and individualistic society was inevitable, and that it was a bad idea for civilians 
to intervene and to try to make the officer “look more like the civilian society,” Instead, he 
argued that military professionalism was key to civilian control. Professionalization of the 
military, Huntington argued, leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which 
leads to secure civilian control. Morris Janowitz, on the other hand, argued that the presence of 
a gap is problematic, since the role of the military is likely to evolve in a way that is difficult for 
the civilians to control the military. He also suggested that change in the roles and missions of 
the military and technological innovation may contribute to closing of the gap. 
The Viet Nam War was the second time the “gap” issue attracted attention. The war left 
deep social cleavage between those who went to war and those who did not, as well as between 
the military and the academia, since universities tended to be the center stage for anti-war 
movements. And in the early 1990s, the Viet Nam War spurred the gap debate for the third time, 
when the baby boom generation that was divided over the war started to assume leadership 
positions. The Clinton administration’s relationship with the military was off to a difficult start, 
since President Clinton had opposed the Viet Nam war, and since he tried to push through a 
highly unpopular agenda, allowing for gay people to serve in the military. 
In 1994, Richard Kohn published an article with a provocative title, “Out of Control?” 
which started the “crisis in civil-military relations” debate in the academia
136
. The center of 
debate was the three potential “gaps” between the civilians and military in the United States. 
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The first “gap” is the gap in values and norms. The “gays in the military” issue highlighted the 
possible conservative tendencies among officers, and led to concerns about the 
“Republicanization” of the officer corps. The second potential “gap” was over policy, 
specifically about the use of the military in non-traditional missions and humanitarian 
intervention. The military was seen to be reluctant to these new missions, as exemplified by the 
then Chief of Staff, Colin Powell’s public statements about his concern about sending ground 
troops to Bosnia. The third potential “gap” was about the proper role of the military in the 
policy making process. The so-called “Powell Doctrine,” in which the military expects the 
civilians to meet certain conditions before sending troops abroad, was debated, due to concerns 
that such conditions can constrain the civilian leader’s policy choices.  
The concern over these three potential gaps: gap in values, policies, and roles of the 
military; was the impetus behind the “Soldiers and Civilians” project launched by the Triangle 
Institute for Security Studies in 1997
137
. In this project, a large scale opinion survey was 
conducted between 1998 and 1999 among military officers (those who were in attendance at 
professional military education institutions) and civilian elites to examine if the three “gaps” 
actually existed, and if there is, why. Their results can be summarized as follows. 
First, the military officers were in fact more conservative than civilian elites, but not 
more conservative than the general public at that time. Support for the Republican Party was 
clear, with 63.8% identifying themselves as Republican. Second, difference in policy 
preferences were observed in the responses to support for non-traditional missions, with the 
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civilian elites expressing stronger support for humanitarian missions. However, there was no 
significant gap in attitudes over traditional missions. This tendency is also seen in responses to 
questions about casualties: military elite expressed lower casualty tolerance for non-traditional 
issues. Finally, the military elites expressed support for the so-called “Powell Doctrine,” while 
civilian elite expected greater role of civilian leaders in decisions regarding use of force. 
 
Relevance of the Civil-Military Gap debate in Japan 
 Is there a civil-military gap in Japan? Most people probably answer yes, not so much 
because they have actually met or know someone in the Self Defense Force (SDF), or there is 
concrete evidence to show that there is a gap, but because they simply have no idea. Unless you 
live in a rural area with a large SDF base, you have probably never met anyone from the Self 
Defense Force. The image of the SDF can be rather complex and somewhat contradictory. The 
SDF is sometimes seen as kind-hearted rescuers in case of natural disasters, while at the same 
time depicted as dangerous descendants of the imperial military. 
The “gap” issue in Japan is particularly interesting because there are two contradictory 
forces at work: one to professionalize the SDF, the other to civilianize. On the one hand, 
lifetime employment system in the society at large affects the military profession as well: 80% 
of SDF officers who are commissioned through officer candidate schools remain in the SDF 
until their retirement age, between 53 and 60 depending on rank.
138
 Furthermore, SDF facilities 
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tend to be located in less populated areas, limiting the interaction with civilians especially in 
urban areas.
139
 Together, these suggest the presence of a Huntingtonian civil-military gap. 
 On the other hand, as part of an effort to improve public perception of the SDF, they 
have been actively involved in community service, such as disaster relief and lifesaving, 
building snow statutes for the annual snow festival in Hokkaido, and plowing snow for 
preparing ski courses during the Nagano Olympics. In the past, they had even helped out with 
planting rice in areas where the young labor force has left to find work in urban areas. It has 
also been noted that servicemen generally do not wear uniform outside of bases, in an effort to 
blend in with the rest of the community. The prevalence of these “civilian” activities, a 
Janowitzian prescription, may minimize the gap between civilians and the SDF. 
 Whether or not a gap exists will not be a problem, if the SDF were not significant 
actors in the defense policy making process. If they were successfully “contained,” as once 
argued, and if the SDF only existed for deterrent purposes and were unlikely to be ever used, it 
would not matter what they thought or believed. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
the “ex-ante” control mechanism that were in place for a long time allowed for a considerable 
level of autonomy for the SDF, and changes in the control mechanism and the shift to a more 
active role for the SDF makes it important for us to understand what the preferences of the 
members of the SDF are like, and whether or not there is a civil-military gap in Japan. 
 In 2004, with funding from the Suntory Foundation, I conducted the first ever 
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academic survey conducted among Self Defense Officers, the “Survey on the Japan Self 
Defense Forces and Society in the Post-Cold-War Era.” The survey was a mail-in survey, with 
questionnaires sent out to 1,394 SDF officers and 500 civilian elite. The SDF officers to whom 
the questionnaires were delivered were entry-level officers of the Ground, Maritime and Air 
Officer Candidate Schools, or more senior level officers taking courses at the three services’ 
Staff Colleges located in Tokyo. The officers at the Staff Colleges were chosen in order to 
address future leaders of the SDF, since assignments to these staff colleges indicate that they 
had been recognized to be further promoted. As for the civilian elite sample, the alumni 
directory of the Gakushi-kai, the alumni association of six national universities was used to 
conduct a random sampling of Tokyo University graduates in the age range corresponding to 
the SDF officer sample.  
  The questionnaire consisted of 85 questions. 24 questions were adapted from the 
tri-annual survey conducted by the Japan Cabinet Administrative Office (CAO) on the SDF and 
National Security. The CAO survey questionnaire was chosen because it is one of the few 
systematic surveys done to address the Japanese public’s perceptions of national security, 
consistently asking the same questions over time, to allow for a time-series analysis. Adapting 
questions from the CAO survey also allowed me to compare the attitudes of the general public 
with those of the civilian elite and SDF officers. The questions and results of January 2003 and 
February 2006 version of the CAO survey were used as points of comparison. 
 Another 43 questions were adapted from the survey conducted by the Triangle Institute 







questionnaires were systematic and thorough, especially with regards to questions about how 
the military (SDF) sees its role in the civilian society. With permission from Professor Peter 
Feaver, one of the principal investigators in the survey, I selected 43 out of 81 questions in the 
TISS survey. I then modified the questions and answer options to make them reflect the 
situation in Japan.  
 The surveys were mailed to the Officer Candidate Schools and Staff Colleges in bulk, 
but mailed back individually by mail to ensure that participation in the survey was voluntary, 
and that there will be no fear of censorship. As for the civilian elite sample, the questionnaires 
were mailed to and returned on an individual basis. Table 6-1 shows the composition of the 
SDF officer sample by service and rank, and the breakdown of the civilian sample by 
occupation. We can see that officer candidates are overrepresented in the Ground Self Defense 
Forces (GSDF) and Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) samples. I took this potential bias in 
account when I analyzed the results.  
 The response rate for the SDF officers was quite high, at 65.0%, while the civilian elite 
response rate was 20.6%. Since the questionnaire would have taken about 45 minutes to 
complete, I found the response rate reasonable. After the questionnaires were sent back, I used 
SPSS software to analyze the results. I tested for whether or not there was a significant 
difference across the civilian and SDF samples, as well as whether or not there was a significant 
difference across ranks and across services among the SDF sample. 
 There were three limitation of my survey, compared with the TISS survey. First, the 







comparison indirectly through the CAO survey results. There is also a possible bias arising 
from the fact that I chose Tokyo University graduates as proxy for “civilian elite”, in contrast to 
the TISS survey which used “Who’s who” and other directories of prominent Americans in 
categories of “American Politics,” “State Department,” “Media,” “Foreign Affairs,” and “Labor.” 
Arguably, there are prominent Japanese civilians who are not graduates of Tokyo University.  
However, I decided that using the Tokyo University directory was a better method than using 
the equivalent of “Who’s who” in Japan, since the people included in “Who’s Who” in Japan 
were mostly much older than the SDF officer sample.  
 
Are SDF Officers More Conservative than Civilian Elite? 
 What impressions do SDF officers and civilian elite have about each other? And what 
impressions do they think the general public has about the SDF? The response to the question, 
“what is the Japanese public’s impression of the SDF?” as shown in Table 6-2, the SDF officers 
tend to believe that the public has a more positive impression of the SDF than civilian elites 
believe. 74.9% of SDF officers believe that the public has either a “good impression (9.2%)” or 























Civilian elite 58 35 0 5 0 5 103 500 20.6% 
 
Table 6-2  What is the Japanese public’s impression of the SDF? 
 SDF officers Civilian Elite  
Have a good impression 9.2 5.8 ** 
Does not have a bad impression 65.7 53.4 ** 
Does not have a good impression  15.3 28.2 ** 
Have a bad impression 1.9 2.9 ** 
Don’t know 7.9 9.7 ** 
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42 6 32 41 0 1 276 398 668 59.6% 
Maritime 
SDF 
7 38 50 82 21 4 30 232 310 74.8% 
Air SDF 27 46 61 10 1 0 131 276 416 66.3% 





 Next, how exactly do the civilian elites and the SDF officers view one another? Table 
6-3 shows the contrasting responses to the question, “what expressions do you think explains 
the cultures within and outside the SDF?” Both SDF officers and civilian elite view the society 
at large to be “self-centered”, “materialistic” and “immoral”, and the SDF to be “disciplined” 
and “inflexible.” The difference is that the SDF officers tend to see the two cultures to be more 
different than the society at large. The notable example is the about “honesty,” the SDF officers 
believe they are much more honest than civilians, but the civilian elite do not consider 
themselves so different from SDF officers. 
 Finally, are SDF officers more conservative than civilian elites? When asked about 
their own political orientation on a scale of one to five (liberal to conservative), there were no 
statistically significant difference between the officers and civilian elites. In fact, more civilian 
elites identified themselves as relatively conservative (36.2% of officers, 52% of civilian elite.) 
This may be because the civilian elites who responded to the survey may be conservative 
leaning, given that they responded to a relatively cumbersome survey asking questions about 
the SDF. However, it is fair to argue that runs counter to conventional understanding, that 










Table 6-3 Mutual Image of Civilians and SDF Officers 
 
 
Q36 What expressions do you think explains the cultures within and outside the SDF? Circle all answers that match your 









 Civilian Culture SDF Culture 
SDF officers Civilian elite  SDF officers Civilian elite  
Honest 5.4 12.6 ＊＊ 32.8 13.6 ＊＊ 
Intolerant  10.3 24.3 ＊＊ 9.1 4.9  
Materialistic 38.7 51.5 ＊ 3.6 1.9  
Immoral 42.9 34.0  4.2 1.0  
Kind 7.4 9.7  17.2 1.9 ＊＊ 
Self-centered 58.9 59.2  3.9 2.9  
Diligent 23.7 43.7 ＊＊ 29.7 41.7 ＊ 
Inflexible 6.9 16.5 ＊＊ 49.5 35.9 ＊＊ 
Disciplined  4.4 15.5 ＊＊ 72.7 81.6  
Creative 22.4 5.8 ＊＊ 2.1 0  
Obedient 2.4 5.8 ＊ 42.6 60.2 ＊＊ 









Table 6-4  Relationship between the SDF and Society 
  SDF Civilian  
Q35 The decline of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society 71.2 69.3 ** 
Through leading by example, the military could help American society become more moral 58.2 26.8 ** 
The world is changing and we should adjust our view of what is moral and immoral behavior to fit these 
changes 
38.7 38.6  
Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and customs 41.5 17.8 ** 
All Japanese people should be willing to give up their lives to defend our country 44.4 30.7 ** 
The SDF should interact with the general public and introduce the values and customs of the society at large 63.9 74.3 * 
Q37 Most members of the SDF have a great deal of respect for civilian society 53.5 44.6 ** 
Most members of civilian society have a great deal of respect for the SDF 29.8 26.7  
All male citizens should be required to do some national service 48.2 35.6 ** 
All female citizens should be required to do some national service 22.5 23.8  
I am proud of the men and women who serve in the SDF 78.4 68.0 ** 
I am confident in the ability of the SDF to perform well in an emergency 69.8 63.3 * 
The SDF are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits 35.3 21.8 ** 
Even if civilian society did not always appreciate the essential military values of commitment and 
unselfishness, the SDF could still maintain required traditional standards 
84.0 90.0  
The Japanese people understand the sacrifices made by SDF members 19.1 27.0  
Q34 We should relax environmental regulations to stimulate economic growth 14.4 9.8  
We should encourage mothers to stay at home with their children rather than working outside the home 60.1 48.0 ** 
We should raise taxes to improve social security 64.4 60.8  
We should redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor through taxation and subsidies 46.4 49.0 ** 
We should redistribute income from urban to rural areas through taxation and subsidies 42.7 37.3 ** 
We should increase public infrastructure spending to stimulate economic recovery 48.6 38.2 ** 
Government intervention to the economy should be kept at a minimum. 56.4 83.4 ** 
Q35 This questions asks you to indicate your position on a variety of social issues. Please choose your position. Q37 Here are 
some statements people have made about the SDF. For each, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. Q34 This question asks you to indicate your position on certain domestic issues. 




When we break down the meaning of “conservative”, the results are more complex. As 
we can see in Table 6-4, in response to questions about social issues, officers showed a more 
conservative leaning. Officers responded more positively than civilian elites to statements such 
as “society is collapsing due to the breakdown of traditional values,” and “mothers should stay 
at home for raising children.”  On the other hand, attitudes towards economic issues were 
more complex. While there was slightly less support among officers for income redistribution 
(from rich to poor), they support government role in the economy, such as public works and 
regional redistribution. Overall, we can observe an interesting tendency among SDF officers to 
support the type of conservatism the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) pursued, suggesting a 
strong LDP support among the officer corps.  
 As for the relationship between the SDF and the society at large, the SDF officers 
seemed more confident about how they are viewed by the rest of society. For example, there is 
stronger support for statements such as “the SDF can be a role model for the society at large” 
and “Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and 
customs,” and were “proud of the men and women who serve in the SDF.” On the other hand, 
fewer SDF officers and civilian elite believe that “most members of civilian society have a great 
deal of respect for the SDF,” or “the Japanese people understand the sacrifices made by SDF 
members,” and they are in agreement that the SDF is not necessarily respected or understood by 
the rest of society. 
 Overall, we can conclude that the both the SDF officers and civilian elite consider the 






leaning. Is this a problem, as it was considered a problem in the U.S. when the officers showed 
Republican leanings? It is somewhat unsurprising to find that the SDF officers seem to have a 
leaning towards the conservative LDP, since the opposition parties were skeptical about the 
existence of the SDF itself. Thus, it was considered almost a given that the SDF officers will 
show strong conservative tendencies, and support the LDP. However, the political landscape has 
changed, and very few parties deny the legitimacy of the SDF, or find it in their political interest 
to do so. There are signs of change among the SDF officers as well. Among the younger caliber 
of SDF officers, there are strong support for statements such as “the world is changing and we 
should adjust our view of what is moral and immoral behavior to fit these changes,” and “the 
SDF should interact with the general public and introduce the values and customs of the society 
at large.” Therefore, in the long term, some may start to consider the civil-military gap to be a 
problem, and efforts may be made to minimize the gap. As I explained in detail in the chapter 
on personnel, the changes in the composition of the officer corps, from pre-war to Defense 
Academy graduates to university graduates, may accelerate this trend. 
 
Do Civilians and SDF Preference Divergence on Defense Policy? 
 As we have seen in the previous section, the survey results show that SDF officers are 
generally more conservative than civilian elites. Does this difference translate to differences in 
attitudes toward defense policy issues? In this section, I examine the differences in responses to 
the survey questions regarding Japan’s security policy. In doing so, I will also look for 






responses of the general public may differ from that of the SDF officers and civilian elite. 
 
Figure 6-1  How to Keep Japan Safe 
 
  
First, when asked “what is the best way to keep Japan safe,” keeping the US-Japan 
alliance receives the most support among all three groups. However, when we change the 
question slightly, and ask whether the U.S.-Japan alliance contributes to the peace and security 
of Japan, we see a difference between the three. Compared with the civilian elite and SDF 
officers, only about half of the general public responded that the US-Japan alliance contributed 
to the peace and security of Japan. The difference between the three groups disappears if you 
add the responses “yes” and “yes, relatively speaking,” but it seems safe to conclude that the 
civilian elite and SDF officers show a stronger support and confidence in the US-Japan alliance 






Figure 6-2 Does the US-Japan Alliance contribute to the security of Japan? 
 
 How about support for the different missions of the SDF? The survey results show that 
there is a general agreement that the SDF has played a role in disaster relief, PKO, and 
protecting Japan (Figure 6-3). While the top three answers are not surprising, it may be 
interesting that a higher percentage of SDF officers chose disaster relief over security of Japan, 
and the top three answers were in the same order. There was significant difference in the role of 
the SDF in domestic security, dealing with suspicious vessels, and anti-terrorism activities. 
 As for the future roles of the SDF (Figure 6-4), civilian elites’ support for SDF roles in 
protecting Japan and dealing with suspicious vessels is increasing, and the gap is diminishing. 
However, significant gap remained in attitudes towards SDF roles in providing domestic 
security, civilian cooperation, dealing with international terrorism, and contributing to 






Figure 6-3 The Role of the SDF: Current 
 
 








When we look specifically at the responses to questions regarding UN peacekeeping 
operations (Figure 6-5), we once again see a difference between the general public and civilian 
and SDF elites.  As we disaggregate the answers “agree” and “agree somewhat,” we can 
observe that the general public may be less enthusiastic about sending the SDF to UN 
peacekeeping missions. While it is important to note that more than 70% do support the mission, 
it is important to note the difference in the intensity of support.  
 
Figure 6-5  Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
 
 What is the reason for the strong support in sending the SDF abroad for UN 
peacekeeping missions? Is there any chance that the civilian elite and SDF officers agree with 
the mission but for different reasons? In order to explore possible differences, I asked to list 






6-6). The result was that there was only one statistically significant difference, that civilians 
cared more about “which other countries are participating” than the SDF officers. Somewhat 
surprising result was that “humanitarian necessity” ranked higher than “national interest” for 
both civilians and SDF elite, while “US request” was ranked much lower. Another interesting 
result, which is difficult to see from Figure 6-6, was observed in the composition of support to 
the category “ensuring safety of SDF troops.” When I disaggregated the response to “very 
important” and “important,” I found that more SDF officers considered safety of troops to be an 
important factor in deciding to send troops abroad.   
 
Figure 6-6  Factors for Sending SDF Abroad 
 






in the responses to the question asking specifically about casualty tolerance, which I introduced 
in the previous chapter. As I mentioned previously, one of the interesting findings from the 
civil-military gap studies in the United States is that officers are more casualty tolerant than 
civilians for realist (traditional security) missions, but less so for non-traditional missions. This 
difference in casualty tolerance for different missions was highlighted as one of the reasons 
why the military seemed reluctant about operations that do not seem like a necessity from the 
point of view of national security. Another important factor might be what roles the SDF 
officers expect to play in the defense policy making process, or in other words, whether or not 
they feel that their voices are heard. 
 
SDF roles in the policy making process: divergent expectations? 
 Is there a gap in the expected roles of the SDF officers in the defense policy making 
process? Are the SDF officers frustrated by the limited role they play in the policy making 
process? Table 6-5 summarizes the responses to the survey questions about the role of the SDF 
in society, and the desirable relationship between politicians and the SDF. As for societal roles, 
there were no noteworthy gap between the civilians and politicians, except for the response to 
the statement “members of the SDF should not publicly criticize Japanese society,” to which 
73.1% of SDF officers agreed, in contrast to 56.9% of civilian elite. We can see from the results 
in Table 6-6 that SDF officers are cautious about making political statements in public, because 










Table 6-5  Role of the SDF in society, relationship between SDF and political leaders 
  SDF Civilian  
Q45 Members of the SDF should not publicly criticize senior members of the civilian branch of government  76.5 77.5  
Members of the SDF should not publicly criticize Japanese society 73.1 56.9 ** 
Members of the SDF should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other 
citizen 
41.7 39.6  
It is proper for the SDF to explain and defend in the public the policies of the government 46.5 49.5  
It is proper for the SDF to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interests of 
Japan 
54.8 53.9 * 
Q46 In general, high-ranking civilian officials rather than high-ranking SDF officers should have the final 
say on whether or not to use military force. 
81.3 98.0 ** 
In general, high-ranking civilian officials rather than high-ranking SDF officers should have the final 
say on what type of force to use. 
36.1 66.7 ** 
When civilians tell the SDF what to do, domestic partisan politics rather than national security 
requirements are often the primary motivation. 
57.9 41.6 ** 
In wartime, civilian government leaders should let the SDF take over running the war. 47.3 23.5 ** 
Civilian control of the SDF is absolutely safe and secure in Japan 47.8 53.9  
SDF leaders do not have enough influence in deciding our policy with other countries 73.9 75.5 ** 
 
Q45 This question asks for your opinion on a number of statements concerning the SDF’s role in civilian society. Q46 This 
question asks for your opinion on a number of statements concerning relations between the military and senior civilian leaders. 
(numbers indicate total % of those who responded “strongly agree” or “agree somewhat.”) (＊significant at the 0.05 level, ＊＊











Table 6-6  Roles SDF leaders should play when SDF troops are to be deployed 
 
 SDF Officers Civilian Elite  
Be 
neutral 




advise advocate insist No 
opinion 
 
Deciding whether to send 
troops 
28.2 49.5 10.3 8.9 3.1 55.9 34.3 3.9 5.9 0.0 ** 
Setting rules of engagement 7.0 38.6 16.7 35.1 2.6 7.8 48.0 21.6 21.6 1.0  
Setting roles about use of 
weapons 
6.5 35.0 15.5 40.3 2.7 7.8 42.2 21.6 27.5 1.0  
Ensuring that clear political and 
military goals exist 
16.1 36.1 18.4 24.1 5.3 27.5 48.0 6.9 15.7 2.0 ** 
Deciding what the goals or 
policy should be 
12.1 43.1 19.3 22.7 2.9 15.8 58.4 14.9 10.9 0.0 ** 
Generating public support for 
the intervention 
43.1 25.7 12.5 14.4 4.3 73.3 15.8 2.0 7.9 1.0  
Developing an exit strategy 12.4 41.2 18.6 24.7 3.2 26.5 50.0 7.8 15.7 0.0 ** 
 
Q44 This question asks you to specify the proper role of the SDF leadership in decisions to send SDF troops abroad. The 
following are typical elements of the decision the Prime Minister must make. Please specify the proper role of the SDF for each 






In contrast, there was a significant gap between the civilian elite and SDF officers in 
the responses to questions regarding the proper relationship between politicians and SDF 
officers. Across the board, SDF officers show strong support to statements such as “when 
civilians tell the SDF what to do, domestic partisan politics rather than national security 
requirements are often the primary motivation (SDF: 57.9%, civilian elite 41.6%),” “in wartime, 
civilian government leaders should let the SDF take over running the war (SDF: 47.3%, civilian 
elite: 23.5%).” Furthermore, when asked about the proper role of politicians and the SDF in 
making decisions regarding use of force, nearly 20% disagreed with the statement “in general, 
high-ranking civilian officials rather than high-ranking SDF officers should have the final say 
on whether or not to use military force. (SDF: 81.3%, civilian elite 98.0%)”, and a majority 
disagreed with “in general, high-ranking civilian officials rather than high-ranking SDF officers 
should have the final say on what type of force to use (SDF: 36.1%, civilian elite:66.7%).” This 
is a worrisome result, seen together with the fact that only about half of both SDF and civilian 
elite respondents believed that “civilian control of the SDF is absolutely safe and secure in 
Japan.” There also seems to be an agreement that “SDF leaders do not have enough influence in 
deciding our policy with other countries (SDF: 73.9%, civilian elite 75.5%)”  
What exact role do SDF officers hope to play in the policy making process regarding 
use of force decisions? Table 6-7 shows the SDF officer and civilian elite responses to the 
question, “This question asks you to specify the proper role of the SDF leadership in decisions 
to send SDF troops abroad. The following are typical elements of the decision the Prime 




to choose between “be neutral, advise, advocate, and insist,” we can see that SDF officers 
expected a greater role for SDF officers in all phases of use of force decision making, from 
“deciding whether to send troops, ”setting rules of engagement,” “setting roles about use of 
weapons,” “ensuring that clear political and military goals exist,” “deciding what the goals or 
policy should be,” “generating public support for the intervention,” to “developing an exit 
strategy.” Since the “advise” or “stay neutral,” not “insist” is the most chosen option, it may not 
be accurate to overstate the SDF officers’ desire to play a greater role in the policy making 
process. However, together with results shown in Table 6-6, it seems safe to conclude that SDF 
officers hope to play a greater role in defense policy making process. While the civilian elite 
seem to generally support the SDF officers, the civilian elite and SDF officers’ preferences 
diverge when asked about the exact role the SDF should fulfill in the policy making process 
 
Conclusion 
 Is there a civil-military gap in Japan? Are SDF officers more conservative, or have a 
different set of values and norms compared with the civilian elite? Do the civilian elite and SDF 
officer preferences diverge on defense policy, and on the proper role of the SDF in the defense 
policy making process? In this chapter, I analyzed the results of the opinion survey I conducted 
in 2004 to examine whether, and in what ways, there may be a gap between the civilian elite 
and SDF officers. My findings are as follows. 
First, I found that SDF officers were more generally more conservative than the 




suggest that SDF officers support the type of conservatism that the Liberal Democratic Party 
had pursued. There was also an important generational difference, that the younger generation 
officers found the potential gap between the SDF and the rest of society to be problematic, 
while the more senior officers considered the gap to be inevitable and sometimes even 
desirable. 
Second, the preferences of SDF officers and civilian elite converged on strong support 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance and for actively engaging in peacekeeping operations abroad. There 
was, however, a considerable difference when compared with the general public. As for 
non-traditional missions, there were no notable differences in support for these missions, unlike 
in the United States. Finally, as for the role of the SDF in policy making process, SDF officers 
do seem eager to play a larger role in the defense policy making process, including the use of 
force. This may not necessary mean that the SDF officers will push for active use of force, 
when seen together with the responses to question about casualties. The strong casualty-averse 
tendencies among SDF officers suggest that they may not necessarily be the proponents for use 


















“If you don’t stand up now, the constitution will never change. And you will forever be 
part of the U.S. Military… You are all a samurai….If you are a samurai, how can you 
defend a constitution that denies you?”  Yukio Mishima, November 25, 1970.  
 
 This dissertation offers one answer to the question posed by the Japanese novelist 
Yukio Mishima, in his final speech to SDF members before he committed suicide in Ichigaya, 
at the Eastern Army Headquarters (currently the location of the Ministry of Defense). Was the 
apparent “calm” in civil-military relations in post war Japan, which Mishima was frustrated 
about, due to successful “containment” of the SDF officers despite differences in preferred 
policy, or because the preferred policies of the civilian elite and SDF members happened to 
converge? My answer is that “containment” worked, paradoxically because it offered the SDF a 
level of autonomy within the limits, and that they came to prefer over a system of active 
political engagement with fewer constraints but less autonomy. And the constraints, in some 
ways, may be actually in their interest: having constraints kept their jobs secure and predictable, 
and their missions free of risk.  
The goal of this dissertation was to carefully examine how exactly the system of 
containment had worked, and by objectively addressing what the preferences of the SDF 
officers were then, and are now. I hypothesized that the type of control (ex-ante or ex-post) and 




in civil-military relations: containment, auto pilot, conflictual, and cooperative (possibly 
excessive).  
 The past fifteen years have been a time of major change, especially in terms of how 
politicians dealt with the bureaucracy. In Chapter 2, I looked at why that was the case, and how 
that has impacted the nature of civil-military relations. I will identify three characteristics of 
Japan’s civil-military relations: (1) the extensive delegation of decision making from the 
politicians to the bureaucracy, (2) the emphasis on ex-ante control mechanism for controlling th 
SDF, and (3) dependence on the bureaucracy for ex-post monitoring, and argue that change is 
occurring at all three levels, at the Diet level, cabinet level, and at the JDA level, primarily due 
to the institutional changes (electoral reform, administrative reform) that took place since the 
beginning of 1990s.  
 . From Chapter 3 to Chapter 5, I examined three areas civil-military interaction, of 
personnel, budget, and use of force. The personnel chapter (chapter 3) looked at the changes in 
the compostion of JDA civilian bureaucrats and SDF officers. I highlighted initial phase of the 
establishment of the JDA: the history of rearmament and the significant impact of the United 
States on SDF personnel. I then addressed the possible impact of the dominance of National 
Defense Academy (NDA) graduates in leadership positions. In the following chapter (chapter 4), 
I examined the three-tiered system of the defense budget process, and looked at how the three 
services learned to take advantage of the GNP 1% spending limit and the ambiguity of the Base 
Force Concept to continue purchasing what seemed necessary according to their own threat 




 The chapter on use of force (chapter 5) takes a different approach. I look at how 
constitutional re-interpretation and subsequent legislations expanded the scope of SDF’s use of 
force. Then, I looked at the case of Iraq operation and the debate over casualties to examine the 
source of possible conflict in future use of force. I concluded that due to the surprisingly 
casualty averse nature of SDF officers may create tensions in civil-military relations, as the 
scope of possible use of force is expected to expand with the recent re-interpretation of the 
constitution. 
 Finally, in chapter 6, I introduced the results of the 2004 Civil-Military Gap survey, to 
look at possible gaps in terms of (1)mutual images and values, (2) defense policy, and (3) the 
role of the SDF in defense policy making process. The results confirmed my impression that 
SDF officers are generally confident and content, and that while SDF officers seem somewhat 
more conservative, but the gap is not so alarming. I also found evidence of SDF officers’ strong 
support of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which was consistent with my findings in the previous 
chapters. 
 
 My findings can be summarized as follows. 
(1) Civilian control of the SDF in post war Japan was relatively successful not because the 
ex-ante constraints were strong and suppressed the opposing views of the SDF, but because the 
policy preferences of SDF officers and civilian bureaucracy converged in support of the alliance 
relationship with the United States. While their may have been specific policies that they did 




continue “auto pilot control.” 
(2) Looking towards the future, the shift from ex-ante to ex-post control or from containment to 
engagement may result in tension between the civilians and SDF officers, in cases where 
preferences diverge. One possible area of preference divergence is the likelihood of casualties, 
and the recent re-interpretation of the constitution can lead to conflict in this area. 
(3) The United States and the alliance relationship is crucial in understanding why and how the 
civilian and SDF prefererences generally converged.The early agreement between the civilian 
bureaucracy and SDF officers (and LDP politicians) about the importance of the alliance 
relationship with the United States had a major impact on the nature of civil-military relations.  
 
 As for future research, this dissertation opens the way for more research in the 
following areas. 
(1) Comparing 2004 and 2014 civil-military gap surveys: what has changed, and what has not. 
 I conducted a second round of the Civil-Military Gap survey in 2014. Overall, there 
has not been much change, but two results stand out: (1) both SDF officers and civilian elite are 
more casualty averse than they were in 2004, and (2) SDF officers are more careful about their 
involvement in the policy making process, and prefer to stay “neutral”, rather than to advocate a 
certain policy. Since I had expected that there will be less casualty aversion (due to the recent 
overseas experiences and the expected change in re-interpretation of the constitution) and that 
SDF would be seeking their voice to be heard in the policy making process, the results that 




(2)  The impact of domestic political institutions (electoral rules) on civil-military relations 
 The case of Japan presents a case where major change in political institutions (electoral 
reform, administrative reform) occurred within on country, and had an impact on civil-military 
relations. This may lead to a line of research disaggregating institutional features of democratic 
governnance (presidential vs parliamentary, proportional representation vs winner-take-all 
electoral systems, federal vs centralized systems, etc.) This will follow the earlier works in 
civil-military relations which takes an institutional approach, such as Peter Feaver, Deborah 
Avant, Risa Brooks, and David Pion-Berlin.   
 
(3)  The impact of military-to-military relations on domestic civil-military relations. 
 In the case of Japan, for most of this history, both the civilians and the SDF strongly 
supported the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. However, if the desired policy differed between 
the civilians and the SDF, it could hamper civil-military relations in serious ways, as we saw in 
2009 in the beginning of the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) administration. It is also possible 
to disaggregate U.S. influence on the relationship between the civilians and the SDF in Japan. 
Stronger ties between the U.S. Forces and the SDF have promoted jointness and linkage among 
the three services and in some cases gave the SDF leverage over civilians.  
 Future research can look specificially about the U.S. impact over time, as well as 
across countries. One possibility I am exploring is the difference between Korea and Japan, 
focusing on the evolution of military to military ties and its impact on civil-military relations in 
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